(ADEIMANTUS, SOCRATES.)
HERE Adeimantus interposed a question: How
would you answer, Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you are making these
people miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the city in fact
belongs to them, but they are none the better for it; whereas other men acquire lands, and
build large and handsome houses, and have everything handsome about them, offering
sacrifices to the gods on their own account, and practising hospitality; moreover, as you
were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favorites
of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are quartered in the
city and are always mounting guard?
2 Yes, I said; and you may add that they are
only fed, and not paid in addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they
cannot, if they would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a
mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be
happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature might be added.
But, said he, let us suppose all this to be
included in the charge.
You mean to ask, I said, what will be our
answer?
Yes.
3 If we proceed along the old path, my
belief, I said, is that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that, even as
they are, our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in
founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the
greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view
to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered
State injustice: and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the
happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with
a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by and by we will proceed to
view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and someone came
up to us and said: Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful
parts of the body--the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black--to him we
might fairly answer: Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree
that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other
features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you, do not
compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but
guardians; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold
on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our
potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing
round the wine-cup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only
as much as they like; in this way we might make every class happy--and then, as you
imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads; for, if
we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to
be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now
this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what
you are not, are confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the
government are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how they turn the State
upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness
to the State. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the
State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life
of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean
different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we
must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest
happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in
the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries,
and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the
best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes
will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.
I think that you are quite right.
I wonder whether you will agree with another
remark which occurs to me.
What may that be?
There seem to be two causes of the
deterioration of the arts.
What are they?
Wealth, I said, and poverty.
How do they act?
4 The process is as follows: When a potter
becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?
Certainly not.
He will grow more and more indolent and
careless?
Very true.
And the result will be that he becomes a
worse potter?
Yes; he greatly deteriorates.
5 But, on the other hand, if he has no
money, and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well
himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.
Certainly not.
6 Then, under the influence either of
poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?
That is evident.
Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I
said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city
unobserved.
What evils?
7 Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is
the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of
discontent.
8 That is very true, he replied; but still I
should like to know, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against
an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.
9 There would certainly be a difficulty, I
replied, in going to war with one such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are
two of them.
How so? he asked.
In the first place, I said, if we have to
fight, our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men.
That is true, he said.
10 And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that
a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and
well-to-do gentlemen who were not boxers?
Hardly, if they came upon him at once.
11 What, not, I said, if he were able to run
away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do
this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert,
overturn more than one stout personage?
Certainly, he said, there would be nothing
wonderful in that.
And yet rich men probably have a greater
superiority in the science and practise of boxing than they have in military qualities.
Likely enough.
Then we may assume that our athletes will be
able to fight with two or three times their own number?
I agree with you, for I think you right.
12 And suppose that, before engaging, our
citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver
and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and
help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these words, would
choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the dogs on their side, against
fat and tender sheep?
That is not likely; and yet there might be a
danger to the poor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.
But how simple of you to use the term State
at all of any but our own!
Why so?
13 You ought to speak of other States in the
plural number; not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For
indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the
other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many smaller
divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them all as a single
State. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the
one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And
your State, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in
her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but
in deed and truth, though she number not more than 1,000 defenders. A single State which
is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that
appear to be as great and many times greater.
That is most true, he said.
14 And what, I said, will be the best limit
for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of
territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go?
What limit would you propose?
I would allow the State to increase so far
as is consistent with unity; that, I think, is the proper limit.
Very good, he said.
Here then, I said, is another order which
will have to be conveyed to our guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor
small, but one and self-sufficing.
And surely, said he, this is not a very
severe order which we impose upon them.
15 And the other, said I, of which we were
speaking before is lighter still--I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the
guardians when inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the
lower classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in the case of the
citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended
him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not
many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.
Yes, he said; that is not so difficult.
16 The regulations which we are prescribing,
my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but
trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing--a thing, however,
which I would rather call, not, great, but sufficient for our purpose.
What may that be? he asked.
17 Education, I said, and nurture: If our
citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way
through all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage,
the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general
principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.
That will be the best way of settling them.
18 Also, I said, the State, if once started
well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant
good constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve
more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.
Very possibly, he said.
