PENSEES
by Blaise Pascal
SECTION
I THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE
1. The difference between the mathematical
and the intuitive mind.—In the one, the principles are palpable, but removed from
ordinary use; so that for want of habit it is difficult to turn one's mind in that
direction: but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the principles fully, and
one must have a quite inaccurate mind who reasons wrongly from principles so plain that it
is almost impossible they should escape notice.
But in the intuitive mind the principles are
found in common use and are before the eyes of everybody. One has only to look, and no
effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the
principles are so subtle and so numerous that it is almost impossible but that some escape
notice. Now the omission of one principle leads to error; thus one must have very clear
sight to see all the principles and, in the next place, an accurate mind not to draw false
deductions from known principles.
All mathematicians would then be intuitive
if they had clear sight, for they do not reason incorrectly from principles known to them;
and intuitive minds would be mathematical if they could turn their eyes to the principles
of mathematics to which they are unused.
The reason, therefore, that some intuitive
minds are not mathematical is that they cannot at all turn their attention to the
principles of mathematics. But the reason that mathematicians are not intuitive is that
they do not see what is before them, and that, accustomed to the exact and plain
principles of mathematics, and not reasoning till they have well inspected and arranged
their principles, they are lost in matters of intuition where the principles do not allow
of such arrangement. They are scarcely seen; they are felt rather than seen; there is the
greatest difficulty in making them felt by those who do not of themselves perceive them.
These principles are so fine and so numerous that a very delicate and very clear sense is
needed to perceive them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are perceived, without
for the most part being able to demonstrate them in order as in mathematics, because the
principles are not known to us in the same way, and because it would be an endless matter
to undertake it. We must see the matter at once, at one glance, and not by a process of
reasoning, at least to a certain degree. And thus it is rare that mathematicians are
intuitive and that men of intuition are mathematicians, because mathematicians wish to
treat matters of intuition mathematically and make themselves ridiculous, wishing to begin
with definitions and then with axioms, which is not the way to proceed in this kind of
reasoning. Not that the mind does not do so, but it does it tacitly, naturally, and
without technical rules; for the expression of it is beyond all men, and only a few can
feel it.
Intuitive minds, on the contrary, being thus
accustomed to judge at a single glance, are so astonished when they are presented with
propositions of which they understand nothing, and the way to which is through definitions
and axioms so sterile, and which they are not accustomed to see thus in detail, that they
are repelled and disheartened.
But dull minds are never either intuitive or
mathematical.
Mathematicians who are only mathematicians
have exact minds, provided all things are explained to them by means of definitions and
axioms; otherwise they are inaccurate and insufferable, for they are only right when the
principles are quite clear.
And men of intuition who are only intuitive
cannot have the patience to reach to first principles of things speculative and
conceptual, which they have never seen in the world and which are altogether out of the
common.
2. There are different kinds of right
understanding; some have right understanding in a certain order of things, and not in
others, where they go astray. Some draw conclusions well from a few premises, and this
displays an acute judgment.
Others draw conclusions well where there are
many premises.
For example, the former easily learn
hydrostatics, where the premises are few, but the conclusions are so fine that only the
greatest acuteness can reach them.
And in spite of that these persons would
perhaps not be great mathematicians, because mathematics contain a great number of
premises, and there is perhaps a kind of intellect that can search with ease a few
premises to the bottom and cannot in the least penetrate those matters in which there are
many premises.
There are then two kinds of intellect: the
one able to penetrate acutely and deeply into the conclusions of given premises, and this
is the precise intellect; the other able to comprehend a great number of premises without
confusing them, and this is the mathematical intellect. The one has force and exactness,
the other comprehension. Now the one quality can exist without the other; the intellect
can be strong and narrow, and can also be comprehensive and weak.
3. Those who are accustomed to judge by
feeling do not understand the process of reasoning, for they would understand at first
sight and are not used to seek for principles. And others, on the contrary, who are
accustomed to reason from principles, do not at all understand matters of feeling, seeking
principles and being unable to see at a glance.
4. Mathematics, intuition.—True
eloquence makes light of eloquence, true morality makes light of morality; that is to say,
the morality of the judgement, which has no rules, makes light of the morality of the
intellect.
For it is to judgement that perception
belongs, as science belongs to intellect. Intuition is the part of judgement, mathematics
of intellect.
To make light of philosophy is to be a true
philosopher.
5. Those who judge of a work by rule are in
regard to others as those who have a watch are in regard to others. One says, "It is
two hours ago"; the other says, "It is only three-quarters of an hour." I
look at my watch, and say to the one, "You are weary," and to the other,
"Time gallops with you"; for it is only an hour and a half ago, and I laugh at
those who tell me that time goes slowly with me and that I judge by imagination. They do
not know that I judge by my watch.
6. Just as we harm the understanding, we
harm the feelings also.
The understanding and the feelings are
moulded by intercourse; the understanding and feelings are corrupted by intercourse. Thus
good or bad society improves or corrupts them. It is, then, all-important to know how to
choose in order to improve and not to corrupt them; and we cannot make this choice, if
they be not already improved and not corrupted. Thus a circle is formed, and those are
fortunate who escape it.
7. The greater intellect one has, the more
originality one finds in men. Ordinary persons find no difference between men.
8. There are many people who listen to a
sermon in the same way as they listen to vespers.
9. When we wish to correct with advantage
and to show another that he errs, we must notice from what side he views the matter, for
on that side it is usually true, and admit that truth to him, but reveal to him the side
on which it is false. He is satisfied with that, for he sees that he was not mistaken and
that he only failed to see all sides. Now, no one is offended at not seeing everything;
but one does not like to be mistaken, and that perhaps arises from the fact that man
naturally cannot see everything, and that naturally he cannot err in the side he looks at,
since the perceptions of our senses are always true.
10. People are generally better persuaded by
the reasons which they have themselves discovered than by those which have come into the
mind of others.
11. All great amusements are dangerous to
the Christian life; but among all those which the world has invented there is none more to
be feared than the theatre. It is a representation of the passions so natural and so
delicate that it excites them and gives birth to them in our hearts, and, above all, to
that of love, principally when it is represented as very chaste and virtuous. For the more
innocent it appears to innocent souls, the more they are likely to be touched by it. Its
violence pleases our self-love, which immediately forms a desire to produce the same
effects which are seen so well represented; and, at the same time, we make ourselves a
conscience founded on the propriety of the feelings which we see there, by which the fear
of pure souls is removed, since they imagine that it cannot hurt their purity to love with
a love which seems to them so reasonable.
So we depart from the theatre with our heart
so filled with all the beauty and tenderness of love, the soul and the mind so persuaded
of its innocence, that we are quite ready to receive its first impressions, or rather to
seek an opportunity of awakening them in the heart of another, in order that we may
receive the same pleasures and the same sacrifices which we have seen so well represented
in the theatre.
12. Scaramouch, who only thinks of one
thing.
The doctor, who speaks for a quarter of an
hour after he has said everything, so full is he of the desire of talking.
13. One likes to see the error, the passion
of Cleobuline, because she is unconscious of it. She would be displeasing, if she were not
deceived.
14. When a natural discourse paints a
passion or an effect, one feels within oneself the truth of what one reads, which was
there before, although one did not know it. Hence one is inclined to love him who makes us
feel it, for he has not shown us his own riches, but ours. And thus this benefit renders
him pleasing to us, besides that such community of intellect as we have with him
necessarily inclines the heart to love.
15. Eloquence, which persuades by sweetness,
not by authority; as a tyrant, not as a king.
16. Eloquence is an art of saying things in
such a way (1) that those to whom we speak may listen to them without pain and with
pleasure; (2) that they feel themselves interested, so that self-love leads them more
willingly to reflection upon it.
It consists, then, in a correspondence which
we seek to establish between the head and the heart of those to whom we speak, on the one
hand, and, on the other, between the thoughts and the expressions which we employ. This
assumes that we have studied well the heart of man so as to know all its powers and, then,
to find the just proportions of the discourse which we wish to adapt to them. We must put
ourselves in the place of those who are to hear us, and make trial on our own heart of the
turn which we give to our discourse in order to see whether one is made for the other, and
whether we can assure ourselves that the hearer will be, as it were, forced to surrender.
We ought to restrict ourselves, so far as possible, to the simple and natural, and not to
magnify that which is little, or belittle that which is great. It is not enough that a
thing be beautiful; it must be suitable to the subject, and there must be in it nothing of
excess or defect.
17. Rivers are roads which move, and which
carry us whither we desire to go.
18. When we do not know the truth of a
thing, it is of advantage that there should exist a common error which determines the mind
of man, as, for example, the moon, to which is attributed the change of seasons, the
progress of diseases, etc. For the chief malady of man is restless curiosity about things
which he cannot understand; and it is not so bad for him to be in error as to be curious
to no purpose.
The manner in which Epictetus, Montaigne,
and Salomon de Tultie wrote is the most usual, the most suggestive, the most remembered,
and the oftenest quoted, because it is entirely composed of thoughts born from the common
talk of life. As when we speak of the common error which exists among men that the moon is
the cause of everything, we never fail to say that Salomon de Tultie says that, when we do
not know the truth of a thing, it is of advantage that there should exist a common error,
etc.; which is the thought above.
19. The last thing one settles in writing a
book is what one should put in first.
20. Order.—Why should I undertake to
divide my virtues into four rather than into six? Why should I rather establish virtue in
four, in two, in one? Why into Abstine et sustine rather than into "Follow
Nature," or, "Conduct your private affairs without injustice," as Plato, or
anything else? But there, you will say, everything is contained in one word. Yes, but it
is useless without explanation, and when we come to explain it, as soon as we unfold this
maxim which contains all the rest, they emerge in that first confusion which you desired
to avoid. So, when they are all included in one, they are hidden and useless, as in a
chest, and never appear save in their natural confusion. Nature has established them all
without including one in the other.
21. Nature has made all her truths
independent of one another. Our art makes one dependent on the other. But this is not
natural. Each keeps its own place.
22. Let no one say that I have said nothing
new; the arrangement of the subject is new. When we play tennis, we both play with the
same ball, but one of us places it better.
I had as soon it said that I used words
employed before. And in the same way if the same thoughts in a different arrangement do
not form a different discourse, no more do the same words in their different arrangement
form different thoughts!
23. Words differently arranged have a
different meaning, and meanings differently arranged have different effects.
24. Language.—We should not turn the
mind from one thing to another, except for relaxation, and that when it is necessary and
the time suitable, and not otherwise. For he that relaxes out of season wearies, and he
who wearies us out of season makes us languid, since we turn quite away. So much does our
perverse lust like to do the contrary of what those wish to obtain from us without giving
us pleasure, the coin for which we will do whatever is wanted.
25. Eloquence.—It requires the pleasant
and the real; but the pleasant must itself be drawn from the true.
26. Eloquence is a painting of thought; and
thus those who, after having painted it, add something more, make a picture instead of a
portrait.
27. Miscellaneous. Language.—Those who
make antitheses by forcing words are like those who make false windows for symmetry. Their
rule is not to speak accurately, but to make apt figures of speech.
28. Symmetry is what we see at a glance;
based on the fact that there is no reason for any difference, and based also on the face
of man; whence it happens that symmetry is only wanted in breadth, not in height or depth.
29. When we see a natural style, we are
astonished and delighted; for we expected to see an author, and we find a man. Whereas
those who have good taste, and who, seeing a book, expect to find a man, are quite
surprised to find an author. Plus poetice quam humane locutus es. Those honour Nature well
who teach that she can speak on everything, even on theology.
30. We only consult the ear because the
heart is wanting. The rule is uprightness.
Beauty of omission, of judgement.
31. All the false beauties which we blame in
Cicero have their admirers, and in great number.
32. There is a certain standard of grace and
beauty which consists in a certain relation between our nature, such as it is, weak or
strong, and the thing which pleases us.
Whatever is formed according to this
standard pleases us, be it house, song, discourse, verse, prose, woman, birds, rivers,
trees, rooms, dress, etc. Whatever is not made according to this standard displeases those
who have good taste.
And as there is a perfect relation between a
song and a house which are made after a good model, because they are like this good model,
though each after its kind; even so there is a perfect relation between things made after
a bad model. Not that the bad model is unique, for there are many; but each bad sonnet,
for example, on whatever false model it is formed, is just like a woman dressed after that
model.
Nothing makes us understand better the
ridiculousness of a false sonnet than to consider nature and the standard and, then, to
imagine a woman or a house made according to that standard.
33. Poetical beauty.—As we speak of
poetical beauty, so ought we to speak of mathematical beauty and medical beauty. But we do
not do so; and the reason is that we know well what is the object of mathematics, and that
it consists in proofs, and what is the object of medicine, and that it consists in
healing. But we do not know in what grace consists, which is the object of poetry. We do
not know the natural model which we ought to imitate; and through lack of this knowledge,
we have coined fantastic terms, "The golden age," "The wonder of our
times," "Fatal," etc., and call this jargon poetical beauty.
But whoever imagines a woman after this
model, which consists in saying little things in big words, will see a pretty girl adorned
with mirrors and chains, at whom he will smile; because we know better wherein consists
the charm of woman than the charm of verse. But those who are ignorant would admire her in
this dress, and there are many villages in which she would be taken for the queen; hence
we call sonnets made after this model "Village Queens."
34. No one passes in the world as skilled in
verse unless he has put up the sign of a poet, a mathematician, etc. But educated people
do not want a sign and draw little distinction between the trade of a poet and that of an
embroiderer.
People of education are not called poets or
mathematicians, etc.; but they are all these and judges of all these. No one guesses what
they are. When they come into society, they talk on matters about which the rest are
talking. We do not observe in them one quality rather than another, save when they have to
make use of it. But then we remember it, for it is characteristic of such persons that we
do not say of them that they are fine speakers, when it is not a question of oratory, and
that we say of them that they are fine speakers, when it is such a question.
It is therefore false praise to give a man
when we say of him, on his entry, that he is a very clever poet; and it is a bad sign when
a man is not asked to give his judgement on some verses.
35. We should not be able to say of a man,
"He is a mathematician," or "a preacher," or "eloquent"; but
that he is "a gentleman." That universal quality alone pleases me. It is a bad
sign when, on seeing a person, you remember his book. I would prefer you to see no quality
till you meet it and have occasion to use it (Ne quid minis), for fear some one quality
prevail and designate the man. Let none think him a fine speaker, unless oratory be in
question, and then let them think it.
36. Man is full of wants: he loves only
those who can satisfy them all. "This one is a good mathematician," one will
say. But I have nothing to do with mathematics; he would take me for a proposition.
"That one is a good soldier." He would take me for a besieged town. I need,
then, an upright man who can accommodate himself generally to all my wants.
37. Since we cannot be universal and know
all that is to be known of everything, we ought to know a little about everything. For it
is far better to know something about everything than to know all about one thing. This
universality is the best. If we can have both, still better; but if we must choose, we
ought to choose the former. And the world feels this and does so; for the world is often a
good judge.
38. A poet and not an honest man.
39. If lightning fell on low places, etc.,
poets, and those who can only reason about things of that kind, would lack proofs.
40. If we wished to prove the examples which
we take to prove other things, we should have to take those other things to be examples;
for, as we always believe the difficulty is in what we wish to prove, we find the examples
clearer and a help to demonstration.
Thus, when we wish to demonstrate a general
theorem, we must give the rule as applied to a particular case; but if we wish to
demonstrate a particular case, we must begin with the general rule. For we always find the
thing obscure which we wish to prove and that clear which we use for the proof; for, when
a thing is put forward to be proved, we first fill ourselves with the imagination that it
is, therefore, obscure and, on the contrary, that what is to prove it is clear, and so we
understand it easily.
41. Epigrams of Martial.—Man loves
malice, but not against one-eyed men nor the unfortunate, but against the fortunate and
proud. People are mistaken in thinking otherwise.
For lust is the source of all our actions,
and humanity, etc. We must please those who have humane and tender feelings. That epigram
about two one-eyed people is worthless, for it does not console them and only gives a
point to the author's glory. All that is only for the sake of the author is worthless.
Ambitiosa recident ornamenta.
42. To call a king "Prince" is
pleasing, because it diminishes his rank.
43. Certain authors, speaking of their
works, say: "My book," "My commentary," "My history," etc.
They resemble middle-class people who have a house of their own and always have "My
house" on their tongue. They would do better to say: "Our book," "Our
commentary," "Our history," etc., because there is in them usually more of
other people's than their own.
44. Do you wish people to believe good of
you? Don't speak.
45. Languages are ciphers, wherein letters
are not changed into letters, but words into words, so that an unknown language is
decipherable.
46. A maker of witticisms, a bad character.
47. There are some who speak well and write
badly. For the place and the audience warm them, and draw from their minds more than they
think of without that warmth.
48. When we find words repeated in a
discourse and, in trying to correct them, discover that they are so appropriate that we
would spoil the discourse, we must leave them alone. This is the test; and our attempt is
the work of envy, which is blind, and does not see that repetition is not in this place a
fault; for there is no general rule.
49. To mask nature and disguise her. No more
king, pope, bishop—but august monarch, etc.; not Paris—the capital of the
kingdom. There are places in which we ought to call Paris, "Paris," others in
which we ought to call it the capital of the kingdom.
50. The same meaning changes with the words
which express it. Meanings receive their dignity from words instead of giving it to them.
Examples should be sought....
51. Sceptic, for obstinate.
52. No one calls another a Cartesian but he
who is one himself, a pedant but a pedant, a provincial but a provincial; and I would
wager it was the printer who put it on the title of Letters to a Provincial.
