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St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION
(Questions [1]-59)
OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION (SIX ARTICLES)
Concerning the first, three things
occur to be considered: first, the fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union
of the Word Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting for God to become incarnate?
(2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?
(3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?
(4)
Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than actual?
(5)
Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the beginning of the world?
(6)
Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of the world?
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Whether it was fitting that God
should become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it
was not fitting for God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very
essence of goodness, it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from
all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for Him not to be
united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God to become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it is not
fitting to unite things that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union
if one were "to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of
a man" [*Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1]. But God and flesh are infinitely apart; since
God is most simple, and flesh is most composite---especially human flesh. Therefore it was
not fitting that God should be united to human flesh.
Objection 3: Further, a body is as
distant from the highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly
unfitting that God, Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not
fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.
Objection 4: Further, it is not
becoming that He Who surpassed the greatest things should be contained in the least, and
He upon Whom rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But
God---Who takes care of the whole world---the whole universe of things cannot contain.
Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He should be hid under the frail body of a
babe in swathing bands, in comparison with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little;
and that this Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government of
the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus writes to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).
On the contrary, It would seem most
fitting that by visible things the invisible things of God should be made known; for to
this end was the whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rm. 1:20): "For the invisible
things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made
known at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of
God---"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own handiwork; His
justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to be overcome by none other than
man, and yet He did not snatch men forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a
suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is
nothing greater than for God to become incarnate . . ."
I answer that, To each things, that
is befitting which belongs to it by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man,
since this belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature of God
is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what belongs to the essence
of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to
others, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the
highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is
brought about chiefly by "His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is
made up of these three---the Word, a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of
the Incarnation was not completed through God being changed in any way from the state in
which He had been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the creature in
a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself. But it is fitting that a
creature which by nature is mutable, should not always be in one way. And therefore, as
the creature began to be, although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been
previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.
Reply to Objection 2: To be united to
God in unity of person was not fitting to human flesh, according to its natural
endowments, since it was above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by
reason of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's salvation.
Reply to Objection 3: Every mode of
being wherein any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by
God's wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and
incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own goodness. And so also
the evil of punishment was established by God's justice for God's glory. But evil of fault
is committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the order of the
Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a nature created,
mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty, but it did not become Him to assume the evil
of fault.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine
replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God
was so joined to human flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were,
contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is the thought
of men unable to see anything but corporeal things . . . God is great not in mass, but in
might. Hence the greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if
the passing word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible
that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once?" Hence nothing unfitting
arises from God becoming incarnate.
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Whether it was necessary for the
restoration of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it
was not necessary for the reparation of the human race that the Word of God should become
incarnate. For since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said (FP, Question [4],
Articles [1],2),
no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate Word of
God restored human nature. He could also have restored it without assuming flesh.
Objection 2: Further, for the
restoration of human nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is required than
that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God
cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more inclined to be merciful
than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to man's charge, so He ought to credit him with
the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that
the Word of God should become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, to revere God
pertains especially to man's salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): "If, then, I
be a father, where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" But men
revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond man's senses,
hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written:
"The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and
farther on: "Who is as the Lord our God?" which pertains to reverence. Therefore
it would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like unto us by
assuming flesh.
On the contrary, What frees the human
race from perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the
Incarnation is such; according to Jn. 3:16: "God so loved the world as to give His
only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life
everlasting." Therefore it was necessary for man's salvation that God should become
incarnate.
I answer that, A thing is said to be
necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food
is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better
and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not
necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God
with His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the
second way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human
nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10): "We shall also show that other ways
were not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but that there was
not a more fitting way of healing our misery."
Now this may be viewed with respect
to our "furtherance in good." First, with regard to faith, which is made more
certain by believing God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2):
"In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself,
the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith."
Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says
(De Trin. xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how
deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son
of God should become a partner with us of human nature?" Thirdly, with regard to
charity, which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv):
"What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for
us?" And he afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us
hasten to love in return." Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an
example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): "Man who might be seen was
not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God
was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown
to man." Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the
true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's
humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): "Go was made man, that man
might be made God."
So also was this useful for our
"withdrawal from evil." First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the
devil to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De
Trin. xiii, 17): "Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let
not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no
bodies." Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man's dignity, lest we
should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved
to us how high a place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to
men as a true man." And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn,
O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by
evil deeds to your former worthlessness." Thirdly, because, "in order to do away
with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of
ours went before," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because
"man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be
convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the same place.
Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the
justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now
a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to
satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the
same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by
eternity, in order that one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise
in the other---for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have
brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an example."