19 Then to sum up: This is the point to
which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed--that music and
gymnastics be preserved in their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their
utmost to maintain them intact. And when anyone says that mankind most regard
"The newest song which the singers
have,"
20 they will be afraid that he may be
praising, not new songs, but a new kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or
conceived to be the meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to
the whole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe
him; he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always
change with them.
Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my
suffrage to Damon's and your own.
Then, I said, our guardians must lay the
foundations of their fortress in music?
Yes, he said; the lawlessness of which you
speak too easily steals in.
Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement;
and at first sight it appears harmless.
21 Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm;
were it not that little by little this spirit of license, finding a home, imperceptibly
penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades
contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in
utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private as
well as public.
Is that true? I said.
That is my belief, he replied.
22 Then, as I was saying, our youth should
be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the
youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted and virtuous
citizens.
Very true, he said.
23 And when they have made a good beginning
in play, and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of
order, in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all
their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen places [a]
[principle] in the State will raise them up again.
Very true, he said.
Thus educated, they will invent for
themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected.
What do you mean?
24 I mean such things as these:--when the
young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by
standing and making them sit; what honor is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to
be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree
with me?
Yes.
25 But there is, I think, small wisdom in
legislating about such matters--I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written
enactments about them likely to be lasting.
Impossible.
26 It would seem, Adeimantus, that the
direction in which education starts a man, will determine his future life. Does not like
always attract like?
To be sure.
Until some one rare and grand result is
reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?
That is not to be denied.
And for this reason, I said, I shall not
attempt to legislate further about them.
Naturally enough, he replied.
27 Well, and about the business of the
agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with
artisans; about insult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of
juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions and
exactions of market and harbor dues which may be required, and in general about the
regulations of markets, police, harbors, and the like.. But, O heavens! shall we
condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?
I think, he said, that there is no need to
impose laws about them on good men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon
enough for themselves.
Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only
preserve to them the laws which we have given them.
And without divine help, said Adeimantus,
they will go on forever making and mending the laws and their lives in the hope of
attaining perfection.
28 You would compare them, I said, to those
invalids who, having no self-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?
Exactly.
29 Yes, I said; and what a delightful life
they lead! they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and
always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try.
Such cases are very common, he said, with
invalids of this sort.
30 Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is
that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that,
unless they give up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, nether drug nor cautery
nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.
Charming! he replied. I see nothing in going
into a passion with a man who tells you what is right.
These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be
in your good graces.
Assuredly not.
31 Nor would you praise the behavior of
States which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there not
ill-ordered States in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the
constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and
indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their
humors is held to be a great and good statesman--do not these States resemble the persons
whom I was describing?
Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the
men; and I am very far from praising them.
But do you not admire, I said, the coolness
and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?
32 Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of
them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief
that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.
33 What do you mean? I said; you should have
more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot
measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?
Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.
34 Well, then, do not be angry with them;
for are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was
describing; they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds
in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are
in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?
Yes, he said; that is just what they are
doing.
35 I conceive, I said, that the true
legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws
or the constitution either in an ill-ordered or in a wellordered State; for in the former
they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them;
and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.
What, then, he said, is still remaining to
us of the work of legislation?
Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the
god of Delphi, there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things
of all.
Which are they? he said.
36 The institution of temples and
sacrifices, and the entire service of gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the
repositories of the dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would
propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant
ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any
interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of
the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.
You are right, and we will do as you
propose.
37 But where, amid all this, is justice? Son
of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and
search, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let
us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they differ
from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his
portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.
Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise
to search yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an
impiety?
I do not deny that I said so; and as you
remind me, I will be as good as my word; but you must join.
We will, he replied.
Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in
this way: I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is
perfect.
That is most certain.
And being perfect, is therefore wise and
valiant and temperate and just.
That is likewise clear.
And whichever of these qualities we find in
the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?
Very good.
38 If there were four things, and we were
searching for one of them, wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us
from the first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three
first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.
Very true, he said.
And is not a similar method to be pursued
about the virtues, which are also four in number?
Clearly.
39 First among the virtues found in the
State, wisdom comes into view, and in this I detect a certain peculiarity.
What is that?
The State which we have been describing is
said to be wise as being good in counsel?
Very true.
40 And good counsel is clearly a kind of
knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?