53. A carriage upset or overturned,
according to the meaning. To spread abroad or upset, according to the meaning. (The
argument by force of M. le Maitre over the friar.)
54. Miscellaneous.—A form of speech,
"I should have liked to apply myself to that."
55. The aperitive virtue of a key, the
attractive virtue of a hook.
56. To guess: "The part that I take in
your trouble." The Cardinal did not want to be guessed.
"My mind is disquieted." I am
disquieted is better.
57. I always feel uncomfortable under such
compliments as these: "I have given you a great deal of trouble," "I am
afraid I am boring you," "I fear this is too long." We either carry our
audience with us, or irritate them.
58. You are ungraceful: "Excuse me,
pray." Without that excuse I would not have known there was anything amiss.
"With reverence be it spoken..." The only thing bad is their excuse.
59. "To extinguish the torch of
sedition"; too luxuriant. "The restlessness of his genius"; two superfluous
grand words.
SECTION II: THE MISERY OF MAN WITHOUT GOD
60. First part: Misery of man without
God.
Second part: Happiness of man with God.
Or, First part: That nature is corrupt.
Proved by nature itself.
Second part: That there is a Redeemer.
Proved by Scripture.
61. Order.—I might well have taken this
discourse in an order like this: to show the vanity of all conditions of men, to show the
vanity of ordinary lives, and then the vanity of philosophic lives, sceptics, stoics; but
the order would not have been kept. I know a little what it is, and how few people
understand it. No human science can keep it. Saint Thomas did not keep it. Mathematics
keep it, but they are useless on account of their depth.
62. Preface to the first part.—To speak
of those who have treated of the knowledge of self; of the divisions of Charron, which
sadden and weary us; of the confusion of Montaigne; that he was quite aware of his want of
method and shunned it by jumping from subject to subject; that he sought to be
fashionable.
His foolish project of describing himself!
And this not casually and against his maxims, since every one makes mistakes, but by his
maxims themselves, and by first and chief design. For to say silly things by chance and
weakness is a common misfortune, but to say them intentionally is intolerable, and to say
such as that...
63. Montaigne.—Montaigne's faults are
great. Lewd words; this is bad, notwithstanding Mademoiselle de Gournay. Credulous; people
without eyes. Ignorant; squaring the circle, a greater world. His opinions on suicide, on
death. He suggests an indifference about salvation, without fear and without repentance.
As his book was not written with a religious purpose, he was not bound to mention
religion; but it is always our duty not to turn men from it. One can excuse his rather
free and licentious opinions on some relations of life; but one cannot excuse his
thoroughly pagan views on death, for a man must renounce piety altogether, if he does not
at least wish to die like a Christian. Now, through the whole of his book his only
conception of death is a cowardly and effeminate one.
64. It is not in Montaigne, but in myself,
that I find all that I see in him.
65. What good there is in Montaigne can only
have been acquired with difficulty. The evil that is in him, I mean apart from his
morality, could have been corrected in a moment, if he had been informed that he made too
much of trifles and spoke too much of himself.
66. One must know oneself. If this does not
serve to discover truth, it at least serves as a rule of life, and there is nothing
better.
67. The vanity of the
sciences.—Physical science will not console me for the ignorance of morality in the
time of affliction. But the science of ethics will always console me for the ignorance of
the physical sciences.
68. Men are never taught to be gentlemen and
are taught everything else; and they never plume themselves so much on the rest of their
knowledge as on knowing how to be gentlemen. They only plume themselves on knowing the one
thing they do not know.
69. The infinites, the mean.—When we
read too fast or too slowly, we understand nothing.
70. Nature... —Nature has set us so
well in the centre, that if we change one side of the balance, we change the other also.
This makes me believe that the springs in our brain are so adjusted that he who touches
one touches also its contrary.
71. Too much and too little wine. Give him
none, he cannot find truth; give him too much, the same.
72. Man's disproportion.—This is where
our innate knowledge leads us. If it be not true, there is no truth in man; and if it be
true, he finds therein great cause for humiliation, being compelled to abase himself in
one way or another. And since he cannot exist without this knowledge, I wish that, before
entering on deeper researches into nature, he would consider her both seriously and at
leisure, that he would reflect upon himself also, and knowing what proportion there is...
Let man then contemplate the whole of nature in her full and grand majesty, and turn his
vision from the low objects which surround him. Let him gaze on that brilliant light, set
like an eternal lamp to illumine the universe; let the earth appear to him a point in
comparison with the vast circle described by the sun; and let him wonder at the fact that
this vast circle is itself but a very fine point in comparison with that described by the
stars in their revolution round the firmament. But if our view be arrested there, let our
imagination pass beyond; it will sooner exhaust the power of conception than nature that
of supplying material for conception. The whole visible world is only an imperceptible
atom in the ample bosom of nature. No idea approaches it. We may enlarge our conceptions
beyond an imaginable space; we only produce atoms in comparison with the reality of
things. It is an infinite sphere, the centre of which is everywhere, the circumference
nowhere. In short, it is the greatest sensible mark of the almighty power of God that
imagination loses itself in that thought.
Returning to himself, let man consider what
he is in comparison with all existence; let him regard himself as lost in this remote
corner of nature; and from the little cell in which he finds himself lodged, I mean the
universe, let him estimate at their true value the earth, kingdoms, cities, and himself.
What is a man in the Infinite?
But to show him another prodigy equally
astonishing, let him examine the most delicate things he knows. Let a mite be given him,
with its minute body and parts incomparably more minute, limbs with their joints, veins in
the limbs, blood in the veins, humours in the blood, drops in the humours, vapours in the
drops. Dividing these last things again, let him exhaust his powers of conception, and let
the last object at which he can arrive be now that of our discourse. Perhaps he will think
that here is the smallest point in nature. I will let him see therein a new abyss. I will
paint for him not only the visible universe, but all that he can conceive of nature's
immensity in the womb of this abridged atom. Let him see therein an infinity of universes,
each of which has its firmament, its planets, its earth, in the same proportion as in the
visible world; in each earth animals, and in the last mites, in which he will find again
all that the first had, finding still in these others the same thing without end and
without cessation. Let him lose himself in wonders as amazing in their littleness as the
others in their vastness. For who will not be astounded at the fact that our body, which a
little while ago was imperceptible in the universe, itself imperceptible in the bosom of
the whole, is now a colossus, a world, or rather a whole, in respect of the nothingness
which we cannot reach? He who regards himself in this light will be afraid of himself, and
observing himself sustained in the body given him by nature between those two abysses of
the Infinite and Nothing, will tremble at the sight of these marvels; and I think that, as
his curiosity changes into admiration, he will be more disposed to contemplate them in
silence than to examine them with presumption.
For, in fact, what is man in nature? A
Nothing in comparison with the Infinite, an All in comparison with the Nothing, a mean
between nothing and everything. Since he is infinitely removed from comprehending the
extremes, the end of things and their beginning are hopelessly hidden from him in an
impenetrable secret; he is equally incapable of seeing the Nothing from which he was made,
and the Infinite in which he is swallowed up.
What will he do then, but perceive the
appearance of the middle of things, in an eternal despair of knowing either their
beginning or their end. All things proceed from the Nothing, and are borne towards the
Infinite. Who will follow these marvellous processes? The Author of these wonders
understands them. None other can do so.
Through failure to contemplate these
Infinites, men have rashly rushed into the examination of nature, as though they bore some
proportion to her. It is strange that they have wished to understand the beginnings of
things, and thence to arrive at the knowledge of the whole, with a presumption as infinite
as their object. For surely this design cannot be formed without presumption or without a
capacity infinite like nature.
If we are well informed, we understand that,
as nature has graven her image and that of her Author on all things, they almost all
partake of her double infinity. Thus we see that all the sciences are infinite in the
extent of their researches. For who doubts that geometry, for instance, has an infinite
infinity of problems to solve? They are also infinite in the multitude and fineness of
their premises; for it is clear that those which are put forward as ultimate are not
self-supporting, but are based on others which, again having others for their support, do
not permit of finality. But we represent some as ultimate for reason, in the same way as
in regard to material objects we call that an indivisible point beyond which our senses
can no longer perceive anything, although by its nature it is infinitely divisible.
Of these two Infinites of science, that of
greatness is the most palpable, and hence a few persons have pretended to know all things.
"I will speak of the whole," said Democritus.
But the infinitely little is the least
obvious. Philosophers have much oftener claimed to have reached it, and it is here they
have all stumbled. This has given rise to such common titles as First Principles,
Principles of Philosophy, and the like, as ostentatious in fact, though not in appearance,
as that one which blinds us, De omni scibili.
We naturally believe ourselves far more
capable of reaching the centre of things than of embracing their circumference. The
visible extent of the world visibly exceeds us; but as we exceed little things, we think
ourselves more capable of knowing them. And yet we need no less capacity for attaining the
Nothing than the All. Infinite capacity is required for both, and it seems to me that
whoever shall have understood the ultimate principles of being might also attain to the
knowledge of the Infinite. The one depends on the other, and one leads to the other. These
extremes meet and reunite by force of distance and find each other in God, and in God
alone.
Let us, then, take our compass; we are
something, and we are not everything. The nature of our existence hides from us the
knowledge of first beginnings which are born of the Nothing; and the littleness of our
being conceals from us the sight of the Infinite.
Our intellect holds the same position in the
world of thought as our body occupies in the expanse of nature.
Limited as we are in every way, this state
which holds the mean between two extremes is present in all our impotence. Our senses
perceive no extreme. Too much sound deafens us; too much light dazzles us; too great
distance or proximity hinders our view. Too great length and too great brevity of
discourse tend to obscurity; too much truth is paralysing (I know some who cannot
understand that to take four from nothing leaves nothing). First principles are too
self-evident for us; too much pleasure disagrees with us. Too many concords are annoying
in music; too many benefits irritate us; we wish to have the wherewithal to overpay our
debts. Beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi posse; ubi multum antevenere,
pro gratia odium redditur. We feel neither extreme heat nor extreme cold. Excessive
qualities are prejudicial to us and not perceptible by the senses; we do not feel but
suffer them. Extreme youth and extreme age hinder the mind, as also too much and too
little education. In short, extremes are for us as though they were not, and we are not
within their notice. They escape us, or we them.
This is our true state; this is what makes
us incapable of certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance. We sail within a vast sphere,
ever drifting in uncertainty, driven from end to end. When we think to attach ourselves to
any point and to fasten to it, it wavers and leaves us; and if we follow it, it eludes our
grasp, slips past us, and vanishes for ever. Nothing stays for us. This is our natural
condition and yet most contrary to our inclination; we burn with desire to find solid
ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the Infinite.
But our whole groundwork cracks, and the earth opens to abysses.
Let us, therefore, not look for certainty
and stability. Our reason is always deceived by fickle shadows; nothing can fix the finite
between the two Infinites, which both enclose and fly from it.
If this be well understood, I think that we
shall remain at rest, each in the state wherein nature has placed him. As this sphere
which has fallen to us as our lot is always distant from either extreme, what matters it
that man should have a little more knowledge of the universe? If he has it, he but gets a
little higher. Is he not always infinitely removed from the end, and is not the duration
of our life equally removed from eternity, even if it lasts ten years longer?
In comparison with these Infinites, all
finites are equal, and I see no reason for fixing our imagination on one more than on
another. The only comparison which we make of ourselves to the finite is painful to us.
If man made himself the first object of
study, he would see how incapable he is of going further. How can a part know the whole?
But he may perhaps aspire to know at least the parts to which he bears some proportion.
But the parts of the world are all so related and linked to one another that I believe it
impossible to know one without the other and without the whole.
Man, for instance, is related to all he
knows. He needs a place wherein to abide, time through which to live, motion in order to
live, elements to compose him, warmth and food to nourish him, air to breathe. He sees
light; he feels bodies; in short, he is in a dependent alliance with everything. To know
man, then, it is necessary to know how it happens that he needs air to live, and, to know
the air, we must know how it is thus related to the life of man, etc. Flame cannot exist
without air; therefore, to understand the one, we must understand the other.
Since everything, then, is cause and effect,
dependent and supporting, mediate and immediate, and all is held together by a natural
though imperceptible chain which binds together things most distant and most different, I
hold it equally impossible to know the parts without knowing the whole and to know the
whole without knowing the parts in detail.
The eternity of things in itself or in God
must also astonish our brief duration. The fixed and constant immobility of nature, in
comparison with the continual change which goes on within us, must have the same effect.
And what completes our incapability of
knowing things is the fact that they are simple and that we are composed of two opposite
natures, different in kind, soul and body. For it is impossible that our rational part
should be other than spiritual; and if any one maintain that we are simply corporeal, this
would far more exclude us from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so
inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. It is impossible to imagine how it
should know itself.
So, if we are simply material, we can know
nothing at all; and if we are composed of mind and matter, we cannot know perfectly things
which are simple, whether spiritual or corporeal. Hence it comes that almost all
philosophers have confused ideas of things, and speak of material things in spiritual
terms, and of spiritual things in material terms. For they say boldly that bodies have a
tendency to fall, that they seek after their centre, that they fly from destruction, that
they fear the void, that they have inclinations, sympathies, antipathies, all of which
attributes pertain only to mind. And in speaking of minds, they consider them as in a
place, and attribute to them movement from one place to another; and these are qualities
which belong only to bodies.
Instead of receiving the ideas of these
things in their purity, we colour them with our own qualities, and stamp with our
composite being all the simple things which we contemplate.
Who would not think, seeing us compose all
things of mind and body, but that this mixture would be quite intelligible to us? Yet it
is the very thing we least understand. Man is to himself the most wonderful object in
nature; for he cannot conceive what the body is, still less what the mind is, and least of
all how a body should be united to a mind. This is the consummation of his difficulties,
and yet it is his very being. Modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus comprehendi ab
hominibus non potest, et hoc tamen homo est. Finally, to complete the proof of our
weakness, I shall conclude with these two considerations...
73. But perhaps this subject goes beyond the
capacity of reason. Let us therefore examine her solutions to problems within her powers.
If there be anything to which her own interest must have made her apply herself most
seriously, it is the inquiry into her own sovereign good. Let us see, then, wherein these
strong and clear-sighted souls have placed it and whether they agree.
One says that the sovereign good consists in
virtue, another in pleasure, another in the knowledge of nature, another in truth, Felix
qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, another in total ignorance, another in indolence,
others in disregarding appearances, another in wondering at nothing, nihil admirari prope
res una quae possit facere et servare beatum, and the true sceptics in their indifference,
doubt, and perpetual suspense, and others, wiser, think to find a better definition. We
are well satisfied.
We must see if this fine philosophy has
gained nothing certain from so long and so intent study; perhaps at least the soul will
know itself. Let us hear the rulers of the world on this subject. What have they thought
of her substance? 394. Have they been more fortunate in locating her? 395. What have they
found out about her origin, duration, and departure? Harum sententiarum, 399.
Is, then, the soul too noble a subject for
their feeble lights? Let us, then, abase her to matter and see if she knows whereof is
made the very body which she animates and those others which she contemplates and moves at
her will. What have those great dogmatists, who are ignorant of nothing, known of this
matter? 393.
This would doubtless suffice, if Reason were
reasonable. She is reasonable enough to admit that she has been unable to find anything
durable, but she does not yet despair of reaching it; she is as ardent as ever in this
search, and is confident she has within her the necessary powers for this conquest. We
must therefore conclude, and, after having examined her powers in their effects, observe
them in themselves, and see if she has a nature and a grasp capable of laying hold of the
truth.
74. A letter On the Foolishness of Human
Knowledge and Philosophy.
This letter before Diversion.
Felix qui potuit... Nihil admirari.
280 kinds of sovereign good in Montaigne.
75. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.
Probability.—It will not be difficult
to put the case a stage lower, and make it appear ridiculous. To begin at the very
beginning. What is more absurd than to say that lifeless bodies have passions, fears,
hatreds—that insensible bodies, lifeless and incapable of life, have passions which
presuppose at least a sensitive soul to feel them, nay more, that the object of their
dread is the void? What is there in the void that could make them afraid? Nothing is more
shallow and ridiculous. This is not all; it is said that they have in themselves a source
of movement to shun the void. Have they arms, legs, muscles, nerves?
76. To write against those who made too
profound a study of science: Descartes.
77. I cannot forgive Descartes. In all his
philosophy he would have been quite willing to dispense with God. But he had to make Him
give a fillip to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of God.
78. Descartes useless and uncertain.
79. Descartes.—We must say summarily:
"This is made by figure and motion," for it is true. But to say what these are,
and to compose the machine, is ridiculous. For it is useless, uncertain, and painful. And
were it true, we do not think all Philosophy is worth one hour of pain.
80. How comes it that a cripple does not
offend us, but that a fool does? Because a cripple recognises that we walk straight,
whereas a fool declares that it is we who are silly; if it were not so, we should feel
pity and not anger.
Epictetus asks still more strongly:
"Why are we not angry if we are told that we have a headache, and why are we angry if
we are told that we reason badly, or choose wrongly"? The reason is that we are quite
certain that we have not a headache, or are not lame, but we are not so sure that we make
a true choice. So, having assurance only because we see with our whole sight, it puts us
into suspense and surprise when another with his whole sight sees the opposite, and still
more so when a thousand others deride our choice. For we must prefer our own lights to
those of so many others, and that is bold and difficult. There is never this contradiction
in the feelings towards a cripple.
81. It is natural for the mind to believe
and for the will to love; so that, for want of true objects, they must attach themselves
to false.
82. Imagination.—It is that deceitful
part in man, that mistress of error and falsity, the more deceptive that she is not always
so; for she would be an infallible rule of truth, if she were an infallible rule of
falsehood. But being most generally false, she gives no sign of her nature, impressing the
same character on the true and the false.