And there are very many other
advantages which accrued, above man's apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason has
to do with the first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction
may be said to be sufficient in two ways---first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign,
being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been
corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not be made up
adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed
against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the
greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for condign
satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite
efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed
sufficient, imperfectly---i.e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it, even
though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient.
And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained,
hence it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction
of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: By taking
flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the reason for
reverencing Him, which is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the
contrary, inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew us to
know Him.
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Whether, if man had not sinned, God
would have become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that if
man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the
effect also remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things
are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin"; and
these were discussed above (Article [2]).
Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to
the omnipotence of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some
infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite
of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the Incarnation alone is an infinite
effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely
distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in this
work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last
creature---viz. man---is united to the first principle---viz. God. Therefore, even if man
had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, human nature
has not been made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace
of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature
would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature any
good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 4: Further, God's
predestination is eternal. But it is said of Christ (Rm. 1:4): "Who was predestined
the Son of God in power." Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son
of God should become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.
Objection 5: Further, the mystery of
the Incarnation was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. "This now
is bone of my bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in
Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could not be
fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine
proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become
incarnate.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De
Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Lk. 19:10, "For the Son of Man
is come to seek and to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not
sinned, the Son of Man would not have come." And on 1 Tim. 1:15, "Christ Jesus
came into this world to save sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of
Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away
wounds, and there is no need of medicine."
I answer that, There are different
opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man
would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought
rather to be given to this opinion.
For such things as spring from God's
will, and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed
in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since
everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of
the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the
Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the
Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had
sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: All the other
causes which are assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For
if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and
would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and
carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal
things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford
him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh,"
St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ
came and overthrew the vices of the flesh."
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of
Divine power is shown in the mode of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices
for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to
God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits
of the perfection of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A double
capability may be remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power,
and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural
capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures
implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil
all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this
is false, as stated above (FP, Question [105],
Article [6]).
But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater
after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom;
hence it is written (Rm. 5:20): "Where sin
abounded, grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle,
we say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer!"
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination
presupposes the foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God predestines the
salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined
the work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Nothing
prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence,
the mystery of the Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being
fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause.
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Whether God became incarnate in
order to take away actual sin, rather than to take away original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God
became incarnate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more
grievous the sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became
incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the lightest punishment
is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore the
Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins.
Objection 2: Further, pain of sense
is not due to original sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown (FS, Question [87],
Article [5]).
But Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins---and
not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vision or fruition.
Therefore He came in order to take away actual sin rather than original sin.
Objection 3: Further, as Chrysostom
says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 3): "This must be the mind of the faithful servant,
to account the benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though they
were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself alone, Paul writes to the
Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved me and delivered Himself for me.'" But our
individual sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to
have this conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of
God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world."
I answer that, It is certain that
Christ came into this world not only to take away that sin which is handed on originally
to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that
all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do not adhere to
Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: "The light is come into the world, and men loved
darkness rather than the light"), but because He offered what was sufficient for
blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Rm. 5:15-16): "But not as
the offense, so also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but
grace is of many offenses unto justification."
Moreover, the more grievous the sin,
the more particularly did Christ come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in
two ways: in one way "intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be
greater, and in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of the
nature of voluntary, as has been shown (FS, Question [81],
Article [1]).
In another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness on a
greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way original sin, whereby the whole
human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And
in this respect Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as "the
good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an individual," as is said
Ethic. i, 2.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In the future
award the pain of sense will not be meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as
hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from
original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin, wished to
suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and the like in Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom says
(De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6): "The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to
diminish Christ's gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but
that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does it matter that
they are given to others, if what are given to you are as complete and perfect as if none
of them were given to another than yourself?" And hence, although a man ought to
account Christ's gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be
given to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of the whole
nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed
in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity,
what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by each one.
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Whether it was fitting that God
should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it
was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the
work of the Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to Eph.
2:4,5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved
us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ." But
charity does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according
to Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give
to thee, when thou canst give at present." Therefore God ought not to have put off
the work of the Incarnation, but ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race
from the beginning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus
came into this world to save sinners." But more would have been saved had God become
incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the various centuries very many,
through not knowing God, perished in their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should
become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.
Objection 3: Further, the work of
grace is not less orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more
perfect, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to have
been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the Incarnation we see the perfection
of grace, according to Jn. 1:14: "The Word was made flesh"; and afterwards it is
added: "Full of grace and truth." Therefore Christ ought to have become
incarnate at the beginning of the human race.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): "But when the
fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law":
upon which a gloss says that "the fulness of the time is when it was decreed by God
the Father to send His Son." But God decreed everything by His wisdom. Therefore God
became incarnate at the most fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should become
incarnate at the beginning of the human race.