Clearly.
And the kinds of knowledge in a State are
many and diverse?
Of course.
41 There is the knowledge of the carpenter;
but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in
counsel?
Certainly not; that would only give a city
the reputation of skill in carpentering.
Then a city is not to be called wise because
possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?
Certainly not.
42 Nor by reason of a knowledge which
advises about brazen pots, he said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?
Not by reason of any of them, he said.
Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which
cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?
Yes.
43 Well, I said, and is there any knowledge
in our recently founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any
particular thing in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best
deal with itself and with other States?
There certainly is.
And what is this knowledge, and among whom
is it found? I asked.
44 It is the knowledge of the guardians, he
replied, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.
And what is the name which the city derives
from the possession of this sort of knowledge?
The name of good in counsel and truly wise.
And will there be in our city more of these
true guardians or more smiths?
The smiths, he replied, will be far more
numerous.
Will not the guardians be the smallest of
all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?
Much the smallest.
45 And so by reason of the smallest part or
class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the
whole State, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has
the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to be of all
classes the least.
Most true.
Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in
the State of one of the four virtues have somehow or other been discovered.
And, in my humble opinion, very
satisfactorily discovered, he replied.
46 Again, I said, there is no difficulty in
seeing the nature of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name
of courageous to the State.
How do you mean?
47 Why, I said, everyone who calls any State
courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on
the State's behalf.
No one, he replied, would ever think of any
other.
The rest of the citizens may be courageous
or may be cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the
effect of making the city either the one or the other.
Certainly not.
48 The city will be courageous in virtue of
a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature
of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and
this is what you term courage.
I should like to hear what you are saying
once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.
I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.
Salvation of what?
49 Of the opinion respecting things to be
feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I
mean by the words "under all circumstances" to intimate that in pleasure or in
pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this
opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?
If you please.
50 You know, I said, that dyers, when they
want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white color
first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white
ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever
is dyed in this manner becomes a fast color, and no washing either with lyes or without
them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will
have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other color.
Yes, he said; I know that they have a
washed-out and ridiculous appearance.
51 Then now, I said, you will understand
what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastics;
we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in
perfection, and the color of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to
be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent
lyes as pleasure-- mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by
sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal
saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call
and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.
52 But I agree, he replied; for I suppose
that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a
slave--this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have
another name.
Most certainly.
Then I may infer courage to be such as you
describe?
53 Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add
the words "of a citizen," you will not be far wrong--hereafter, if you like, we
will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking, not for courage, but
justice; and for the purpose of our inquiry we have said enough.
You are right, he replied.
54 Two virtues remain to be discovered in
the State--first, temperance, and then justice, which is the end of our search.
Very true.
Now, can we find justice without troubling
ourselves about temperance?
55 I do not know how that can be
accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and
temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favor of
considering temperance first.
Certainly, I replied, I should not be
justified in refusing your request.
Then consider, he said.
Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can
at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony
than the preceding.
How so? he asked.
56 Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or
controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the
saying of "a man being his own master;" and other traces of the same notion may
be found in language.
No doubt, he said.
57 There is something ridiculous in the
expression "master of himself;" for the master is also the servant and the
servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.
Certainly.
58 The meaning is, I believe, that in the
human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse
under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise:
but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the
smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse --in this case he is blamed and
is called the slave of self and unprincipled.
Yes, there is reason in that.
59 And now, I said, look at our newly
created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the
State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words
"temperance" and "self-mastery" truly express the rule of the better
part over the worse.
Yes, he said, I see that what you say is
true.
60 Let me further note that the manifold and
complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and
servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.
Certainly, he said.
61 Whereas the simple and moderate desires
which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found
only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.
62 Very true. These two, as you may
perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by
the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.
That I perceive, he said.
Then if there be any city which may be
described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim
such a designation?
Certainly, he replied.
It may also be called temperate, and for the
same reasons?
Yes.
63 And if there be any State in which rulers
and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our
State?
Undoubtedly.
And the citizens being thus agreed among
themselves, in which class will temperance be found--in the rulers or in the subjects?
In both, as I should imagine, he replied.
Do you observe that we were not far wrong in
our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?
Why so?
64 Why, because temperance is unlike courage
and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the
other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the
notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle
class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom, or power, or numbers,
or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of
the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in States and
individuals.