I do not speak of fools, I speak of the
wisest men; and it is among them that the imagination has the great gift of persuasion.
Reason protests in vain; it cannot set a true value on things.
This arrogant power, the enemy of reason,
who likes to rule and dominate it, has established in man a second nature to show how
all-powerful she is. She makes men happy and sad, healthy and sick, rich and poor; she
compels reason to believe, doubt, and deny; she blunts the senses, or quickens them; she
has her fools and sages; and nothing vexes us more than to see that she fills her devotees
with a satisfaction far more full and entire than does reason. Those who have a lively
imagination are a great deal more pleased with themselves than the wise can reasonably be.
They look down upon men with haughtiness; they argue with boldness and confidence, others
with fear and diffidence; and this gaiety of countenance often gives them the advantage in
the opinion of the hearers, such favour have the imaginary wise in the eyes of judges of
like nature. Imagination cannot make fools wise; but she can make them happy, to the envy
of reason which can only make its friends miserable; the one covers them with glory, the
other with shame.
What but this faculty of imagination
dispenses reputation, awards respect and veneration to persons, works, laws, and the
great? How insufficient are all the riches of the earth without her consent!
Would you not say that this magistrate,
whose venerable age commands the respect of a whole people, is governed by pure and lofty
reason, and that he judges causes according to their true nature without considering those
mere trifles which only affect the imagination of the weak? See him go to sermon, full of
devout zeal, strengthening his reason with the ardour of his love. He is ready to listen
with exemplary respect. Let the preacher appear, and let nature have given him a hoarse
voice or a comical cast of countenance, or let his barber have given him a bad shave, or
let by chance his dress be more dirtied than usual, then, however great the truths he
announces, I wager our senator loses his gravity.
If the greatest philosopher in the world
find himself upon a plank wider than actually necessary, but hanging over a precipice, his
imagination will prevail, though his reason convince him of his safety. Many cannot bear
the thought without a cold sweat. I will not state all its effects.
Every one knows that the sight of cats or
rats, the crushing of a coal, etc., may unhinge the reason. The tone of voice affects the
wisest, and changes the force of a discourse or a poem.
Love or hate alters the aspect of justice.
How much greater confidence has an advocate, retained with a large fee, in the justice of
his cause! How much better does his bold manner make his case appear to the judges,
deceived as they are by appearances! How ludicrous is reason, blown with a breath in every
direction!
I should have to enumerate almost every
action of men who scarce waver save under her assaults. For reason has been obliged to
yield, and the wisest reason takes as her own principles those which the imagination of
man has everywhere rashly introduced. He who would follow reason only would be deemed
foolish by the generality of men. We must judge by the opinion of the majority of mankind.
Because it has pleased them, we must work all day for pleasures seen to be imaginary; and,
after sleep has refreshed our tired reason, we must forthwith start up and rush after
phantoms, and suffer the impressions of this mistress of the world. This is one of the
sources of error, but it is not the only one.
Our magistrates have known well this
mystery. Their red robes, the ermine in which they wrap themselves like furry cats, the
courts in which they administer justice, the fleurs-de-lis, and all such august apparel
were necessary; if the physicians had not their cassocks and their mules, if the doctors
had not their square caps and their robes four times too wide, they would never have duped
the world, which cannot resist so original an appearance. If magistrates had true justice,
and if physicians had the true art of healing, they would have no occasion for square
caps; the majesty of these sciences would of itself be venerable enough. But having only
imaginary knowledge, they must employ those silly tools that strike the imagination with
which they have to deal; and thereby, in fact, they inspire respect. Soldiers alone are
not disguised in this manner, because indeed their part is the most essential; they
establish themselves by force, the others by show.
Therefore our kings seek out no disguises.
They do not mask themselves in extraordinary costumes to appear such; but they are
accompanied by guards and halberdiers. Those armed and red-faced puppets who have hands
and power for them alone, those trumpets and drums which go before them, and those legions
round about them, make the stoutest tremble. They have not dress only, they have might. A
very refined reason is required to regard as an ordinary man the Grand Turk, in his superb
seraglio, surrounded by forty thousand janissaries.
We cannot even see an advocate in his robe
and with his cap on his head, without a favourable opinion of his ability. The imagination
disposes of everything; it makes beauty, justice, and happiness, which is everything in
the world. I should much like to see an Italian work, of which I only know the title,
which alone is worth many books, Della opinione regina del mondo. I approve of the book
without knowing it, save the evil in it, if any. These are pretty much the effects of that
deceptive faculty, which seems to have been expressly given us to lead us into necessary
error. We have, however, many other sources of error.
Not only are old impressions capable of
misleading us; the charms of novelty have the same power. Hence arise all the disputes of
men, who taunt each other either with following the false impressions of childhood or with
running rashly after the new. Who keeps the due mean? Let him appear and prove it. There
is no principle, however natural to us from infancy, which may not be made to pass for a
false impression either of education or of sense.
"Because," say some, "you
have believed from childhood that a box was empty when you saw nothing in it, you have
believed in the possibility of a vacuum. This is an illusion of your senses, strengthened
by custom, which science must correct." "Because," say others, "you
have been taught at school that there is no vacuum, you have perverted your common sense
which clearly comprehended it, and you must correct this by returning to your first
state." Which has deceived you, your senses or your education?
We have another source of error in diseases.
They spoil the judgement and the senses; and if the more serious produce a sensible
change, I do not doubt that slighter ills produce a proportionate impression.
Our own interest is again a marvellous
instrument for nicely putting out our eyes. The justest man in the world is not allowed to
be judge in his own cause; I know some who, in order not to fall into this self-love, have
been perfectly unjust out of opposition. The sure way of losing a just cause has been to
get it recommended to these men by their near relatives.
Justice and truth are two such subtle points
that our tools are too blunt to touch them accurately. If they reach the point, they
either crush it, or lean all round, more on the false than on the true.
Man is so happily formed that he has no...
good of the true, and several excellent of the false. Let us now see how much... But the
most powerful cause of error is the war existing between the senses and reason.
83. We must thus begin the chapter on the
deceptive powers. Man is only a subject full of error, natural and ineffaceable, without
grace. Nothing shows him the truth. Everything deceives him. These two sources of truth,
reason and the senses, besides being both wanting in sincerity, deceive each other in
turn. The senses mislead the Reason with false appearances, and receive from Reason in
their turn the same trickery which they apply to her; Reason has her revenge. The passions
of the soul trouble the senses, and make false impressions upon them. They rival each
other in falsehood and deception.
But besides those errors which arise
accidentally and through lack of intelligence, with these heterogeneous faculties...
84. The imagination enlarges little objects
so as to fill our souls with a fantastic estimate; and, with rash insolence, it belittles
the great to its own measure, as when talking of God.
85. Things which have most hold on us, as
the concealment of our few possessions, are often a mere nothing. It is a nothing which
our imagination magnifies into a mountain. Another turn of the imagination would make us
discover this without difficulty.
86. My fancy makes me hate a croaker, and
one who pants when eating. Fancy has great weight. Shall we profit by it? Shall we yield
to this weight because it is natural? No, but by resisting it...
87. Nae iste magno conatu magnas nugas
dixerit.
583. Quasi quidquam infelicius sit homini
cui sua figmenta dominantur.
88. Children who are frightened at the face
they have blackened are but children. But how shall one who is so weak in his childhood
become really strong when he grows older? We only change our fancies. All that is made
perfect by progress perishes also by progress. All that has been weak can never become
absolutely strong. We say in vain, "He has grown, he has changed"; he is also
the same.
89. Custom is our nature. He who is
accustomed to the faith believes in it, can no longer fear hell, and believes in nothing
else. He who is accustomed to believe that the king is terrible... etc. Who doubts, then,
that our soul, being accustomed to see number, space, motion, believes that and nothing
else?
90. Quod crebro videt non miratur, etiamsi
cur fiat nescit; quod ante non viderit, id si evenerit, ostentum esse censet.
91. Spongia solis.—When we see the same
effect always recur, we infer a natural necessity in it, as that there will be a tomorrow,
etc. But Nature often deceives us, and does not subject herself to her own rules.
92. What are our natural principles but
principles of custom? In children they are those which they have received from the habits
of their fathers, as hunting in animals. A different custom will cause different natural
principles. This is seen in experience; and if there are some natural principles
ineradicable by custom, there are also some customs opposed to nature, ineradicable by
nature or by a second custom. This depends on disposition.
93. Parents fear lest the natural love of
their children may fade away. What kind of nature is that which is subject to decay?
Custom is a second nature which destroys the former. But what is nature? For is custom not
natural? I am much afraid that nature is itself only a first custom, as custom is a second
nature.
94. The nature of man is wholly natural,
omne animal.
There is nothing he may not make natural;
there is nothing natural he may not lose.
95. Memory, joy, are intuitions; and even
mathematical propositions become intuitions, for education produces natural intuitions,
and natural intuitions are erased by education.
96. When we are accustomed to use bad
reasons for proving natural effects, we are not willing to receive good reasons when they
are discovered. An example may be given from the circulation of the blood as a reason why
the vein swells below the ligature.
97. The most important affair in life is the
choice of a calling; chance decides it. Custom makes men masons, soldiers, slaters.
"He is a good slater," says one, and, speaking of soldiers, remarks, "They
are perfect fools." But others affirm, "There is nothing great but war; the rest
of men are good for nothing." We choose our callings according as we hear this or
that praised or despised in our childhood, for we naturally love truth and hate folly.
These words move us; the only error is in their application. So great is the force of
custom that, out of those whom nature has only made men, are created all conditions of
men. For some districts are full of masons, others of soldiers, etc. Certainly nature is
not so uniform. It is custom then which does this, for it constrains nature. But sometimes
nature gains the ascendancy and preserves man's instinct, in spite of all custom, good or
bad.
98. Bias leading to error.—It is a
deplorable thing to see all men deliberating on means alone, and not on the end. Each
thinks how he will acquit himself in his condition; but as for the choice of condition, or
of country, chance gives them to us.
It is a pitiable thing to see so many Turks,
heretics, and infidels follow the way of their fathers for the sole reason that each has
been imbued with the prejudice that it is the best. And that fixes for each man his
condition of locksmith, soldier, etc.
Hence savages care nothing for Providence.
99. There is an universal and essential
difference between the actions of the will and all other actions.
The will is one of the chief factors in
belief, not that it creates belief, but because things are true or false according to the
aspect in which we look at them. The will, which prefers one aspect to another, turns away
the mind from considering the qualities of all that it does not like to see; and thus the
mind, moving in accord with the will, stops to consider the aspect which it likes and so
judges by what it sees.
100. Self-love. The nature of self-love and
of this human Ego is to love self only and consider self only. But what will man do? He
cannot prevent this object that he loves from being full of faults and wants. He wants to
be great, and he sees himself small. He wants to be happy, and he sees himself miserable.
He wants to be perfect, and he sees himself full of imperfections. He wants to be the
object of love and esteem among men, and he sees that his faults merit only their hatred
and contempt. This embarrassment in which he finds himself produces in him the most
unrighteous and criminal passion that can be imagined; for he conceives a mortal enmity
against that truth which reproves him and which convinces him of his faults. He would
annihilate it, but, unable to destroy it in its essence, he destroys it as far as possible
in his own knowledge and in that of others; that is to say, he devotes all his attention
to hiding his faults both from others and from himself, and he cannot endure either that
others should point them out to him, or that they should see them.
Truly it is an evil to be full of faults;
but it is a still greater evil to be full of them and to be unwilling to recognise them,
since that is to add the further fault of a voluntary illusion. We do not like others to
deceive us; we do not think it fair that they should be held in higher esteem by us than
they deserve; it is not, then, fair that we should deceive them and should wish them to
esteem us more highly than we deserve.
Thus, when they discover only the
imperfections and vices which we really have, it is plain they do us no wrong, since it is
not they who cause them; they rather do us good, since they help us to free ourselves from
an evil, namely, the ignorance of these imperfections. We ought not to be angry at their
knowing our faults and despising us; it is but right that they should know us for what we
are and should despise us, if we are contemptible.
Such are the feelings that would arise in a
heart full of equity and justice. What must we say then of our own heart, when we see it
in a wholly different disposition? For is it not true that we hate truth and those who
tell it us, and that we like them to be deceived in our favour, and prefer to be esteemed
by them as being other than what we are in fact? One proof of this makes me shudder. The
Catholic religion does not bind us to confess our sins indiscriminately to everybody; it
allows them to remain hidden from all other men save one, to whom she bids us reveal the
innermost recesses of our heart and show ourselves as we are. There is only this one man
in the world whom she orders us to undeceive, and she binds him to an inviolable secrecy,
which makes this knowledge to him as if it were not. Can we imagine anything more
charitable and pleasant? And yet the corruption of man is such that he finds even this law
harsh; and it is one of the main reasons which has caused a great part of Europe to rebel
against the Church.
How unjust and unreasonable is the heart of
man, which feels it disagreeable to be obliged to do in regard to one man what in some
measure it were right to do to all men! For is it right that we should deceive men?
There are different degrees in this aversion
to truth; but all may perhaps be said to have it in some degree, because it is inseparable
from self-love. It is this false delicacy which makes those who are under the necessity of
reproving others choose so many windings and middle courses to avoid offence. They must
lessen our faults, appear to excuse them, intersperse praises and evidence of love and
esteem. Despite all this, the medicine does not cease to be bitter to self-love. It takes
as little as it can, always with disgust, and often with a secret spite against those who
administer it.
Hence it happens that, if any have some
interest in being loved by us, they are averse to render us a service which they know to
be disagreeable. They treat us as we wish to be treated. We hate the truth, and they hide
it from us. We desire flattery, and they flatter us. We like to be deceived, and they
deceive us.
So each degree of good fortune which raises
us in the world removes us farther from truth, because we are most afraid of wounding
those whose affection is most useful and whose dislike is most dangerous. A prince may be
the byword of all Europe, and he alone will know nothing of it. I am not astonished. To
tell the truth is useful to those to whom it is spoken, but disadvantageous to those who
tell it, because it makes them disliked. Now those who live with princes love their own
interests more than that of the prince whom they serve; and so they take care not to
confer on him a benefit so as to injure themselves.
This evil is no doubt greater and more
common among the higher classes; but the lower are not exempt from it, since there is
always some advantage in making men love us. Human life is thus only a perpetual illusion;
men deceive and flatter each other. No one speaks of us in our presence as he does of us
in our absence. Human society is founded on mutual deceit; few friendships would endure if
each knew what his friend said of him in his absence, although he then spoke in sincerity
and without passion.
Man is, then, only disguise, falsehood, and
hypocrisy, both in himself and in regard to others. He does not wish any one to tell him
the truth; he avoids telling it to others, and all these dispositions, so removed from
justice and reason, have a natural root in his heart.
101. I set it down as a fact that if all men
knew what each said of the other, there would not be four friends in the world. This is
apparent from the quarrels which arise from the indiscreet tales told from time to time. I
say, further, all men would be...
102. Some vices only lay hold of us by means
of others, and these, like branches, fall on removal of the trunk.
103. The example of Alexander's chastity has
not made so many continent as that of his drunkenness has made intemperate. It is not
shameful not to be as virtuous as he, and it seems excusable to be no more vicious. We do
not believe ourselves to be exactly sharing in the vices of the vulgar when we see that we
are sharing in those of great men; and yet we do not observe that in these matters they
are ordinary men. We hold on to them by the same end by which they hold on to the rabble;
for, however exalted they are, they are still united at some point to the lowest of men.
They are not suspended in the air, quite removed from our society. No, no; if they are
greater than we, it is because their heads are higher; but their feet are as low as ours.
They are all on the same level, and rest on the same earth; and by that extremity they are
as low as we are, as the meanest folk, as infants, and as the beasts.
104. When our passion leads us to do
something, we forget our duty; for example, we like a book and read it, when we ought to
be doing something else. Now, to remind ourselves of our duty, we must set ourselves a
task we dislike; we then plead that we have something else to do and by this means
remember our duty.
105. How difficult it is to submit anything
to the judgement of another, without prejudicing his judgement by the manner in which we
submit it! If we say, "I think it beautiful," "I think it obscure," or
the like, we either entice the imagination into that view, or irritate it to the contrary.
It is better to say nothing; and then the other judges according to what really is, that
is to say, according as it then is and according as the other circumstances, not of our
making, have placed it. But we at least shall have added nothing, unless it be that
silence also produces an effect, according to the turn and the interpretation which the
other will be disposed to give it, or as he will guess it from gestures or countenance, or
from the tone of the voice, if he is a physiognomist. So difficult is it not to upset a
judgement from its natural place, or, rather, so rarely is it firm and stable!
106. By knowing each man's ruling passion,
we are sure of pleasing him; and yet each has his fancies, opposed to his true good, in
the very idea which he has of the good. It is a singularly puzzling fact.
107. Lustravit lampade terras. —The
weather and my mood have little connection. I have my foggy and my fine days within me; my
prosperity or misfortune has little to do with the matter. I sometimes struggle against
luck, the glory of mastering it makes me master it gaily; whereas I am sometimes surfeited
in the midst of good fortune.
108. Although people may have no interest in
what they are saying, we must not absolutely conclude from this that they are not lying;
for there are some people who lie for the mere sake of lying.
109. When we are well we wonder what we
would do if we were ill, but when we are ill we take medicine cheerfully; the illness
persuades us to do so. We have no longer the passions and desires for amusements and
promenades which health gave to us, but which are incompatible with the necessities of
illness. Nature gives us, then, passions and desires suitable to our present state. We are
only troubled by the fears which we, and not nature, give ourselves, for they add to the
state in which we are the passions of the state in which we are not.
