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St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH (Questions
[110]-114)
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices
opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the
opposite vice. Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?
(2) Of the species of lying;
(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
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Question: 110 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Whether lying is always opposed to
truth?
Objection 1: It seems that lying is
not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is
compatible with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies,
according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
Objection 2: Further, the virtue of
truth applies not only to words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life.
But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that "a lie is
a false signification by words." Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly
opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says
(Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the "liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this
is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
On the contrary, Augustine says
(Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to
deceive. Wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest
lie." But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
I answer that, A moral act takes its
species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will,
which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own
object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the
will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above (FS, Question [18],
Articles [6],7).
Now it has been said above (Question [109],
Article [1],
ad 3) that the virtue of truth---and consequently the opposite vices---regards a
manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of
reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in
comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest
something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural
instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a
moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the
proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention
of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while
the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
Accordingly if these three things
concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the
intention to deceive, then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said is false,
formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the
will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a
lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say
what is false; wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its
being in opposition to the "mind." Consequently if one says what is false,
thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is
beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside
the speaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference.
If, on the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive,
even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it
contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of
a lie.
That a person intends to cause
another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of
lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its
species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy
body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of
its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue
of truth.
Reply to Objection 1: We judge of a
thing according to what is in it formally and essentially rather than according to what is
in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as
a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a
falsehood with the intention of telling the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it
is said that "a lie is a false signification by words," the term
"words" denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify
something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire to
deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any
effect belong to the species of its cause.
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Question: 110 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Whether lies are sufficiently
divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies?
Objection 1: It seems that lies are
not sufficiently divided into "officious," "jocose" and
"mischievous" lies. For a division should be made according to that which
pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text.
43; De Part. Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a
moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an
indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division is made according
to the intention of the effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun,
an "officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in
order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine
(Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is "in religious
doctrine"; the second is "a lie that profits no one and injures someone";
the third "profits one party so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told
out of mere lust of lying and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire
to please"; the sixth "injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his
money"; the seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from
death"; the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from
defilement of the body." Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is
insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into "boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech,
and "irony," which falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these
two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that
the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7,
"Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," says "that there are three kinds
of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is
another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of
malice." The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the
third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three kinds.
I answer that, Lies may be divided in
three ways. First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and
essential division of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to
"boasting," and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs to
"irony." This division is an essential division of lying itself, because lying
as such is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of
equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.
Secondly, lies may be divided with
respect to their nature as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or
diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is
aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is called a
"mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to
some good---either of pleasure and then it is a "jocose" lie, or of usefulness,
and then we have the "officious" lie, whereby it is intended to help another
person, or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three
kinds aforesaid.
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more
general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or
diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in
the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under
"mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie
"in religious doctrine," or against man, and this either with the sole intention
of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie, which "profits no one, and
injures someone"; or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time
profiting another, and this is the third kind of lie, "which profits one, and injures
another." Of these the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are
always more grievous, as stated above (FS, Question [73],
Article [3]):
and the second is more grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is diminished
by the intention of profiting another.
After these three, which aggravate
the sin of lying, we have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition
or diminution; and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of lying and
deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7)
that "the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying."
The four kinds that follow lessen
the gravity of the sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told
"with a desire to please": and the remaining three are comprised under the
officious lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness
regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which
"profits someone in saving his money"; or his body, and this is the seventh
kind, which "saves a man from death"; or the morality of his virtue, and this is
the eighth kind, which "saves him from unlawful defilement of his body."
Now it is evident that the greater
the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful
consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in
their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good, and
life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Question: 110 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Whether every lie is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that not every
lie is a sin. For it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the
Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of
Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them must
have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no one is
rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it
is stated that "God built them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, the deeds of
holy men are related in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But we read of
certain very holy men that they lied. Thus (Gn. 12 and 20) we are told
that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that
he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gn. 27:27-29). Again, Judith is
commended (Judith 15:10,11) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a
sin.
Objection 4: Further, one ought to
choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb,
lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's
mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save
another from committing murder, or another from being killed.
