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St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO
ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider active and
contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into
active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of
the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
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Whether life is fittingly divided
into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life
is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of
life by its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living
things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of action and contemplation
by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and
contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the division of
that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active
and contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences
of the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore life is unfittingly
divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, the word
"life" implies movement, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas
contemplation consists rather in rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my
house, I shall repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is
unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom.
xiv super Ezech.): "There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His
holy word, the active life and the contemplative."
I answer that, Properly speaking,
those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now
that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most
becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of its life by that
operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of
plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation
and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason.
Wherefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that wherein he delights
most, and on which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate with
his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are
especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on
external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active and
contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: Each thing's
proper form that makes it actually "to be" is properly that thing's principle of
operation. Hence "to live" is, in living things, "to be," because
living things through having "being" from their form, act in such and such a
way.
Reply to Objection 2: Life in general
is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species
from having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life.
Reply to Objection 3: It is true that
contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a
movement of the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement; in
which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation and understanding are
movements of a kind, in so far as movement is defined "the act of a perfect
thing." In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in
contemplation, namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique"
[*Cf. Question [180], Article [6]].
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Question: 179 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Whether life is adequately divided
into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life
is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 5) that there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the
"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and
contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De
Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of
"leisure" which pertains to the contemplative, the "busy" life which
pertains to the active, and a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem
that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, man's life is
diversified according to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more
than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided
into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
On the contrary, These two lives are
signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel:
and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life
by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.]). Now this
signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is
adequately divided into active and contemplative.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1],
ad 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the
intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative
intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect.
Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: The life of
pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals;
wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a
beast." Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into active
and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 2: A mean is a
combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and
cold, and pale in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that
which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the simples
predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the
active element, abounds.
Reply to Objection 3: All the
occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in
accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of
the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister
to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised
under the active life. Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of
truth belong to the contemplative life.
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