As nature makes us always unhappy in every
state, our desires picture to us a happy state; because they add to the state in which we
are the pleasures of the state in which we are not. And if we attained to these pleasures,
we should not be happy after all; because we should have other desires natural to this new
state.
We must particularise this general
proposition....
110. The consciousness of the falsity of
present pleasures, and the ignorance of the vanity of absent pleasures, cause inconstancy.
111. Inconstancy.—We think we are
playing on ordinary organs when playing upon man. Men are organs, it is true, but, odd,
changeable, variable with pipes not arranged in proper order. Those who only know how to
play on ordinary organs will not produce barmonies on these. We must know where are.
112. Inconstancy.—Things have different
qualities, and the soul different inclinations; for nothing is simple which is presented
to the soul, and the soul never presents itself simply to any object. Hence it comes that
we weep and laugh at the same thing.
113. Inconstancy and oddity.—To live
only by work, and to rule over the most powerful State in the world, are very opposite
things. They are united in the person of the great Sultan of the Turks.
114. Variety is as abundant as all tones of
the voice, all ways of walking, coughing, blowing the nose, sneezing. We distinguish vines
by their fruit, and call them the Condrien, the Desargues, and such and such a stock. Is
this all? Has a vine ever produced two bunches exactly the same, and has a bunch two
grapes alike, etc.?
I can never judge of the same thing exactly
in the same way. I cannot judge of my work, while doing it. I must do as the artists,
stand at a distance, but not too far. How far, then? Guess.
115. Variety.—Theology is a science,
but at the same time how many sciences? A man is a whole; but if we dissect him, will he
be the head, the heart, the stomach, the veins, each vein, each portion of a vein, the
blood, each humour in the blood?
A town, a country-place, is from afar a town
and a country-place. But, as we draw near, there are houses, trees, tiles, leaves, grass,
ants, limbs of ants, in infinity. All this is contained under the name of country-place.
116. Thoughts.—All is one, all is
different. How many natures exist in man? How many vocations? And by what chance does each
man ordinarily choose what he has heard praised? A well-turned heel.
117. The heel of a slipper.—"Ah!
How well this is turned! Here is a clever workman! How brave is this soldier!" This
is the source of our inclinations and of the choice of conditions. "How much this man
drinks! How little that one"! This makes people sober or drunk, soldiers, cowards,
etc.
118. Chief talent, that which rules the
rest.
119. Nature imitates herself A seed grown in
good ground brings forth fruit. A principle instilled into a good mind brings forth fruit.
Numbers imitate space, which is of a different nature.
All is made and led by the same master,
root, branches, and fruits; principles and consequences.
120. Nature diversifies and imitates; art
imitates and diversifies.
121. Nature always begins the same things
again, the years, the days, the hours; in like manner spaces and numbers follow each other
from beginning to end. Thus is made a kind of infinity and eternity. Not that anything in
all this is infinite and eternal, but these finite realities are infinitely multiplied.
Thus it seems to me to be only the number which multiplies them that is infinite.
122. Time heals griefs and quarrels, for we
change and are no longer the same persons. Neither the offender nor the offended are any
more themselves. It is like a nation which we have provoked, but meet again after two
generations. They are still Frenchmen, but not the same.
123. He no longer loves the person whom he
loved ten years ago. I quite believe it. She is no longer the same, nor is he. He was
young, and she also; she is quite different. He would perhaps love her yet, if she were
what she was then.
124. We view things not only from different
sides, but with different eyes; we have no wish to find them alike.
125. Contraries.—Man is naturally
credulous and incredulous, timid and rash.
126. Description of man: dependency, desire
of independence, need.
127. Condition of man: inconstancy,
weariness, unrest.
128. The weariness which is felt by us in
leaving pursuits to which we are attached. A man dwells at home with pleasure; but if he
sees a woman who charms him, or if he enjoys himself in play for five or six days, he is
miserable if he returns to his former way of living. Nothing is more common than that.
129. Our nature consists in motion; complete
rest is death.
130. Restlessness.—If a soldier, or
labourer, complain of the hardship of his lot, set him to do nothing.
131. Weariness.—Nothing is so
insufferable to man as to be completely at rest, without passions, without business,
without diversion, without study. He then feels his nothingness, his forlornness, his
insufficiency, his dependence, his weakness, his emptiness. There will immediately arise
from the depth of his heart weariness, gloom, sadness, fretfulness, vexation, despair.
132. Methinks Caesar was too old to set
about amusing himself with conquering the world. Such sport was good for Augustus or
Alexander. They were still young men and thus difficult to restrain. But Caesar should
have been more mature.
133. Two faces which resemble each other
make us laugh, when together, by their resemblance, though neither of them by itself makes
us laugh.
134. How useless is painting, which attracts
admiration by the resemblance of things, the originals of which we do not admire!
135. The struggle alone pleases us, not the
victory. We love to see animals fighting, not the victor infuriated over the vanquished.
We would only see the victorious end; and, as soon as it comes, we are satiated. It is the
same in play, and the same in the search for truth. In disputes we like to see the clash
of opinions, but not at all to contemplate truth when found. To observe it with pleasure,
we have to see it emerge out of strife. So in the passions, there is pleasure in seeing
the collision of two contraries; but when one acquires the mastery, it becomes only
brutality. We never seek things for themselves, but for the search. Likewise in plays,
scenes which do not rouse the emotion of fear are worthless, so are extreme and hopeless
misery, brutal lust, and extreme cruelty.
136. A mere trifle consoles us, for a mere
trifle distresses us.
137. Without examining every particular
pursuit, it is enough to comprehend them under diversion.
138. Men naturally slaters and of all
callings, save in their own rooms.
139. Diversion.—When I have
occasionally set myself to consider the different distractions of men, the pains and
perils to which they expose themselves at court or in war, whence arise so many quarrels,
passions, bold and often bad ventures, etc., I have discovered that all the unhappiness of
men arises from one single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber. A man
who has enough to live on, if he knew how to stay with pleasure at home, would not leave
it to go to sea or to besiege a town. A commission in the army would not be bought so
dearly, but that it is found insufferable not to budge from the town; and men only seek
conversation and entering games, because they cannot remain with pleasure at home.
But, on further consideration, when, after
finding the cause of all our ills, I have sought to discover the reason of it, I have
found that there is one very real reason, namely, the natural poverty of our feeble and
mortal condition, so miserable that nothing can comfort us when we think of it closely.
Whatever condition we picture to ourselves,
if we muster all the good things which it is possible to possess, royalty is the finest
position in the world. Yet, when we imagine a king attended with every pleasure he can
feel, if he be without diversion and be left to consider and reflect on what he is, this
feeble happiness will not sustain him; he will necessarily fall into forebodings of
dangers, of revolutions which may happen, and, finally, of death and inevitable disease;
so that, if he be without what is called diversion, he is unhappy and more unhappy than
the least of his subjects who plays and diverts himself.
Hence it comes that play and the society of
women, war and high posts, are so sought after. Not that there is in fact any happiness in
them, or that men imagine true bliss to consist in money won at play, or in the hare which
they hunt; we would not take these as a gift. We do not seek that easy and peaceful lot
which permits us to think of our unhappy condition, nor the dangers of war, nor the labour
of office, but the bustle which averts these thoughts of ours and amuses us.
Reasons why we like the chase better than
the quarry.
Hence it comes that men so much love noise
and stir; hence it comes that the prison is so horrible a punishment; hence it comes that
the pleasure of solitude is a thing incomprehensible. And it is, in fact, the greatest
source of happiness in the condition of kings that men try incessantly to divert them and
to procure for them all kinds of pleasures.
The king is surrounded by persons whose only
thought is to divert the king and to prevent his thinking of self. For he is unhappy, king
though he be, if he think of himself.
This is all that men have been able to
discover to make themselves happy. And those who philosophise on the matter, and who think
men unreasonable for spending a whole day in chasing a hare which they would not have
bought, scarce know our nature. The hare in itself would not screen us from the sight of
death and calamities; but the chase, which turns away our attention from these, does
screen us.
The advice given to Pyrrhus, to take the
rest which he was about to seek with so much labour, was full of difficulties.
To bid a man live quietly is to bid him live
happily. It is to advise him to be in a state perfectly happy, in which he can think at
leisure without finding therein a cause of distress. This is to misunderstand nature.
As men who naturally understand their own
condition avoid nothing so much as rest, so there is nothing they leave undone in seeking
turmoil. Not that they have an instinctive knowledge of true happiness...
So we are wrong in blaming them. Their error
does not lie in seeking excitement, if they seek it only as a diversion; the evil is that
they seek it as if the possession of the objects of their quest would make them really
happy. In this respect it is right to call their quest a vain one. Hence in all this both
the censurers and the censured do not understand man's true nature.
And thus, when we take the exception against
them, that what they seek with such fervour cannot satisfy them, if they replied—as
they should do if they considered the matter thoroughly—that they sought in it only a
violent and impetuous occupation which turned their thoughts from self, and that they
therefore chose an attractive object to charm and ardently attract them, they would leave
their opponents without a reply. But they do not make this reply, because they do not know
themselves. They do not know that it is the chase, and not the quarry, which they seek.
Dancing: We must consider rightly where to
place our feet.—A gentleman sincerely believes that hunting is great and royal sport;
but a beater is not of this opinion.
They imagine that, if they obtained such a
post, they would then rest with pleasure and are insensible of the insatiable nature of
the if desire. They think they are truly seeking quiet, and they are only seeking
excitement.
They have a secret instinct which impels
them to seek amusement and occupation abroad, and which arises from the sense of their
constant unhappiness. They have another secret instinct, a remnant of the greatness of our
original nature, which teaches them that happiness in reality consists only in rest and
not in stir. And of these two contrary instincts they form within themselves a confused
idea, which hides itself from their view in the depths of their soul, inciting them to aim
at rest through excitement, and always to fancy that the satisfaction which they have not
will come to them, if, by surmounting whatever difficulties confront them, they can
thereby open the door to rest.
Thus passes away all man's life. Men seek
rest in a struggle against difficulties; and when they have conquered these, rest becomes
insufferable. For we think either of the misfortunes we have or of those which threaten
us. And even if we should see ourselves sufficiently sheltered on all sides, weariness of
its own accord would not fail to arise from the depths of the heart wherein it has its
natural roots and to fill the mind with its poison.
Thus so wretched is man that he would weary
even without any cause for weariness from the peculiar state of his disposition; and so
frivolous is he that, though full of a thousand reasons for weariness, the least thing,
such as playing billiards or hitting a ball, is sufficient to amuse him.
But will you say what object has he in all
this? The pleasure of bragging tomorrow among his friends that he has played better than
another. So others sweat in their own rooms to show to the learned that they have solved a
problem in algebra, which no one had hitherto been able to solve. Many more expose
themselves to extreme perils, in my opinion as foolishly, in order to boast afterwards
that they have captured a town. Lastly, others wear themselves out in studying all these
things, not in order to become wiser, but only in order to prove that they know them; and
these are the most senseless of the band, since they are so knowingly, whereas one may
suppose of the others that, if they knew it, they would no longer be foolish.
This man spends his life without weariness
in playing every day for a small stake. Give him each morning the money he can win each
day, on condition he does not play; you make him miserable. It will perhaps be said that
he seeks the amusement of play and not the winnings. Make him, then, play for nothing; he
will not become excited over it and will feel bored. It is, then, not the amusement alone
that he seeks; a languid and passionless amusement will weary him. He must get excited
over it and deceive himself by the fancy that he will be happy to win what he would not
have as a gift on condition of not playing; and he must make for himself an object of
passion, and excite over it his desire, his anger, his fear, to obtain his imagined end,
as children are frightened at the face they have blackened.
Whence comes it that this man, who lost his
only son a few months ago, or who this morning was in such trouble through being
distressed by lawsuits and quarrels, now no longer thinks of them? Do not wonder; he is
quite taken up in looking out for the boar which his dogs have been hunting so hotly for
the last six hours. He requires nothing more. However full of sadness a man may be, he is
happy for the time, if you can prevail upon him to enter into some amusement; and however
happy a man may be, he will soon be discontented and wretched, if he be not diverted and
occupied by some passion or pursuit which prevents weariness from overcoming him. Without
amusement there is no joy; with amusement there is no sadness. And this also constitutes
the happiness of persons in high position, that they have a number of people to amuse them
and have the power to keep themselves in this state.
Consider this. What is it to be
superintendent, chancellor, first president, but to be in a condition wherein from early
morning a large number of people come from all quarters to see them, so as not to leave
them an hour in the day in which they can think of themselves? And when they are in
disgrace and sent back to their country houses, where they lack neither wealth nor
servants to help them on occasion, they do not fail to be wretched and desolate, because
no one prevents them from thinking of themselves.
140. How does it happen that this man, so
distressed at the death of his wife and his only son, or who has some great lawsuit which
annoys him, is not at this moment sad, and that he seems so free from all painful and
disquieting thoughts? We need not wonder; for a ball has been served him, and he must
return it to his companion. He is occupied in catching it in its fall from the roof, to
win a game. How can he think of his own affairs, pray, when he has this other matter in
hand? Here is a care worthy of occupying this great soul and taking away from him every
other thought of the mind. This man, born to know the universe, to judge all causes, to
govern a whole state, is altogether occupied and taken up with the business of catching a
hare. And if he does not lower himself to this and wants always to be on the strain, he
will be more foolish still, because he would raise himself above humanity; and after all,
he is only a man, that is to say capable of little and of much, of all and of nothing; he
is neither angel nor brute, but man.
141. Men spend their time in following a
ball or a hare; it is the pleasure even of kings.
142. Diversion—Is not the royal dignity
sufficiently great in itself to make its possessor happy by the mere contemplation of what
he is? Must he be diverted from this thought like ordinary folk? I see well that a man is
made happy by diverting him from the view of his domestic sorrows so as to occupy all his
thoughts with the care of dancing well. But will it be the same with a king, and will he
be happier in the pursuit of these idle amusements than in the contemplation of his
greatness? And what more satisfactory object could be presented to his mind? Would it not
be a deprivation of his delight for him to occupy his soul with the thought of how to
adjust his steps to the cadence of an air, or of how to throw a ball skilfully, instead of
leaving it to enjoy quietly the contemplation of the majestic glory which encompasses him?
Let us make the trial; let us leave a king all alone to reflect on himself quite at
leisure, without any gratification of the senses, without any care in his mind, without
society; and we will see that a king without diversion is a man full of wretchedness. So
this is carefully avoided, and near the persons of kings there never fail to be a great
number of people who see to it that amusement follows business, and who watch all the time
of their leisure to supply them with delights and games, so that there is no blank in it.
In fact, kings are surrounded with persons who are wonderfully attentive in taking care
that the king be not alone and in a state to think of himself, knowing well that he will
be miserable, king though he be, if he meditate on self.
In all this I am not talking of Christian
kings as Christians, but only as kings.
143. Diversion.—Men are entrusted from
infancy with the care of their honour, their property, their friends, and even with the
property and the honour of their friends. They are overwhelmed with business, with the
study of languages, and with physical exercise; and they are made to understand that they
cannot be happy unless their health, their honour, their fortune and that of their friends
be in good condition, and that a single thing wanting will make them unhappy. Thus they
are given cares and business which make them bustle about from break of day. It is, you
will exclaim, a strange way to make them happy! What more could be done to make them
miserable?—Indeed! what could be done? We should only have to relieve them from all
these cares; for then they would see themselves: they would reflect on what they are,
whence they came, whither they go, and thus we cannot employ and divert them too much. And
this is why, after having given them so much business, we advise them, if they have some
time for relaxation, to employ it in amusement, in play, and to be always fully occupied.
How hollow and full of ribaldry is the heart
of man!
144. I spent a long time in the study of the
abstract sciences, and was disheartened by the small number of fellow-students in them.
When I commenced the study of man, I saw that these abstract sciences are not suited to
man and that I was wandering farther from my own state in examining them than others in
not knowing them. I pardoned their little knowledge; but I thought at least to find many
companions in the study of man and that it was the true study which is suited to him. I
have been deceived; still fewer study it than geometry. It is only from the want of
knowing how to study this that we seek the other studies. But is it not that even here is
not the knowledge which man should have and that for the purpose of happiness it is better
for him not to know himself.?
145. One thought alone occupies us; we
cannot think of two things at the same time. This is lucky for us according to the world,
not according to God.
146. Man is obviously made to think. It is
his whole dignity and his whole merit; and his whole duty is to think as he ought. Now,
the order of thought is to begin with self, and with its Author and its end.
Now, of what does the world think? Never of
this, but of dancing, playing the lute, singing, making verses, running at the ring, etc.,
fighting, making oneself king, without thinking what it is to be a king and what to be a
man.
147. We do not content ourselves with the
life we have in ourselves and in our own being; we desire to live an imaginary life in the
mind of others, and for this purpose we endeavour to shine. We labour unceasingly to adorn
and preserve this imaginary existence and neglect the real. And if we possess calmness, or
generosity, or truthfulness, we are eager to make it known, so as to attach these virtues
to that imaginary existence. We would rather separate them from ourselves to join them to
it; and we would willingly be cowards in order to acquire the reputation of being brave. A
great proof of the nothingness of our being, not to be satisfied with the one without the
other, and to renounce the one for the other! For he would be infamous who would not die
to preserve his honour.
148. We are so presumptuous that we would
wish to be known by all the world, even by people who shall come after, when we shall be
no more; and we are so vain that the esteem of five or six neighbours delights and
contents us.