I entirely agree with you.
And so, I said, we may consider three out of
the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which
make a State virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.
The inference is obvious.
65 The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when,
like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal
away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this
country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let
me know.
66 Would that I could! but you should regard
me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him--that is about
as much as I am good for.
Offer up a prayer with me and follow.
I will, but you must show me the way.
Here is no path, I said, and the wood is
dark and perplexing; still we must push on.
Let us push on.
Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I
begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.
Good news, he said.
Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.
Why so?
67 Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our
inquiry, ages ago, there was Justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her;
nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in
their hands--that was the way with us--we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what
was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.
What do you mean?
I mean to say that in reality for a long
time past we have been talking of Justice, and have failed to recognize her.
68 I grow impatient at the length of your
exordium. Well, then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the
original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that
one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;
now justice is this principle or a part of it.
Yes, we often said that one man should do
one thing only.
69 Further, we affirmed that Justice was
doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many
others have said the same to us.
Yes, we said so.
70 Then to do one's own business in a
certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?
I cannot, but I should like to be told.
71 Because I think that this is the only
virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and
wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence
of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying
that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth, or remaining one.
That follows of necessity.
72 If we are asked to determine which of
these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State,
whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the
opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness
in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children
and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject--the quality, I mean, of everyone
doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm--the question is not so
easily answered.
Certainly, he replied, there would be a
difficulty in saying which.
Then the power of each individual in the
State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom,
temperance, courage.
Yes, he said.
And the virtue which enters into this
competition is justice?
Exactly.
73 Let us look at the question from another
point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would intrust the office of
determining suits-at-law?
Certainly.
74 And are suits decided on any other ground
but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?
Yes; that is their principle.
Which is a just principle?
Yes.
Then on this view also justice will be
admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?
Very true.
75 Think, now, and say whether you agree
with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of
a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same
person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any
great harm would result to the State?
Not much.
76 But when the cobbler or any other man
whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or
the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the
class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is
unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is
trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying
that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.
77 Most true. Seeing, then, I said, that
there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one
into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?
Precisely.
And the greatest degree of evil-doing to
one's own city would be termed by you injustice?
Certainly. This, then, is injustice; and on
the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own
business, that is justice, and will make the city just.
I agree with you.
78 We will not, I said, be over-positive as
yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as
in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must
have a fresh inquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you
remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger
scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger
example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we
could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which
we made be now applied to the individual--if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if
there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another
trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a
light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix
in our souls.
That will be in regular course; let us do as
you say.
I proceeded to ask: When two things, a
greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they
are called the same?
Like, he replied.
The just man then, if we regard the idea of
justice only, will be like the just State?
He will.
79 And a State was thought by us to be just
when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to
be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of
these same classes?
True, he said.
And so of the individual; we may assume that
he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may
be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner?
Certainly, he said.
80 Once more, then, O my friend, we have
alighted upon an easy question--whether the soul has these three principles or not?
An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the
proverb holds that hard is the good.
81 Very true, I said; and I do not think
that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this
question; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution
not below the level of the previous inquiry.
82 May we not be satisfied with that? he
said; under the circumstances, I am quite content. I, too, I replied, shall be extremely
well satisfied.
Then faint not in pursuing the speculation,
he said.
83 Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in
each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that
from the individual they pass into the State?--how else can they come there? Take the
quality of passion or spirit; it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when
found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g.,
the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the Northern nations; and the same may be said of
the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of
the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and
Egyptians.
Exactly so, he said.
There is no difficulty in understanding
this.
None whatever.
84 But the question is not quite so easy
when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say,
we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire
the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in
each sort of action--to determine that is the difficulty.
Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.
Then let us now try and determine whether
they are the same or different.
How can we? he asked.
85 I replied as follows: The same thing
clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at
the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in
things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.
Good.
For example, I said, can the same thing be
at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?
Impossible.
86 Still, I said, let us have a more precise
statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a
man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say
that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment--to such a mode
of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while
another is at rest.
Very true.
87 And suppose the objector to refine still
further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops,
when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the
same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his
objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in
motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis
and a circumference; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the
perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis
inclines either to the right or left, forward or backward, then in no point of view can
they be at rest.