Objection 5: Further, it is a lie not
to fulfill what one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for
Isidore says (Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill."
Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Objection 6: Further, apparently a
lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De
Mend. xxi): "Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives
himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives others."
Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie;
seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, but
merely for the sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in
Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
On the contrary, It is written
(Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to make any manner of lie."
I answer that, An action that is
naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order
for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a
complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom.
iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue
matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue
for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while
truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also
Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).
Reply to Objection 1: It is unlawful
to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical
Scripture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived
of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain
people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute
a lie. Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to
understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will
conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is
expressed." Hence it is evident, as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that "we
must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way
and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or heard."
Reply to Objection 2: The midwives
were rewarded, not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will,
which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And because the
midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie was not
meritorious.
Reply to Objection 3: In Holy Writ,
as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as
examples of perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If,
however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such
statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v):
"We must believe that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are
mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically." As to
Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, not to
tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father,"
Augustine says (Questions. Super. Gen. xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii).
Wherefore Abraham himself said (Gn. 20:12): "She is truly my
sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related
to him on his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was
spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's birthright was due to him by
right: and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in
order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles, should
supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.
Some, however, are commended in the
Scriptures, not on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition,
seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain
undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holofernes, but for her
desire to save the people, to which end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might
also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense.
Reply to Objection 4: A lie is sinful
not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as
stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in
order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in
order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common.
Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger
whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as
Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).
Reply to Objection 5: A man does not
lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary
to what he has in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith
in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he has
promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did well to
change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the
business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound to keep a
promise, it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie
in promising---since he promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken
for granted---nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances are
no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had
promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did not lie, because
obstacles had arisen which prevented him.
Reply to Objection 6: An action may
be considered in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent.
Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive;
although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by
the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of
figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib.
De Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every
statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said
figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify."
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Question: 110 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Whether every lie is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that every lie
is a mortal sin. For it is written (Ps. 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy
all that speak a lie," and (Wis. 1:11): "The mouth that belieth killeth the
soul." Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every
lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is
against a precept of the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of
the decalogue: "Thou shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says
(De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he
wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith
with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity."
Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty of iniquity," for a
venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.
Objection 4: Further, the eternal
reward is not lost save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost,
being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn
from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward which
they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received in eternal life,
dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty."
Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the
least of lies, is a mortal sin.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says
(Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all,
but not even to wish to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept.
Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told
by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others.
On the contrary, Augustine says on
Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are
not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the
sake of our neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and
officious lies are not mortal sins.
I answer that, A mortal sin is,
properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with
God, as stated above (Question [24],
Article [12];
Question [35],
Article [3]).
Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect
of the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.
A lie may be in itself contrary to
charity by reason of its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is
contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that a
lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of
faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the
false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, for
instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this
description inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, since it causes him to have a false
opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and
consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the
lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in
question does no harm to one's neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some
contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind, considered
in itself, is not a mortal sin.
As regards the end in view, a lie
may be contrary to charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this
is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's
neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal sin,
since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely
the intention of committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to
charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the
case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie,
where the good also of one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to
charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it
will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying
publicly.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages
quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou
wilt destroy all that speak a lie."
Reply to Objection 2: Since all the
precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated
above (Question [44],
Article [1],
ad 3; FS,
Question [100], Article [5], ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so
far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden
to bear false witness against our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3: Even a venial
sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the
equity of justice; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): "Every sin is
iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking.
Reply to Objection 4: The lie of the
midwives may be considered in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness
towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous
disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his
exposition of Is. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains that God "built them
spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be considered with regard to the external act of
lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal
meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though
this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we
must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the
eternal reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as the
objection understands the words to mean.
Reply to Objection 5: Some say that
for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no
circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another
species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except
perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for instance if it be against his
vow: and this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a
jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on account of
scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of
perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie": although
Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless
perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position
to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their
office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal
sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.
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