149. We do not trouble ourselves about being
esteemed in the towns through which we pass. But if we are to remain a little while there,
we are so concerned. How long is necessary? A time commensurate with our vain and paltry
life.
150. Vanity is so anchored in the heart of
man that a soldier, a soldier's servant, a cook, a porter brags and wishes to have his
admirers. Even philosophers wish for them. Those who write against it want to have the
glory of having written well; and those who read it desire the glory of having read it. I
who write this have perhaps this desire, and perhaps those who will read it...
151. Glory.—Admiration spoils all from
infancy. Ah! How well said! Ah! How well done! How well-behaved he is! etc.
The children of Port-Royal, who do not
receive this stimulus of envy and glory, fall into carelessness.
152. Pride.—Curiosity is only vanity.
Most frequently we wish to know but to talk. Otherwise we would not take a sea voyage in
order never to talk of it, and for the sole pleasure of seeing without hope of ever
communicating it.
153. Of the desire of being esteemed by
those with whom we are.—Pride takes such natural possession of us in the midst of our
woes, errors, etc. We even lose our life with joy, provided people talk of it.
Vanity: play, hunting, visiting, false
shame, a lasting name.
154. I have no friends to your advantage.
155. A true friend is so great an advantage,
even for the greatest lords, in order that he may speak well of them and back them in
their absence, that they should do all to have one. But they should choose well; for, if
they spend all their efforts in the interests of fools, it will be of no use, however well
these may speak of them; and these will not even speak well of them if they find
themselves on the weakest side, for they have no influence; and thus they will speak ill
of them in company.
156. Ferox gens, nullam esse vitam sine
armis rati. —They prefer death to peace; others prefer death to war.
Every opinion may be held preferable to
life, the love of which is so strong and so natural.
157. Contradiction: contempt for our
existence, to die for nothing, hatred of our existence.
158. Pursuits.—The charm of fame is so
great that we like every object to which it is attached, even death.
159. Noble deeds are most estimable when
hidden. When I see some of these in history, they please me greatly. But after all they
have not been quite hidden, since they have been known; and though people have done what
they could to hide them, the little publication of them spoils all, for what was best in
them was the wish to hide them.
160. Sneezing absorbs all the functions of
the soul, as well as work does; but we do not draw therefrom the same conclusions against
the greatness of man, because it is against his will. And although we bring it on
ourselves, it is nevertheless against our will that we sneeze. It is not in view of the
act itself; it is for another end. And thus it is not a proof of the weakness of man and
of his slavery under that action.
It is not disgraceful for man to yield to
pain, and it is disgraceful to yield to pleasure. This is not because pain comes to us
from without, and we ourselves seek pleasure; for it is possible to seek pain, and yield
to it purposely, without this kind of baseness. Whence comes it, then, that reason thinks
it honourable to succumb under stress of pain, and disgraceful to yield to the attack of
pleasure? It is because pain does not tempt and attract us. It is we ourselves who choose
it voluntarily, and will it to prevail over us. So that we are masters of the situation;
and in this man yields to himself. But in pleasure it is man who yields to pleasure. Now
only mastery and sovereignty bring glory, and only slavery brings shame.
161. Vanity.—How wonderful it is that a
thing so evident as the vanity of the world is so little known, that it is a strange and
surprising thing to say that it is foolish to seek greatness?
162. He who will know fully the vanity of
man has only to consider the causes and effects of love. The cause is a je ne sais quoi
(Corneille), and the effects are dreadful. This je ne sais quoi, so small an object that
we cannot recognise it, agitates a whole country, princes, armies, the entire world.
Cleopatra's nose: had it been shorter, the
whole aspect of the world would have been altered.
163. Vanity.—The cause and the effects
of love: Cleopatra.
164. He who does not see the vanity of the
world is himself very vain. Indeed who do not see it but youths who are absorbed in fame,
diversion, and the thought of the future? But take away diversion, and you will see them
dried up with weariness. They feel then their nothingness without knowing it; for it is
indeed to be unhappy to be in insufferable sadness as soon as we are reduced to thinking
of self and have no diversion.
165. Thoughts.—In omnibus requiem
quaesivi. If our condition were truly happy, we not need diversion from thinking of it in
order to make ourselves happy.
166. Diversion.—Death is easier to bear
without thinking of it than is the thought of death without peril.
167. The miseries of human life has
established all this: as men have seen this, they have taken up diversion.
168. Diversion.—As men are not able to
fight against death, misery, ignorance, they have taken it into their heads, in order to
be happy, not to think of them at all.
169. Despite these miseries, man wishes to
be happy, and only wishes to be happy, and cannot wish not to be so. But how will he set
about it? To be happy he would have to make himself immortal; but, not being able to do
so, it has occurred to him to prevent himself from thinking of death.
170. Diversion.—If man were happy, he
would be the more so, the less he was diverted, like the Saints and God. Yes; but is it
not to be happy to have a faculty of being amused by diversion? No; for that comes from
elsewhere and from without, and thus is dependent, and therefore subject to be disturbed
by a thousand accidents, which bring inevitable griefs.
171. Misery.—The only thing which
consoles us for our miseries is diversion, and yet this is the greatest of our miseries.
For it is this which principally hinders us from reflecting upon ourselves and which makes
us insensibly ruin ourselves. Without this we should be in a state of weariness, and this
weariness would spur us to seek a more solid means of escaping from it. But diversion
amuses us, and leads us unconsciously to death.
172. We do not rest satisfied with the
present. We anticipate the future as too slow in coming, as if in order to hasten its
course; or we recall the past, to stop its too rapid flight. So imprudent are we that we
wander in the times which are not ours and do not think of the only one which belongs to
us; and so idle are we that we dream of those times which are no more and thoughtlessly
overlook that which alone exists. For the present is generally painful to us. We conceal
it from our sight, because it troubles us; and, if it be delightful to us, we regret to
see it pass away. We try to sustain it by the future and think of arranging matters which
are not in our power, for a time which we have no certainty of reaching.
Let each one examine his thoughts, and he
will find them all occupied with the past and the future. We scarcely ever think of the
present; and if we think of it, it is only to take light from it to arrange the future.
The present is never our end. The past and the present are our means; the future alone is
our end. So we never live, but we hope to live; and, as we are always preparing to be
happy, it is inevitable we should never be so.
173. They say that eclipses foretoken
misfortune, because misfortunes are common, so that, as evil happens so often, they often
foretell it; whereas if they said that they predict good fortune, they would often be
wrong. They attribute good fortune only to rare conjunctions of the heavens; so they
seldom fail in prediction.
174. Misery.—Solomon and Job have best
known and best spoken of the misery of man; the former the most fortunate, and the latter
the most unfortunate of men; the former knowing the vanity of pleasures from experience,
the latter the reality of evils.
175. We know ourselves so little that many
think they are about to die when they are well, and many think they are well when they are
near death, unconscious of approaching fever, or of the abscess ready to form itself.
176. Cromwell was about to ravage all
Christendom; the royal family was undone, and his own for ever established, save for a
little grain of sand which formed in his ureter. Rome herself was trembling under him; but
this small piece of gravel having formed there, he is dead, his family cast down, all is
peaceful, and the king is restored.
177. Three hosts. Would he who had possessed
the friendship of the King of England, the King of Poland, and the Queen of Sweden, have
believed he would lack a refuge and shelter in the world?
178. Macrobius: on the innocents slain by
Herod.
179. When Augustus learnt that Herod's own
son was amongst the infants under two years of age, whom he had caused to be slain, he
said that it was better to be Herod's pig than his son. Macrobius, Saturnalia, ii. 4.
180. The great and the humble have the same
misfortunes, the same griefs, the same passions; but the one is at the top of the wheel,
and the other near the centre, and so less disturbed by the same revolutions.
181. We are so unfortunate that we can only
take pleasure in a thing on condition of being annoyed if it turn out ill, as a thousand
things can do, and do every hour. He who should find the secret of rejoicing in the good,
without troubling himself with its contrary evil, would have hit the mark. It is perpetual
motion.
182. Those who have always good hope in the
midst of misfortunes, and who are delighted with good luck, are suspected of being very
pleased with the ill success of the affair, if they are not equally distressed by bad
luck; and they are overjoyed to find these pretexts of hope, in order to show that they
are concerned and to conceal by the joy which they feign to feel that which they have at
seeing the failure of the matter.
183. We run carelessly to the precipice,
after we have put something before us to prevent us seeing it.
SECTION III: OF THE NECESSITY OF THE WAGER
184. A letter to incite to the search
after God.
And then to make people seek Him among the
philosophers, sceptics, and dogmatists, who disquiet him who inquires of them.
185. The conduct of God, who disposes all
things kindly, is to put religion into the mind by reason, and into the heart by grace.
But to will to put it into the mind and heart by force and threats is not to put religion
there, but terror; terorrem potius quam religionem.
186. Nisi terrerentur et non docerentur,
improba quasi dominatio videretur (St. Augustine, Epistle 48 or 49), Contra Mendacium ad
Consentium.
187. Order.—Men despise religion; they
hate it and fear it is true. To remedy this, we must begin by showing that religion is not
contrary to reason; that it is venerable, to inspire respect for it; then we must make it
lovable, to make good men hope it is true; finally, we must prove it is true.
Venerable, because it has perfect knowledge
of man; lovable because it promises the true good.
188. In every dialogue and discourse, we
must be able to say to those who take offence, "Of what do you complain?"
189. To begin by pitying unbelievers; they
are wretched enough by their condition. We ought only to revile them where it is
beneficial; but this does them harm.
190. To pity atheists who seek, for are they
not unhappy enough? To inveigh against those who make a boast of it.
191. And will this one scoff at the other?
Who ought to scoff? And yet, the latter does not scoff at the other, but pities him.
192. To reproach Milton with not being
troubled, since God will reproach him.
193. Quid fiet hominibus qui minima
contemnunt, majora non credunt?
194. ... Let them at least learn what is the
religion they attack, before attacking it. If this religion boasted of having a clear view
of God, and of possessing it open and unveiled, it would be attacking it to say that we
see nothing in the world which shows it with this clearness. But since, on the contrary,
it says that men are in darkness and estranged from God, that He has hidden Himself from
their knowledge, that this is in fact the name which He gives Himself in the Scriptures,
Deus absconditus; and finally, if it endeavours equally to establish these two things:
that God has set up in the Church visible signs to make Himself known to those who should
seek Him sincerely, and that He has nevertheless so disguised them that He will only be
perceived by those who seek Him with all their heart; what advantage can they obtain,
when, in the negligence with which they make profession of being in search of the truth,
they cry out that nothing reveals it to them; and since that darkness in which they are,
and with which they upbraid the Church, establishes only one of the things which she
affirms, without touching the other, and, very far from destroying, proves her doctrine?
In order to attack it, they should have
protested that they had made every effort to seek Him everywhere, and even in that which
the Church proposes for their instruction, but without satisfaction. If they talked in
this manner, they would in truth be attacking one of her pretensions. But I hope here to
show that no reasonable person can speak thus, and I venture even to say that no one has
ever done so. We know well enough how those who are of this mind behave. They believe they
have made great efforts for their instruction when they have spent a few hours in reading
some book of Scripture and have questioned some priests on the truths of the faith. After
that, they boast of having made vain search in books and among men. But, verily, I will
tell them what I have often said, that this negligence is insufferable. We are not here
concerned with the trifling interests of some stranger, that we should treat it in this
fashion; the matter concerns ourselves and our all.
The immortality of the soul is a matter
which is of so great consequence to us and which touches us so profoundly that we must
have lost all feeling to be indifferent as to knowing what it is. All our actions and
thoughts must take such different courses, according as there are or are not eternal joys
to hope for, that it is impossible to take one step with sense and judgment unless we
regulate our course by our view of this point which ought to be our ultimate end.
Thus our first interest and our first duty
is to enlighten ourselves on this subject, whereon depends all our conduct. Therefore
among those who do not believe, I make a vast difference between those who strive with all
their power to inform themselves and those who live without troubling or thinking about
it.
I can have only compassion for those who
sincerely bewail their doubt, who regard it as the greatest of misfortunes, and who,
sparing no effort to escape it, make of this inquiry their principal and most serious
occupation.
But as for those who pass their life without
thinking of this ultimate end of life, and who, for this sole reason that they do not find
within themselves the lights which convince them of it, neglect to seek them elsewhere,
and to examine thoroughly whether this opinion is one of those which people receive with
credulous simplicity, or one of those which, although obscure in themselves, have
nevertheless a solid and immovable foundation, I look upon them in a manner quite
different.
This carelessness in a matter which concerns
themselves, their eternity, their all, moves me more to anger than pity; it astonishes and
shocks me; it is to me monstrous. I do not say this out of the pious zeal of a spiritual
devotion. I expect, on the contrary, that we ought to have this feeling from principles of
human interest and self-love; for this we need only see what the least enlightened persons
see.
We do not require great education of the
mind to understand that here is no real and lasting satisfaction; that our pleasures are
only vanity; that our evils are infinite; and, lastly, that death, which threatens us
every moment, must infallibly place us within a few years under the dreadful necessity of
being for ever either annihilated or unhappy.
There is nothing more real than this,
nothing more terrible. Be we as heroic as we like, that is the end which awaits the world.
Let us reflect on this and then say whether it is not beyond doubt that there is no good
in this life but in the hope of another; that we are happy only in proportion as we draw
near it; and that, as there are no more woes for those who have complete assurance of
eternity, so there is no more happiness for those who have no insight into it.
Surely then it is a great evil thus to be in
doubt, but it is at least an indispensable duty to seek when we are in such doubt; and
thus the doubter who does not seek is altogether completely unhappy and completely wrong.
And if besides this he is easy and content, professes to be so, and indeed boasts of it;
if it is this state itself which is the subject of his joy and vanity, I have no words to
describe so silly a creature.
How can people hold these opinions? What joy
can we find in the expectation of nothing but hopeless misery? What reason for boasting
that we are in impenetrable darkness? And how can it happen that the following argument
occurs to a reasonable man?
"I know not who put me into the world,
nor what the world is, nor what I myself am. I am in terrible ignorance of everything. I
know not what my body is, nor my senses, nor my soul, not even that part of me which
thinks what I say, which reflects on all and on itself, and knows itself no more than the
rest. I see those frightful spaces of the universe which surround me, and I find myself
tied to one corner of this vast expanse, without knowing why I am put in this place rather
than in another, nor why the short time which is given me to live is assigned to me at
this point rather than at another of the whole eternity which was before me or which shall
come after me. I see nothing but infinites on all sides, which surround me as an atom and
as a shadow which endures only for an instant and returns no more. All I know is that I
must soon die, but what I know least is this very death which I cannot escape.
"As I know not whence I come, so I know
not whither I go. I know only that, in leaving this world, I fall for ever either into
annihilation or into the hands of an angry God, without knowing to which of these two
states I shall be for ever assigned. Such is my state, full of weakness and uncertainty.
And from all this I conclude that I ought to spend all the days of my life without caring
to inquire into what must happen to me. Perhaps I might find some solution to my doubts,
but I will not take the trouble, nor take a step to seek it; and after treating with scorn
those who are concerned with this care, I will go without foresight and without fear to
try the great event, and let myself be led carelessly to death, uncertain of the eternity
of my future state."
Who would desire to have for a friend a man
who talks in this fashion? Who would choose him out from others to tell him of his
affairs? Who would have recourse to him in affliction? And indeed to what use in life
could one put him?
In truth, it is the glory of religion to
have for enemies men so unreasonable; and their opposition to it is so little dangerous
that it serves, on the contrary, to establish its truths. For the Christian faith goes
mainly to establish these two facts: the corruption of nature, and redemption by Jesus
Christ. Now I contend that, if these men do not serve to prove the truth of the redemption
by the holiness of their behaviour, they at least serve admirably to show the corruption
of nature by sentiments so unnatural.
Nothing is so important to man as his own
state, nothing is so formidable to him as eternity; and thus it is not natural that there
should be men indifferent to the loss of their existence, and to the perils of everlasting
suffering. They are quite different with regard to all other things. They are afraid of
mere trifles; they foresee them; they feel them. And this same man who spends so many days
and nights in rage and despair for the loss of office, or for some imaginary insult to his
honour, is the very one who knows without anxiety and without emotion that he will lose
all by death. It is a monstrous thing to see in the same heart and at the same time this
sensibility to trifles and this strange insensibility to the greatest objects. It is an
incomprehensible enchantment, and a supernatural slumber, which indicates as its cause an
all-powerful force.
There must be a strange confusion in the
nature of man, that he should boast of being in that state in which it seems incredible
that a single individual should be. However, experience has shown me so great a number of
such persons that the fact would be surprising, if we did not know that the greater part
of those who trouble themselves about the matter are disingenuous and not, in fact, what
they say. They are people who have heard it said that it is the fashion to be thus daring.
It is what they call "shaking off the yoke," and they try to imitate this. But
it would not be difficult to make them understand how greatly they deceive themselves in
thus seeking esteem. This is not the way to gain it, even I say among those men of the
world who take a healthy view of things and who know that the only way to succeed in this
life is to make ourselves appear honourable, faithful, judicious, and capable of useful
service to a friend; because naturally men love only what may be useful to them. Now, what
do we gain by hearing it said of a man that he has now thrown off the yoke, that he does
not believe there is a God who watches our actions, that he considers himself the sole
master of his conduct, and that he thinks he is accountable for it only to himself.? Does
he think that he has thus brought us to have henceforth complete confidence in him and to
look to him for consolation, advice, and help in every need of life? Do they profess to
have delighted us by telling us that they hold our soul to be only a little wind and
smoke, especially by telling us this in a haughty and self-satisfied tone of voice? Is
this a thing to say gaily? Is it not, on the contrary, a thing to say sadly, as the
saddest thing in the world?
