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Question: 143 [<< | >>]
St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN
GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of
temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in
particular.
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Question: 143 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Whether the parts of temperance are
rightly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully
(De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts
them to be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be
distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue.
Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, mildness
seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about
pleasures of touch, as stated above (Question [141],
Article [4]).
Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.
Objection 3: Further, modesty
concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty
be known to all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above
(Question [58],
Article [8]).
Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, Macrobius (In
Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance
results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the companions of
temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method,
contentment." [*'Per-se-sufficientiam' which could be rendered 'self-sufficiency,'
but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See Question [169], Article [1].]
Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (Questions [48],128),
a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and
potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are
necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral parts of temperance,
"shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to
temperance, and "honesty," whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as
stated above (Question [141],
Article [2],
ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the
vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are
its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the
difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of
two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is
"abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is "sobriety." Other
pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal
pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the
pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or
fondling, we have "purity."
The potential parts of a principal
virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in
some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is
not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are
most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some
matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be
reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
This happens in three ways: first,
in the inward movements of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the
body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which
temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a
particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by
the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by "continence," the
effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does
not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope,
and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by "humility."
The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained
by "meekness" or "mildness."
With regard to bodily movements and
actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of "modesty," which, according
to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and
what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he
assigns to "method." The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does,
and this he ascribes to "refinement." The third has to do with the conversation
or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called
"gravity."
With regard to external things, a
twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this
Macrobius assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly,
we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes
"moderation," Andronicus "simplicity."
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that
continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state
further on (Question [165],
Article [1]);
and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with
temperance both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since
it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Mildness or
meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because
they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the matter
of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider
this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of
temperance.
Reply to Objection 4: Under modesty
Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external
things, as well as the moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
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