I answer that, Since the work of the
Incarnation is principally ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out
sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the beginning
of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to the sick. Hence our Lord
Himself says (Mt. 9:12,13): "They that
are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not come to call
the just, but sinners."
Nor was it fitting that God should
become incarnate immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin,
which had come of pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be
humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the words in Gal. 3:19,
"Being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator," a gloss says: "With
great wisdom was it so ordered that the Son of Man should not be sent immediately after
man's fall. For first of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his
will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he failed in it, he
received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the law, but of his nature, the disease
gained strength; so that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician,
and beseech the aid of grace."
Secondly, on account of the order of
furtherance in good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 15:46,47): "Yet
that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is
spiritual . . . The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven,
heavenly."
Thirdly, on account of the dignity
of the incarnate Word, for on the words (Gal. 4:4), "But when the
fulness of the time was come," a gloss says: "The greater the judge who was
coming, the more numerous was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him."
Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith
should cool by the length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of
the world. Hence (Lk. 18:8) it is written: "But
yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find think you, faith on earth?"
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does
not put off bringing assistance to a friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as
well as the state of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the
very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt rather than benefit. And
hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human race the remedy of the Incarnation in the
beginning, lest they should despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize
their disease.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine
replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan., Ep. cii), saying (Question [2])
that "Christ wished to appear to man and to have His doctrine preached to them when
and where He knew those were who would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His
Gospel was not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear themselves
towards His preaching as not to believe in His corporeal presence, even were He to raise
the dead." But the same Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book (De
Perseverantia ix), says: "How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not
believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would not have believed
had they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness that they would have done penance
with great humility if these signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst?"
And he adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): "Hence, as the Apostle says (Rm. 9:16), 'it is not of him that
willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy'; Who (succors whom He will
of) those who, as He foresaw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst them,
(while others) He succors not, having judged them in His predestination secretly yet
justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with those who are set
free, and His truth with those who are condemned." [*The words in brackets are not in
the text of St. Augustine].
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection is
prior to imperfection, both in time and nature, in things that are different (for what
brings others to perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same, imperfection
is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus the eternal perfection of God
precedes in duration the imperfection of human nature; but the latter's ultimate
perfection in union with God follows.
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Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Whether the Incarnation ought to
have been put off till the end of the world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the
work of the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. For it is
written (Ps. 91:11): "My old age in
plentiful mercy"---i.e. "in the last days," as a gloss says. But the time
of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: "For it
is time to have mercy on it." Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off
till the end of the world.
Objection 2: Further, as has been
said (Article [5],
ad 3), in the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore,
what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest perfection of
human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in Christ it hath pleased the
Father that all the fulness of the Godhead should dwell," as the Apostle says (Col.
1:19, and 2:9). Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the
world.
Objection 3: Further, what can be
done by one ought not to be done by two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the
world was sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for
Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation ought to have been
put off till the end of the world.
On the contrary, It is written (Hab.
3:2): "In the midst of the years Thou shalt make it known." Therefore the
mystery of the Incarnation which was made known to the world ought not to have been put
off till the end of the world.
I answer that, As it was not fitting
that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting
that the Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is shown first
from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it has been said (Article [5],
ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in one way, and contrariwise in another
way imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being
imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the
efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work
of the Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is raised to its
highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take
place at the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of
the perfection of human nature, according to Jn. 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all
received"; and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have been put off till
the end of the world. But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally
raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world.
Secondly, from the effect of man's
salvation; for, as is said Qq. Vet et Nov. Test., qu. 83, "it is in the power of the
Giver to have pity when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was
fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the feebleness of the
human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim and their morals lax, He was pleased
to choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and
later on when reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because the
gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and they who received it would
not keep it, being touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their
sin and to offer them, justified, to God the Father." But if this remedy had been put
off till the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all uprightness of
morals would have been swept away from the earth.
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the
manifestation of the Divine power, which has saved men in several ways---not only by faith
in some future thing, but also by faith in something present and past.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss has
in view the mercy of God, which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the
mercy shown the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as
Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be compared to the youth of
the human race, "on account of the strength and fervor of faith, which works by
charity"; and to old age---i.e. the sixth age---on account of the number of
centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be
together in a body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of
quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says elsewhere (Qq.
lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the
human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the
time of youth." But in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that
Christ came in the sixth age---i.e. in the old age---of the human race.
Reply to Objection 2: The work of the
Incarnation is to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to
perfection, but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom
says on Jn. 3:11, "For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world"
(Hom. xxviii): "There are two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of
sins; the second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have perished
together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God." Hence it is plain that He
ought not to have put off the coming in mercy till the end of the world.
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