If they thought of it seriously, they would
see that this is so bad a mistake, so contrary to good sense, so opposed to decency, and
so removed in every respect from that good breeding which they seek, that they would be
more likely to correct than to pervert those who had an inclination to follow them. And,
indeed, make them give an account of their opinions, and of the reasons which they have
for doubting religion, and they will say to you things so feeble and so petty, that they
persuade you of the contrary. The following is what a person one day said to such a one
very appositely: "If you continue to talk in this manner, you will really make me
religious." And he was right, for who would not have a horror of holding opinions in
which he would have such contemptible persons as companions!
Thus those who only feign these opinions
would be very unhappy, if they restrained their natural feelings in order to make
themselves the most conceited of men. If, at the bottom of their heart, they are troubled
at not having more light, let them not disguise the fact; this avowal will not be
shameful. The only shame is to have none. Nothing reveals more an extreme weakness of mind
than not to know the misery of a godless man. Nothing is more indicative of a bad
disposition of heart than not to desire the truth of eternal promises. Nothing is more
dastardly than to act with bravado before God. Let them then leave these impieties to
those who are sufficiently ill-bred to be really capable of them. Let them at least be
honest men, if they cannot be Christians. Finally, let them recognise that there are two
kinds of people one can call reasonable; those who serve God with all their heart because
they know Him, and those who seek Him with all their heart because they do not know Him.
But as for those who live without knowing
Him and without seeking Him, they judge themselves so little worthy of their own care,
that they are not worthy of the care of others; and it needs all the charity of the
religion which they despise, not to despise them even to the point of leaving them to
their folly. But because this religion obliges us always to regard them, so long as they
are in this life, as capable of the grace which can enlighten them, and to believe that
they may, in a little time, be more replenished with faith than we are, and that, on the
other hand, we may fall into the blindness wherein they are, we must do for them what we
would they should do for us if we were in their place, and call upon them to have pity
upon themselves, and to take at least some steps in the endeavour to find light. Let them
give to reading this some of the hours which they otherwise employ so uselessly; whatever
aversion they may bring to the task, they will perhaps gain something, and at least will
not lose much. But as for those who bring to the task perfect sincerity and a real desire
to meet with truth, those I hope will be satisfied and convinced of the proofs of a
religion so divine, which I have here collected, and in which I have followed somewhat
after this order...
195. Before entering into the proofs of the
Christian religion, I find it necessary to point out the sinfulness of those men who live
in indifference to the search for truth in a matter which is so important to them, and
which touches them so nearly.
Of all their errors, this doubtless is the
one which most convicts them of foolishness and blindness, and in which it is easiest to
confound them by the first glimmerings of common sense and by natural feelings.
For it is not to be doubted that the
duration of this life is but a moment; that the state of death is eternal, whatever may be
its nature; and that thus all our actions and thoughts must take such different
directions, according to the state of that eternity, that it is impossible to take one
step with sense and judgement, unless we regulate our course by the truth of that point
which ought to be our ultimate end.
There is nothing clearer than this; and
thus, according to the principles of reason, the conduct of men is wholly unreasonable, if
they do not take another course.
On this point, therefore, we condemn those
who live without thought of the ultimate end of life, who let themselves be guided by
their own inclinations and their own pleasures without reflection and without concern,
and, as if they could annihilate eternity by turning away their thought from it, think
only of making themselves happy for the moment.
Yet this eternity exists, and death, which
must open into it and threatens them every hour, must in a little time infallibly put them
under the dreadful necessity of being either annihilated or unhappy for ever, without
knowing which of these eternities is for ever prepared for them.
This is a doubt of terrible consequence.
They are in peril of eternal woe and thereupon, as if the matter were not worth the
trouble, they neglect to inquire whether this is one of those opinions which people
receive with too credulous a facility, or one of those which, obscure in themselves, have
a very firm, though hidden, foundation. Thus they know not whether there be truth or
falsity in the matter, nor whether there be strength or weakness in the proofs. They have
them before their eyes; they refuse to look at them; and in that ignorance they choose all
that is necessary to fall into this misfortune if it exists, to await death to make trial
of it, yet to be very content in this state, to make profession of it, and indeed to boast
of it. Can we think seriously of the importance of this subject without being horrified at
conduct so extravagant?
This resting in ignorance is a monstrous
thing, and they who pass their life in it must be made to feel its extravagance and
stupidity, by having it shown to them, so that they may be confounded by the sight of
their folly. For this is how men reason, when they choose to live in such ignorance of
what they are and without seeking enlightenment. "I know not," they say...
196. Men lack heart; they would not make a
friend of it.
197. To be insensible to the extent of
despising interesting things, and to become insensible to the point which interests us
most.
198. The sensibility of man to trifles, and
his insensibility to great things, indicates a strange inversion.
199. Let us imagine a number of men in
chains and all condemned to death, where some are killed each day in the sight of the
others, and those who remain see their own fate in that of their fellows and wait their
turn, looking at each other sorrowfully and without hope. It is an image of the condition
of men.
200. A man in a dungeon, ignorant whether
his sentence be pronounced and having only one hour to learn it, but this hour enough, if
he knew that it is pronounced, to obtain its repeal, would act unnaturally in spending
that hour, not in ascertaining his sentence, but in playing piquet. So it is against
nature that man, etc. It is making heavy the hand of God.
Thus not only the zeal of those who seek Him
proves God, but also the blindness of those who seek Him not.
201. All the objections of this one and that
one only go against themselves, and not against religion. All that infidels say ...
202. From those who are in despair at being
without faith, we see that God does not enlighten them; but as to the rest, we see there
is a God who makes them blind.
203. Fascinatio nugacitatis. —That
passion may not harm us, let us act as if we had only eight hours to live.
204. If we ought to devote eight hours of
life, we ought to devote a hundred years.
205. When I consider the short duration of
my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and after, the little space which I fill and
even can see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant and
which know me not, I am frightened and am astonished at being here rather than there; for
there is no reason why here rather than there, why now rather than then. Who has put me
here? By whose order and direction have this place and time been allotted to me? Memoria
hospitis unius diei praetereuntis.
206. The eternal silence of these infinite
spaces frightens me.
207. How many kingdoms know us not!
208. Why is my knowledge limited? Why my
stature? Why my life to one hundred years rather than to a thousand? What reason has
nature had for giving me such, and for choosing this number rather than another in the
infinity of those from which there is no more reason to choose one than another, trying
nothing else?
209. Art thou less a slave by being loved
and favoured by thy master? Thou art indeed well off, slave. Thy master favours thee; he
will soon beat thee.
210. The last act is tragic, however happy
all the rest of the play is; at the last a little earth is thrown upon our head, and that
is the end for ever.
211. We are fools to depend upon the society
of our fellow-men. Wretched as we are, powerless as we are, they will not aid us; we shall
die alone. We should therefore act as if we were alone, and in that case should we build
fine houses, etc. We should seek the truth without hesitation; and, if we refuse it, we
show that we value the esteem of men more than the search for truth.
212. Instability.—It is a horrible
thing to feel all that we possess slipping away.
213. Between us and heaven or hell there is
only life, which is the frailest thing in the world.
214. Injustice.—That presumption should
be joined to meanness is extreme injustice.
215. To fear death without danger, and not
in danger, for one must be a man.
216. Sudden death alone is feared; hence
confessors stay with lords.
217. An heir finds the title-deeds of his
house. Will he say, "Perhaps they are forged" and neglect to examine them?
218. Dungeon.—I approve of not
examining the opinion of Copernicus; but this...! It concerns all our life to know whether
the soul be mortal or immortal.
219. It is certain that the mortality or
immortality of the soul must make an entire difference to morality. And yet philosophers
have constructed their ethics independently of this: they discuss to pass an hour.
Plato, to incline to Christianity.
220. The fallacy of philosophers who have
not discussed the immortality of the soul. The fallacy of their dilemma in Montaigne.
221. Atheists ought to say what is perfectly
evident; now it is not perfectly evident that the soul is material.
222. Atheists.—What reason have they
for saying that we cannot rise from the dead? What is more difficult, to be born or to
rise again; that what has never been should be, or that what has been should be again? Is
it more difficult to come into existence than to return to it? Habit makes the one appear
easy to us; want of habit makes the other impossible. A popular way of thinking!
Why cannot a virgin bear a child? Does a hen
not lay eggs without a cock? What distinguishes these outwardly from others? And who has
told us that the hen may not form the germ as well as the cock?
223. What have they to say against the
resurrection, and against the child-bearing of the Virgin? Which is the more difficult, to
produce a man or an animal, or to reproduce it? And if they had never seen any species of
animals, could they have conjectured whether they were produced without connection with
each other?
224. How I hate these follies of not
believing in the Eucharist, etc.! If the Gospel be true, if Jesus Christ be God, what
difficulty is there?
225. Atheism shows strength of mind, but
only to a certain degree.
226. Infidels, who profess to follow reason,
ought to be exceedingly strong in reason. What say they then? "Do we not see,"
say they, "that the brutes live and die like men, and Turks like Christians? They
have their ceremonies, their prophets, their doctors, their saints, their monks, like
us," etc. (Is this contrary to Scripture? Does it not say all this?)
If you care but little to know the truth,
here is enough of it to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to know
it, it is not enough; look at it in detail. This would be sufficient for a question in
philosophy; but not here, where it concerns your all. And yet, after a trifling reflection
of this kind, we go to amuse ourselves, etc. Let us inquire of this same religion whether
it does not give a reason for this obscurity; perhaps it will teach it to us.
227. Order by dialogues.—What ought I
to do? I see only darkness everywhere. Shall I believe I am nothing? Shall I believe I am
God?
"All things change and succeed each
other." You are mistaken; there is...
228. Objection of atheists: "But we
have no light."
229. This is what I see and what troubles
me. I look on all sides, and I see only darkness everywhere. Nature presents to me nothing
which is not matter of doubt and concern. If I saw nothing there which revealed a
Divinity, I would come to a negative conclusion; if I saw everywhere the signs of a
Creator, I would remain peacefully in faith. But, seeing too much to deny and too little
to be sure, I am in a state to be pitied; wherefore I have a hundred times wished that if
a God maintains Nature, she should testify to Him unequivocally, and that, if the signs
she gives are deceptive, she should suppress them altogether; that she should say
everything or nothing, that I might see which cause I ought to follow. Whereas in my
present state, ignorant of what I am or of what I ought to do, I know neither my condition
nor my duty. My heart inclines wholly to know where is the true good, in order to follow
it; nothing would be too dear to me for eternity.
I envy those whom I see living in the faith
with such carelessness and who make such a bad use of a gift of which it seems to me I
would make such a different use.
230. It is incomprehensible that God should
exist, and it is incomprehensible that He should not exist; that the soul should be joined
to the body, and that we should have no soul; that the world should be created, and that
it should not be created, etc.; that original sin should be, and that it should not be.
231. Do you believe it to be impossible that
God is infinite, without parts? Yes. I wish therefore to show you an infinite and
indivisible thing. It is a point moving everywhere with an infinite velocity; for it is
one in all places and is all totality in every place.
Let this effect of nature, which previously
seemed to you impossible, make you know that there may be others of which you are still
ignorant. Do not draw this conclusion from your experiment, that there remains nothing for
you to know; but rather that there remains an infinity for you to know.
232. Infinite movement, the point which
fills everything, the moment of rest; infinite without quantity, indivisible and infinite.
233. Infinite—nothing.—Our soul is
cast into a body, where it finds number, dimension. Thereupon it reasons, and calls this
nature necessity, and can believe nothing else.
Unity joined to infinity adds nothing to it,
no more than one foot to an infinite measure. The finite is annihilated in the presence of
the infinite, and becomes a pure nothing. So our spirit before God, so our justice before
divine justice. There is not so great a disproportion between our justice and that of God
as between unity and infinity.
The justice of God must be vast like His
compassion. Now justice to the outcast is less vast and ought less to offend our feelings
than mercy towards the elect.
We know that there is an infinite, and are
ignorant of its nature. As we know it to be false that numbers are finite, it is therefore
true that there is an infinity in number. But we do not know what it is. It is false that
it is even, it is false that it is odd; for the addition of a unit can make no change in
its nature. Yet it is a number, and every number is odd or even (this is certainly true of
every finite number). So we may well know that there is a God without knowing what He is.
Is there not one substantial truth, seeing there are so many things which are not the
truth itself?
We know then the existence and nature of the
finite, because we also are finite and have extension. We know the existence of the
infinite and are ignorant of its nature, because it has extension like us, but not limits
like us. But we know neither the existence nor the nature of God, because He has neither
extension nor limits.
But by faith we know His existence; in glory
we shall know His nature. Now, I have already shown that we may well know the existence of
a thing, without knowing its nature.
Let us now speak according to natural
lights.
If there is a God, He is infinitely
incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are
then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is. This being so, who will dare to
undertake the decision of the question? Not we, who have no affinity to Him.
Who then will blame Christians for not being
able to give a reason for their belief, since they profess a religion for which they
cannot give a reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a
foolishness, stultitiam; and then you complain that they do not prove it! If they proved
it, they would not keep their word; it is in lacking proofs that they are not lacking in
sense. "Yes, but although this excuses those who offer it as such and takes away from
them the blame of putting it forward without reason, it does not excuse those who receive
it." Let us then examine this point, and say, "God is, or He is not." But
to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is an infinite chaos
which separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance
where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do
neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the
propositions.
Do not, then, reprove for error those who
have made a choice; for you know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having
made, not this choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who
chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The true course is not to
wager at all."
Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional.
You are embarked. Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us
see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two
things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your
nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in
choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point
settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is.
Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose
nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is. "That is very fine. Yes, I must
wager; but I may perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of
gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still
wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under
the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to
chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain.
But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an
infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in
wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to
stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one
for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here
an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number
of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; where-ever the
infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, there is
no time to hesitate, you must give all. And thus, when one is forced to play, he must
renounce reason to preserve his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to
happen as the loss of nothingness.
For it is no use to say it is uncertain if
we will gain, and it is certain that we risk, and that the infinite distance between the
certainly of what is staked and the uncertainty of what will be gained, equals the finite
good which is certainly staked against the uncertain infinite. It is not so, as every
player stakes a certainty to gain an uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty to
gain a finite uncertainty, without transgressing against reason. There is not an infinite
distance between the certainty staked and the uncertainty of the gain; that is untrue. In
truth, there is an infinity between the certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But
the uncertainty of the gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the
proportion of the chances of gain and loss. Hence it comes that, if there are as many
risks on one side as on the other, the course is to play even; and then the certainty of
the stake is equal to the uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an
infinite distance between them. And so our proposition is of infinite force, when there is
the finite to stake in a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the
infinite to gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.
"I confess it, I admit it. But, still,
is there no means of seeing the faces of the cards?" Yes, Scripture and the rest,
etc. "Yes, but I have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager, and am
not free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What, then, would you
have me do?"
True. But at least learn your inability to
believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour, then, to
convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your
passions. You would like to attain faith and do not know the way; you would like to cure
yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like
you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you
would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by
which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses
said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness. "But
this is what I am afraid of." And why? What have you to lose?
But to show you that this leads you there,
it is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks.
The end of this discourse.—Now, what
harm will befall you in taking this side? You will be faithful, humble, grateful,
generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have those poisonous
pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others? I will tell you that you will
thereby gain in this life, and that, at each step you take on this road, you will see so
great certainty of gain, so much nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last
recognise that you have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have
given nothing.
"Ah! This discourse transports me,
charms me," etc.
If this discourse pleases you and seems
impressive, know that it is made by a man who has knelt, both before and after it, in
prayer to that Being, infinite and without parts, before whom he lays all he has, for you
also to lay before Him all you have for your own good and for His glory, that so strength
may be given to lowliness.
234. If we must not act save on a certainty,
we ought not to act on religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an
uncertainty, sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at all, for nothing is
certain, and that there is more certainty in religion than there is as to whether we may
see to-morrow; for it is not certain that we may see to-morrow, and it is certainly
possible that we may not, see it. We cannot say as much about religion. It is not certain
that it is; but who will venture to say that it is certainly possible that it is not? Now
when we work for to-morrow, and so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably; for we ought to
work for an uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance which was demonstrated above.
Saint Augustine has seen that we work for an
uncertainty, on sea, in battle, etc. But he has not seen the doctrine of chance which
proves that we should do so. Montaigne has seen that we are shocked at a fool, and that
habit is all-powerful; but he has not seen the reason of this effect.
All these persons have seen the effects, but
they have not seen the causes. They are, in comparison with those who have discovered the
causes, as those who have only eyes are in comparison with those who have intellect. For
the effects are perceptible by sense, and the causes are visible only to the intellect.
And although these effects are seen by the mind, this mind is, in comparison with the mind
which sees the causes, as the bodily senses are in comparison with the intellect.
235. Rem viderunt, causam non viderunt.
236. According to the doctrine of chance,
you ought to put yourself to the trouble of searching for the truth; for if you die
without worshipping the True Cause, you are lost. "But," say you, "if He
had wished me to worship Him, He would have left me signs of His will." He has done
so; but you neglect them. Seek them, therefore; it is well worth it.
237. Chances.—We must live differently
in the world, according to these different assumptions: (1) that we could always remain in
it; (2) that it is certain that we shall not remain here long, and uncertain if we shall
remain here one hour. This last assumption is our condition.
238. What do you then promise me, in
addition to certain troubles, but ten years of self-love (for ten years is the chance), to
try hard to please without success?
239. Objection.—Those who hope for
salvation are so far happy; but they have as a counterpoise the fear of hell.
Reply.—Who has most reason to fear
hell: he who is in ignorance whether there is a hell, and who is certain of damnation if
there is; or he who certainly believes there is a hell and hopes to be saved if there is?
240. "I would soon have renounced
pleasure," say they, "had I faith." For my part I tell you, "You would
soon have faith, if you renounced pleasure." Now, it is for you to begin. If I could,
I would give you faith. I cannot do so, nor therefore test the truth of what you say. But
you can well renounce pleasure and test whether what I say is true.
241. Order.—I would have far more fear
of being mistaken, and of finding that the Christian religion was true, than of not being
mistaken in believing it true.
SECTION IV: OF THE MEANS OF BELIEF
242. Preface to the second
part.—To speak of those who have treated of this matter.
I admire the boldness with which these
persons undertake to speak of God. In addressing their argument to infidels, their first
chapter is to prove Divinity from the works of nature. I should not be astonished at their
enterprise, if they were addressing their argument to the faithful; for it is certain that
those who have the living faith in their hearts see at once that all existence is none
other than the work of the God whom they adore. But for those in whom this light is
extinguished, and in whom we purpose to rekindle it, persons destitute of faith and grace,
who, seeking with all their light whatever they see in nature that can bring them to this
knowledge, find only obscurity and darkness; to tell them that they have only to look at
the smallest things which surround them, and they will see God openly, to give them, as a
complete proof of this great and important matter, the course of the moon and planets, and
to claim to have concluded the proof with such an argument, is to give them ground for
believing that the proofs of our religion are very weak. And I see by reason and
experience that nothing is more calculated to arouse their contempt.
It is not after this manner that Scripture
speaks, which has a better knowledge of the things that are of God. It says, on the
contrary, that God is a hidden God, and that, since the corruption of nature, He has left
men in a darkness from which they can escape only through Jesus Christ, without whom all
communion with God is cut off. Nemo novit Patrem, nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius
revelare.
This is what Scripture points out to us,
when it says in so many places that those who seek God find Him. It is not of that light,
"like the noonday sun," that this is said. We do not say that those who seek the
noonday sun, or water in the sea, shall find them; and hence the evidence of God must not
be of this nature. So it tells us elsewhere: Vere tu es Deus absconditus.
243. It is an astounding fact that no
canonical writer has ever made use of nature to prove God. They all strive to make us
believe in Him. David, Solomon, etc., have never said, "There is no void, therefore
there is a God." They must have had more knowledge than the most learned people who
came after them, and who have all made use of this argument. This is worthy of attention.
244. "Why! Do you not say yourself that
the heavens and birds prove God?" No. "And does your religion not say so"?
No. For although it is true in a sense for some souls to whom God gives this light, yet it
is false with respect to the majority of men.
245. There are three sources of belief:
reason, custom, inspiration. The Christian religion, which alone has reason, does not
acknowledge as her true children those who believe without inspiration. It is not that she
excludes reason and custom. On the contrary, the mind must be opened to proofs, must be
confirmed by custom and offer itself in humbleness to inspirations, which alone can
produce a true and saving effect. Ne evacuetur crux Christi.
246. Order.—After the letter That we
ought to seek God, to write the letter On removing obstacles, which is the discourse on
"the machine," on preparing the machine, on seeking by reason.
247. Order.—A letter of exhortation to
a friend to induce him to seek. And he will reply, "But what is the use of seeking?
Nothing is seen." Then to reply to him, "Do not despair." And he will
answer that he would be glad to find some light, but that, according to this very
religion, if he believed in it, it will be of no use to him, and that therefore he prefers
not to seek. And to answer to that: The machine.
248. A letter which indicates the use of
proofs by the machine.—Faith is different from proof; the one is human, the other is
a gift of God. Justus ex fide vivit. It is this faith that God Himself puts into the
heart, of which the proof is often the instrument, fides ex auditu; but this faith is in
the heart, and makes us not say scio, but credo.
249. It is superstition to put one's hope in
formalities; but it is pride to be unwilling to submit to them.
250. The external must be joined to the
internal to obtain anything from God, that is to say, we must kneel, pray with the lips,
etc., in order that proud man, who would not submit himself to God, may be now subject to
the creature. To expect help from these externals is superstition; to refuse to join them
to the internal is pride.
251. Other religions, as the pagan, are more
popular, for they consist in externals. But they are not for educated people. A purely
intellectual religion would be more suited to the learned, but it would be of no use to
the common people. The Christian religion alone is adapted to all, being composed of
externals and internals. It raises the common people to the internal, and humbles the
proud to the external; it is not perfect without the two, for the people must understand
the spirit of the letter, and the learned must submit their spirit to the letter.
252. For we must not misunderstand
ourselves; we are as much automatic as intellectual; and hence it comes that the
instrument by which conviction is attained is not demonstrated alone. How few things are
demonstrated! Proofs only convince the mind. Custom is the source of our strongest and
most believed proofs. It bends the automaton, which persuades the mind without its
thinking about the matter. Who has demonstrated that there will be a to-morrow and that we
shall die? And what is more believed? It is, then, custom which persuades us of it; it is
custom that makes so many men Christians; custom that makes them Turks, heathens,
artisans, soldiers, etc. (Faith in baptism is more received among Christians than among
Turks.) Finally, we must have recourse to it when once the mind has seen where the truth
is, in order to quench our thirst, and steep ourselves in that belief, which escapes us at
every hour; for always to have proofs ready is too much trouble. We must get an easier
belief, which is that of custom, which, without violence, without art, without argument,
makes us believe things and inclines all our powers to this belief, so that our soul falls
naturally into it. It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction, when the
automaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both our parts must be made to believe, the
mind by reasons which it is sufficient to have seen once in a lifetime, and the automaton
by custom, and by not allowing it to incline to the contrary. Inclina cor meum, Deus.
The reason acts slowly, with so many
examinations and on so many principles, which must be always present, that at every hour
it falls asleep, or wanders, through want of having all its principles present. Feeling
does not act thus; it acts in a moment, and is always ready to act. We must then put our
faith in feeling; otherwise it will be always vacillating.
253. Two extremes: to exclude reason, to
admit reason only.
254. It is not a rare thing to have to
reprove the world for too much docility. It is a natural vice like credulity, and as
pernicious. Superstition.
255. Piety is different from superstition.
To carry piety as far as superstition is to
destroy it.
The heretics reproach us for this
superstitious submission. This is to do what they reproach us for...
Infidelity, not to believe in the Eucharist,
because it is not seen.
Superstition to believe propositions. Faith,
etc.
256. I say there are few true Christians,
even as regards faith. There are many who believe but from superstition. There are many
who do not believe solely from wickedness. Few are between the two.
In this I do not include those who are of
truly pious character, nor all those who believe from a feeling in their heart.
257. There are only three kinds of persons;
those who serve God, having found Him; others who are occupied in seeking Him, not having
found Him; while the remainder live without seeking Him and without having found Him. The
first are reasonable and happy, the last are foolish and unhappy; those between are
unhappy and reasonable.
258. Unusquisque sibi Deum fingit.
Disgust
259. Ordinary people have the power of not
thinking of that about which they do not wish to think. "Do not meditate on the
passages about the Messiah, said the Jew to his son. Thus our people often act. Thus are
false religions preserved, and even the true one, in regard to many persons.
But there are some who have not the power of
thus preventing thought, and who think so much the more as they are forbidden. These undo
false religions and even the true one, if they do not find solid arguments.
260. They hide themselves in the press and
call numbers to their rescue. Tumult.
Authority.—So far from making it a rule
to believe a thing because you have heard it, you ought to believe nothing without putting
yourself into the position as if you had never heard it.
It is your own assent to yourself, and the
constant voice of your own reason, and not of others, that should make you believe.
Belief is so important! A hundred
contradictions might be true. If antiquity were the rule of belief, men of ancient time
would then be without rule. If general consent, if men had perished?
False humanity, pride.
Lift the curtain. You try in vain; if you
must either believe, or deny, or doubt. Shall we then have no rule? We judge that animals
do well what they do. Is there no rule whereby to judge men?
To deny, to believe, and to doubt well, are
to a man what the race is to a horse.
Punishment of those who sin, error.
261. Those who do not love the truth take as
a pretext that it is disputed, and that a multitude deny it. And so their error arises
only from this, that they do not love either truth or charity. Thus they are without
excuse.
262. Superstition and lust. Scruples, evil
desires. Evil fear; fear, not such as comes from a belief in God, but such as comes from a
doubt whether He exists or not. True fear comes from faith; false fear comes from doubt.
True fear is joined to hope, because it is born of faith, and because men hope in the God
in whom they believe. False fear is joined to despair, because men fear the God in whom
they have no belief. The former fear to lose Him; the latter fear to find Him.
263. "A miracle," says one,
"would strengthen my faith." He says so when he does not see one. Reasons, seen
from afar, appear to limit our view; but when they are reached, we begin to see beyond.
Nothing stops the nimbleness of our mind. There is no rule, say we, which has not some
exceptions, no truth so general which has not some aspect in which it fails. It is
sufficient that it be not absolutely universal to give us a pretext for applying the
exceptions to the present subject and for saying, "This is not always true; there are
therefore cases where it is not so." It only remains to show that this is one of
them; and that is why we are very awkward or unlucky, if we do not find one some day.
264. We do not weary of eating and sleeping
every day, for hunger and sleepiness recur. Without that we should weary of them. So,
without the hunger for spiritual things, we weary of them. Hunger after righteousness, the
eighth beautitude.
265. Faith indeed tells what the senses do
not tell, but not the contrary of what they see. It is above them and not contrary to
them.
266. How many stars have telescopes revealed
to us which did not exist for our philosophers of old! We freely attack Holy Scripture on
the great number of stars, saying, "There are only one thousand and twenty-eight, we
know it." There is grass on the earth, we see it—from the moon we would not see
it—and on the grass are leaves, and in these leaves are small animals; but after that
no more. O presumptuous man! The compounds are composed of elements, and the elements not.
O presumptuous man! Here is a fine reflection. We must not say that there is anything
which we do not see. We must then talk like others, but not think like them.
267. The last proceeding of reason is to
recognise that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it. It is but feeble if it
does not see so far as to know this. But if natural things are beyond it, what will be
said of supernatural?
268. Submission.—We must know where to
doubt, where to feel certain, where to submit. He who does not do so understands not the
force of reason. There are some who offend against these three rules, either by affirming
everything as demonstrative, from want of knowing what demonstration is; or by doubting
everything, from want of knowing where to submit; or by submitting in everything, from
want of knowing where they must judge.
269. Submission is the use of reason in
which consists true Christianity.
270. Saint Augustine.—Reason would
never submit, if it did not judge that there are some occasions on which it ought to
submit. It is then right for it to submit, when it judges that it ought to submit.
271. Wisdom sends us to childhood. Nisi
efficiamini sicut parvuli.
272. There is nothing so conformable to
reason as this disavowal of reason.
273. If we submit everything to reason, our
religion will have no mysterious and supernatural element. If we offend the principles of
reason, our religion will be absurd and ridiculous.
274. All our reasoning reduces itself to
yielding to feeling.
But fancy is like, though contrary to,
feeling, so that we cannot distinguish between these contraries. One person says that my
feeling is fancy, another that his fancy is feeling. We should have a rule. Reason offers
itself; but it is pliable in every sense; and thus there is no rule.
275. Men often take their imagination for
their heart; and they believe they are converted as soon as they think of being converted.
276. M. de Roannez said: "Reasons come
to me afterwards, but at first a thing pleases or shocks me without my knowing the reason,
and yet it shocks me for that reason which I only discover afterwards." But I
believe, not that it shocked him for the reasons which were found afterwards, but that
these reasons were only found because it shocked him.
277. The heart has its reasons, which reason
does not know. We feel it in a thousand things. I say that the heart naturally loves the
Universal Being, and also itself naturally, according as it gives itself to them; and it
hardens itself against one or the other at its will. You have rejected the one and kept
the other. Is it by reason that you love yourself?
278. It is the heart which experiences God,
and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by the reason.
Faith is a gift of God; do not believe that
we said it was a gift of reasoning. Other religions do not say this of their faith. They
only give reasoning in order to arrive at it, and yet it does not bring them to it.
279. Faith is a gift of God; do not believe
that we said it was a gift of reasoning. Other religions do not say this of their faith.
They only gave reasoning in order to arrive at it, and yet it does not bring them to it.
280. The knowledge of God is very far from
the love of Him.
281. Heart, instinct, principles.
282. We know truth, not only by the reason,
but also by the heart, and it is in this last way that we know first principles; and
reason, which has no part in it, tries in vain to impugn them. The sceptics, who have only
this for their object, labour to no purpose. We know that we do not dream, and, however
impossible it is for us to prove it by reason, this inability demonstrates only the
weakness of our reason, but not, as they affirm, the uncertainty of all our knowledge. For
the knowledge of first principles, as space, time, motion, number, is as sure as any of
those which we get from reasoning. And reason must trust these intuitions of the heart,
and must base them on every argument. (We have intuitive knowledge of the tri-dimensional
nature of space and of the infinity of number, and reason then shows that there are no two
square numbers one of which is double of the other. Principles are intuited, propositions
are inferred, all with certainty, though in different ways.) And it is as useless and
absurd for reason to demand from the heart proofs of her first principles, before
admitting them, as it would be for the heart to demand from reason an intuition of all
demonstrated propositions before accepting them.
This inability ought, then, to serve only to
humble reason, which would judge all, but not to impugn our certainty, as if only reason
were capable of instructing us. Would to God, on the contrary, that we had never need of
it, and that we knew everything by instinct and intuition! But nature has refused us this
boon. On the contrary, she has given us but very little knowledge of this kind; and all
the rest can be acquired only by reasoning.
Therefore, those to whom God has imparted
religion by intuition are very fortunate and justly convinced. But to those who do not
have it, we can give it only by reasoning, waiting for God to give them spiritual insight,
without which faith is only human and useless for salvation.
283. Order.—Against the objection that
Scripture has no order.
The heart has its own order; the intellect
has its own, which is by principle and demonstration. The heart has another. We do not
prove that we ought to be loved by enumerating in order the causes of love; that would be
ridiculous.
Jesus Christ and Saint Paul employ the rule
of love, not of intellect; for they would warm, not instruct. It is the same with Saint
Augustine. This order consists chiefly in digressions on each point to indicate the end,
and keep it always in sight.
284. Do not wonder to see simple people
believe without reasoning. God imparts to them love of Him and hatred of self. He inclines
their heart to believe. Men will never believe with a saving and real faith, unless God
inclines their heart; and they will believe as soon as He inclines it. And this is what
David knew well, when he said: Inclina cor meum, Deus, in...
285. Religion is suited to all kinds of
minds. Some pay attention only to its establishment, and this religion is such that its
very establishment suffices to prove its truth. Others trace it even to the apostles. The
more learned go back to the beginning of the world. The angels see it better still, and
from a more distant time.
286. Those who believe without having read
the Testaments, do so because they have an inward disposition entirely holy, and all that
they hear of our religion conforms to it. They feel that a God has made them; they desire
only to love God; they desire to hate themselves only. They feel that they have no
strength in themselves; that they are incapable of coming to God; and that if God does not
come to them, they can have no communion with Him. And they hear our religion say that men
must love God only, and hate self only; but that, all being corrupt and unworthy of God,
God made Himself man to unite Himself to us. No more is required to persuade men who have
this disposition in their heart, and who have this knowledge of their duty and of their
inefficiency.
287. Those whom we see to be Christians
without the knowledge of the prophets and evidences, nevertheless judge of their religion
as well as those who have that knowledge. They judge of it by the heart, as others judge
of it by the intellect. God himself inclines them to believe, and thus they are most
effectively convinced.
I confess indeed that one of those
Christians who believe without proofs will not, perhaps, be capable of convincing an
infidel who will say the same of himself. But those who know the proofs of religion will
prove without difficulty that such a believer is truly inspired by God, though he cannot
prove it himself.
For God having said in His prophecies (which
are undoubtedly prophecies) that in the reign of Jesus Christ He would spread His spirit
abroad among nations, and that the youths and maidens and children of the Church would
prophesy; it is certain that the Spirit of God is in these and not in the others.
288. Instead of complaining that God had
hidden Himself, you will give Him thanks for not having revealed so much of Himself; and
you will also give Him thanks for not having revealed Himself to haughty sages, unworthy
to know so holy a God.
Two kinds of persons know Him: those who
have a humble heart, and who love lowliness, whatever kind of intellect they may have,
high or low; and those who have sufficient understanding to see the truth, whatever
opposition they may have to it.
289. Proof.—1. The Christian religion,
by its establishment, having established itself so strongly, so gently, whilst so contrary
to nature. 2. The sanctity, the dignity, and the humility of a Christian soul. 3. The
miracles of Holy Scripture. 4. Jesus Christ in particular. 5. The apostles in particular.
6. Moses and the prophets in particular. 7. The Jewish people. 8. The prophecies. 9.
Perpetuity; no religion has perpetuity. 10. The doctrine which gives a reason for
everything. 11. The sanctity of this law. 12. By the course of the world.
Surely, after considering what is life and
what is religion, we should not refuse to obey the inclination to follow it, if it comes
into our heart; and it is certain that there is no ground for laughing at those who follow
it.
290. Proofs of religion.—Morality,
doctrine, miracles, prophecies, types.
SECTION V: JUSTICE AND THE REASON OF EFFECTS
291. In the letter On Injustice can
come the ridiculousness of the law that the elder gets all. "My friend, you were born
on this side of the mountain, it is therefore just that your elder brother gets
everything."
"Why do you kill me"?
292. He lives on the other side of the
water.
293. "Why do you kill me? What! do you
not live on the other side of the water? If you lived on this side, my friend, I should be
an assassin, and it would be unjust to slay you in this manner. But since you live on the
other side, I am a hero, and it is just."
294. On what shall man found the order of
the world which he would govern? Shall it be on the caprice of each individual? What
confusion! Shall it be on justice? Man is ignorant of it.
Certainly, had he known it, he would not
have established this maxim, the most general of all that obtain among men, that each
should follow the custom of his own country. The glory of true equity would have brought
all nations under subjection, and legislators would not have taken as their model the
fancies and caprice of Persians and Germans instead of this unchanging justice. We would
have seen it set up in all the States on earth and in all times; whereas we see neither
justice nor injustice which does not change its nature with change in climate. Three
degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides the truth. Fundamental
laws change after a few years of possession; right has its epochs; the entry of Saturn
into the Lion marks to us the origin of such and such a crime. A strange justice that is
bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.
Men admit that justice does not consist in
these customs, but that it resides in natural laws, common to every country. They would
certainly maintain it obstinately, if reckless chance which has distributed human laws had
encountered even one which was universal; but the farce is that the caprice of men has so
many vagaries that there is no such law.
Theft, incest, infanticide, parricide, have
all had a place among virtuous actions. Can anything be more ridiculous than that a man
should have the right to kill me because he lives on the other side of the water, and
because his ruler has a quarrel with mine, though I have none with him?
Doubtless there are natural laws; but good
reason once corrupted has corrupted all. Nihil amplius nostrum est; quod nostrum dicimus,
artis est. Ex senatus—consultis et plebiscitis crimina exercentur. Ut olim vitiis,
sic nunc legibus laboramus.
The result of this confusion is that one
affirms the essence of justice to be the authority of the legislator; another, the
interest of the sovereign; another, present custom, and this is the most sure. Nothing,
according to reason alone, is just itself; all changes with time. Custom creates the whole
of equity, for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its
authority; whoever carries it back to first principles destroys it. Nothing is so faulty
as those laws which correct faults. He who obeys them because they are just obeys a
justice which is imaginary and not the essence of law; it is quite self-contained, it is
law and nothing more. He who will examine its motive will find it so feeble and so
trifling that, if he be not accustomed to contemplate the wonders of human imagination, he
will marvel that one century has gained for it so much pomp and reverence. The art of
opposition and of revolution is to unsettle established customs, sounding them even to
their source, to point out their want of authority and justice. We must, it is said, get
back to the natural and fundamental laws of the State, which an unjust custom has
abolished. It is a game certain to result in the loss of all; nothing will be just on the
balance. Yet people readily lend their ear to such arguments. They shake off the yoke as
soon as they recognise it; and the great profit by their ruin and by that of these curious
investigators of accepted customs. But from a contrary mistake men sometimes think they
can justly do everything which is not without an example. That is why the wisest of
legislators said that it was necessary to deceive men for their own good; and another, a
good politician, Cum veritatem qua liberetur ignoret, expedit quod fallatur. We must not
see the fact of usurpation; law was once introduced without reason, and has become
reasonable. We must make it regarded as authoritative, eternal, and conceal its origin, if
we do not wish that it should soon come to an end.
295. Mine, thine.—"This dog is
mine," said those poor children; "that is my place in the sun." Here is the
beginning and the image of the usurpation of all the earth.
296. When the question for consideration is
whether we ought to make war and kill so many men—condemn so many Spaniards to
death—only one man is judge, and he is an interested party. There should be a third,
who is disinterested.
297. Veri juris. —We have it no more;
if we had it, we should take conformity to the customs of a country as the rule of
justice. It is here that, not finding justice, we have found force, etc.
298. Justice, might.—It is right that
what is just should be obeyed; it is necessary that what is strongest should be obeyed.
Justice without might is helpless; might without justice is tyrannical. Justice without
might is gainsaid, because there are always offenders; might without justice is condemned.
We must then combine justice and might and, for this end, make what is just strong, or
what is strong just.
Justice is subject to dispute; might is
easily recognised and is not disputed. So we cannot give might to justice, because might
has gainsaid justice and has declared that it is she herself who is just. And thus, being
unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just.
299. The only universal rules are the laws
of the country in ordinary affairs and of the majority in others. Whence comes this? From
the might which is in them. Hence it comes that kings, who have power of a different kind,
do not follow the majority of their ministers.
No doubt equality of goods is just; but,
being unable to cause might to obey justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable
to strengthen justice, they have justified might; so that the just and the strong should
unite, and there should be peace, which is the sovereign good.
300. "When a strong man armed keepeth
his goods, his goods are in peace."
301. Why do we follow the majority? Is it
because they have more reason? No, because they have more power.
Why do we follow the ancient laws and
opinions? Is it because they are more sound? No, but because they are unique and remove
from us the root of difference.
302. ... It is the effect of might, not of
custom. For those who are capable of originality are few; the greater number will only
follow and refuse glory to those inventors who seek it by their inventions. And if these
are obstinate in their wish to obtain glory and despise those who do not invent, the
latter will call them ridiculous names and will beat them with a stick. Let no one, then,
boast of his subtlety, or let him keep his complacency to himself.
303. Might is the sovereign of the world,
and not opinion. But opinion makes use of might. It is might that makes opinion.
Gentleness is beautiful in our opinion. Why? Because he who will dance on a rope will be
alone, and I win gather a stronger mob of people who will say that it is unbecoming.
304. The cords which bind the respect of men
to each other are in general cords of necessity; for there must be different degrees, all
men wishing to rule, and not all being able to do so, but some being able.
Let us, then, imagine we see society in the
process of formation. Men will doubtless fight till the stronger party overcomes the
weaker, and a dominant party is established. But when this is once determined, the
masters, who do not desire the continuation of strife, then decree that the power which is
in their hands shall be transmitted as they please. Some place it in election by the
people, others in hereditary succession, etc.
And this is the point where imagination
begins to play its part. Till now power makes fact; now power is sustained by imagination
in a certain party, in France in the nobility, in Switzerland in the burgesses, etc.
These cords which bind the respect of men to
such and such an individual are therefore the cords of imagination.
305. The Swiss are offended by being called
gentlemen, and prove themselves true plebeians in order to be thought worthy of great
office.
306. As duchies, kingships, and magistracies
are real and necessary, because might rules all, they exist everywhere and always. But
since only caprice makes such and such a one a ruler, the principle is not constant, but
subject to variation, etc.
307. The chancellor is grave and clothed
with ornaments, for his position is unreal. Not so the king; he has power and has nothing
to do with the imagination. Judges, physicians, etc., appeal only to the imagination.
308. The habit of seeing kings accompanied
by guards, drums, officers, and all the paraphernalia which mechanically inspire respect
and awe, makes their countenance, when sometimes seen alone without these accompaniments,
impress respect and awe on their subjects; because we cannot separate in thought their
persons from the surroundings with which we see them usually joined. And the world, which
knows not that this effect is the result of habit, believes that it arises by a natural
force, whence come these words, "The character of Divinity is stamped on his
countenance," etc.
309. Justice.—As custom determines what
is agreeable, so also does it determine justice.
310. King and tyrant.—I, too, will keep
my thoughts secret.
I will take care on every journey.
Greatness of establishment, respect for
establishment.
The pleasure of the great is the power to
make people happy.
The property of riches is to be given
liberally.
The property of each thing must be sought.
The property of power is to protect.
When force attacks humbug, when a private
soldier takes the square cap off a first president, and throws it out of the window.
311. The government founded on opinion and
imagination reigns for some time, and this government is pleasant and voluntary; that
founded on might lasts for ever. Thus opinion is the queen of the world, but might is its
tyrant.
312. Justice is what is established; and
thus all our established laws will necessarily be regarded as just without examination,
since they are established.
313. Sound opinions of the
people.—Civil wars are the greatest of evils. They are inevitable, if we wish to
reward desert; for all will say they are deserving. The evil we have to fear from a fool
who succeeds by right of birth, is neither so great nor so sure.
314. God has created all for Himself. He has
bestowed upon Himself the power of pain and pleasure.
You can apply it to God, or to yourself. If
to God, the Gospel is the rule. If to yourself, you will take the place of God. As God is
surrounded by persons full of charity, who ask of Him the blessings of charity that are in
His power, so... recognise, then, and learn that you are only a king of lust, and take the
ways of lust.
315. The reason of effects.—It is
wonderful that men would not have me honour a man clothed in brocade and followed by seven
or eight lackeys! Why! He will have me thrashed, if I do not salute him. This custom is a
farce. It is the same with a horse in fine trappings in comparison with another! Montaigne
is a fool not to see what difference there is, to wonder at our finding any, and to ask
the reason. "Indeed," says he, "how comes it," etc....
316. Sound opinions of the people.—To
be spruce is not altogether foolish, for it proves that a great number of people work for
one. It shows by one's hair, that one has a valet, a perfumer, etc., by one's band,
thread, lace,... etc. Now it is not merely superficial nor merely outward show to have
many arms at command. The more arms one has, the more powerful one is. To be spruce is to
show one's power.
317. Deference means, "Put yourself to
inconvenience." This is apparently silly, but is quite right. For it is to say,
"I would indeed put myself to inconvenience if you required it, since indeed I do so
when it is of no service to you." Deference further serves to distinguish the great.
Now if deference was displayed by sitting in an arm-chair, we should show deference to
everybody, and so no distinction would be made; but, being put to inconvenience, we
distinguish very well.
318. He has four lackeys.
319. How rightly do we distinguish men by
external appearances rather than by internal qualities! Which of us two shall have
precedence? Who will give place to the other? The least clever. But I am as clever as he.
We should have to fight over this. He has four lackeys, and I have only one. This can be
seen; we have only to count. It falls to me to yield, and I am a fool if I contest the
matter. By this means we are at peace, which is the greatest of boons.
320. The most unreasonable things in the
world become most reasonable, because of the unruliness of men. What is less reasonable
than to choose the eldest son of a queen to rule a State? We do not choose as captain of a
ship the passenger who is of the best family.
This law would be absurd and unjust; but,
because men are so themselves and always will be so, it becomes reasonable and just. For
whom will men choose, as the most virtuous and able? We at once come to blows, as each
claims to be the most virtuous and able. Let us then attach this quality to something
indisputable. This is the king's eldest son. That is clear, and there is no dispute.
Reason can do no better, for civil war is the greatest of evils.
321. Children are astonished to see their
comrades respected.
322. To be of noble birth is a great
advantage. In eighteen years it places a man within the select circle, known and
respected, as another have merited in fifty years. It is a gain of thirty years without
trouble.
323. What is the Ego?
Suppose a man puts himself at a window to
see those who pass by. If I pass by, can I say that he placed himself there to see me? No;
for he does not think of me in particular. But does he who loves someone on account of
beauty really love that person? No; for the small-pox, which will kill beauty without
killing the person, will cause him to love her no more.
And if one loves me for my judgement,
memory, he does not love me, for I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where,
then, is this Ego, if it be neither in the body nor in the soul? And how love the body or
the soul, except for these qualities which do not constitute me, since they are
perishable? For it is impossible and would be unjust to love the soul of a person in the
abstract and whatever qualities might be therein. We never, then, love a person, but only
qualities.
Let us, then, jeer no more at those who are
honoured on account of rank and office; for we love a person only on account of borrowed
qualities.
324. The people have very sound opinions,
for example:
1. In having preferred diversion and hunting
to poetry. The half-learned laugh at it, and glory in being above the folly of the world;
but the people are right for a reason which these do not fathom.
2. In having distinguished men by external
marks, as birth or wealth. The world again exults in showing how unreasonable this is; but
it is very reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant king.
3. In being offended at a blow, or in
desiring glory so much. But it is very desirable on account of the other essential goods
which are joined to it; and a man who has received a blow, without resenting it, is
overwhelmed with taunts and indignities.
4. In working for the uncertain; in sailing
on the sea; in walking over a plank.
325. Montaigne is wrong. Custom should be
followed only because it is custom, and not because it is reasonable or just. But people
follow it for this sole reason, that they think it just. Otherwise they would follow it no
longer, although it were the custom; for they will only submit to reason or justice.
Custom without this would pass for tyranny; but the sovereignty of reason and justice is
no more tyrannical than that of desire. They are principles natural to man.
It would, therefore, be right to obey laws
and customs, because they are laws; but we should know that there is neither truth nor
justice to introduce into them, that we know nothing of these, and so must follow what is
accepted. By this means we would never depart from them. But people cannot accept this
doctrine; and, as they believe that truth can be found, and that it exists in law and
custom, they believe them and take their antiquity as a proof of their truth, and not
simply of their authority apart from truth. Thus they obey laws, but they are liable to
revolt when these are proved to be valueless; and this can be shown of all, looked at from
a certain aspect.
326. Injustice.—It is dangerous to tell
the people that the laws are unjust; for they obey them only because they think them just.
Therefore it is necessary to tell them at the same time that they must obey them because
they are laws, just as they must obey superiors, not because they are just, but because
they are superiors. In this way all sedition is prevented, if this can be made
intelligible and it be understood what is the proper definition of justice.
327. The world is a good judge of things,
for it is in natural ignorance, which is man's true state. The sciences have two extremes
which meet. The first is the pure natural ignorance in which all men find themselves at
birth. The other extreme is that reached by great intellects, who, having run through all
that men can know, find they know nothing, and come back again to that same ignorance from
which they set out; but this is a learned ignorance which is conscious of itself. Those
between the two, who have departed from natural ignorance and not been able to reach the
other, have some smattering of this vain knowledge and pretend to be wise. These trouble
the world and are bad judges of everything. The people and the wise constitute the world;
these despise it, and are despised. They judge badly of everything, and the world judges
rightly of them.
328. The reason of effects.—Continual
alternation of pro and con.
We have, then, shown that man is foolish, by
the estimation he makes of things which are not essential; and all these opinions are
destroyed. We have next shown that all these opinions are very sound and that thus, since
all these vanities are well founded, the people are not so foolish as is said. And so we
have destroyed the opinion which destroyed that of the people.
But we must now destroy this last
proposition and show that it remains always true that the people are foolish, though their
opinions are sound because they do not perceive the truth where it is, and, as they place
it where it is not, their opinions are always very false and very unsound.
329. The reason of effects.—The
weakness of man is the reason why so many things are considered fine, as to be good at
playing the lute. It is only an evil because of our weakness.
330. The power of kings is founded on the
reason and on the folly of the people, and specially on their folly. The greatest and most
important thing in the world has weakness for its foundation, and this foundation is
wonderfully sure; for there is nothing more sure than this, that the people will be weak.
What is based on sound reason is very ill-founded as the estimate of wisdom.
331. We can only think of Plato and
Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their
friends, and, when they diverted themselves with writing their Laws and the Politics, they
did it as an amusement. That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least
serious; the most philosophic was to live simply and quietly. If they wrote on politics,
it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; and if they presented the appearance
of speaking of a great matter, it was because they knew that the madmen, to whom they
spoke, thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into their principles in order
to make their madness as little harmful as possible.
332. Tyranny consists in the desire of
universal power beyond its scope.
There are different assemblies of the
strong, the fair, the sensible, the pious, in which each man rules at home, not elsewhere.
And sometimes they meet, and the strong and the fair foolishly fight as to who shall be
master, for their mastery is of different kinds. They do not understand one another, and
their fault is the desire to rule everywhere. Nothing can effect this, not even might,
which is of no use in the kingdom of the wise, and is only mistress of external actions.
Tyranny—... So these expressions are
false and tyrannical: "I am fair, therefore I must be feared. I am strong, therefore
I must be loved. I am...
Tyranny is the wish to have in one way what
can only be had in another. We render different duties to different merits; the duty of
love to the pleasant; the duty of fear to the strong; duty of belief to the learned.
We must render these duties; it is unjust to
refuse them, and unjust to ask others. And so it is false and tyrannical to say, "He
is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him; he is not able, therefore I will not fear
him."
333. Have you never seen people who, in
order to complain of the little fuss you make about them, parade before you the example of
great men who esteem them? In answer I reply to them, "Show me the merit whereby you
have charmed these persons, and I also will esteem you."
334. The reason of effects.—Lust and
force are the source of all our actions; lust causes voluntary actions, force involuntary
ones.
335. The reason of effects.—It is,
then, true to say that all the world is under a delusion; for, although the opinions of
the people are sound, they are not so as conceived by them, since they think the truth to
be where it is not. Truth is indeed in their opinions, but not at the point where they
imagine it. Thus it is true that we must honour noblemen, but not because noble birth is
real superiority, etc.
336. The reason of effects.—We must
keep our thought secret, and judge everything by it, while talking like the people.
337. The reason of effects. Degrees. The
people honour persons of high birth. The semi-learned despise them, saying that birth is
not a personal, but a chance superiority. The learned honour them, not for popular
reasons, but for secret reasons. Devout persons, who have more zeal than knowledge,
despise them, in spite of that consideration which makes them honoured by the learned,
because they judge them by a new light which piety gives them. But perfect Christians
honour them by another and higher light. So arise a succession of opinions for and
against, according to the light one has.
338. True Christians, nevertheless, comply
with folly, not because they respect folly, but the command of God, who for the punishment
of men has made them subject to these follies. Omnis creatura subjecta est vanitati.
Liberabitur. Thus Saint Thomas explains the passage in Saint James on giving place to the
rich, that, if they do it not in the sight of God, they depart from the command of religion.