That is the correct mode of describing them,
he replied.
Then none of these objections will confuse
us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in
relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.
Certainly not, according to my way of
thinking.
88 Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled
to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume
their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption
turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.
Yes, he said, that will be the best way.
89 Well, I said, would you not allow that
assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them
opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in
the fact of their opposition)?
Yes, he said, they are opposites.
90 Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and
the desires in general, and again willing and wishing--all these you would refer to the
classes already mentioned. You would say--would you not?--that the soul of him who desires
is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is drawing to himself the thing
which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his
mind, longing for the realization of his desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of
assent, as if he had been asked a question?
Very true.
91 And what would you say of unwillingness
and dislike and the absence of desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class
of repulsion and rejection?
Certainly.
92 Admitting this to be true of desire
generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select
hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?
Let us take that class, he said.
The object of one is food, and of the other
drink?
Yes.
93 And here comes the point: is not thirst
the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by
anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any
particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold
drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive,
then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink
will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is
the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?
Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you
say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.
94 But here a confusion may arise; and I
should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink
only, but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of
desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the
same is true of every other desire.
Yes, he replied, the opponent might have
something to say.
Nevertheless I should still maintain, that
of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation; others are
simple and have their correlatives simple.
I do not know what you mean.
Well, you know of course that the greater is
relative to the less?
Certainly.
And the much greater to the much less?
Yes.
And the sometime greater to the sometime
less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?
Certainly, he said.
95 And so of more or less, and of other
correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or, again, the heavier and the
lighter, the swifter and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives; is
not this true of all of them?
Yes.
96 And does not the same principle hold in
the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true
definition), but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I
mean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge which is
defined and
distinguished from other kinds and is
therefore termed architecture.
Certainly.
Because it has a particular quality which no
other has?
Yes.
97 And it has this particular quality
because it has an object of a particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and
sciences?
Yes.
98 Now, then, if I have made myself clear,
you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was,
that if one term of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is
qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be
disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased,
or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the
term "science" is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in
this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and is hence called not
merely science, but the science of medicine.
I quite understand, and, I think, as you do.
Would you not say that thirst is one of
these essentially relative terms, having clearly a relation--
Yes, thirst is relative to drink.
And a certain kind of thirst is relative to
a certain kind of drink; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good
nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?
Certainly.
Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far
as he is thirsty, desires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?
That is plain.
99 And if you suppose something which pulls
a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which
draws him like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same
time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.
Impossible.
No more than you can say that the hands of
the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand
pushes and the other pulls.
Exactly so, he replied.
And might a man be thirsty, and yet
unwilling to drink?
Yes, he said, it constantly happens.
100 And in such a case what is one to say?
Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and
something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids
him?
I should say so.
And the forbidding principle is derived from
reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?
Clearly.
101 Then we may fairly assume that they are
two, and that they differ from one another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call
the rational principle of the soul; the other, with which he loves, and hungers, and
thirsts, and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or
appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?
Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to
be different.
Then let us finally determine that there are
two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or
akin to one of the preceding?
I should be inclined to say--akin to desire.
102 Well, I said, there is a story which I
remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of
Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed
some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see
them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his
eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to
the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.
I have heard the story myself, he said.
The moral of the tale is, that anger at
times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.
Yes; that is the meaning, he said.
103 And are there not many other cases in
which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles
himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like
the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason; but for the
passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she
should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed
occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in anyone else?
Certainly not.
104 Suppose that a man thinks he has done a
wrong to another, the nobler he is, the less able is he to feel indignant at any
suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict
upon him--these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by
them.
True, he said.
105 But when he thinks that he is the
sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to
be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more
determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either
slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding
his dog bark no more.
The illustration is perfect, he replied; and
in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of
the rulers, who are their shepherds.
I perceive, I said, that you quite
understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider.
What point?
106 You remember that passion or spirit
appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary;
for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.
Most assuredly.
107 But a further question arises: Is
passion different from reason also, or only a kind of reason; in which latter case,
instead of three principles in the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the
concupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries,
counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion
or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?
Yes, he said, there must be a third.
Yes, I replied, if passion, which has
already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.
108 But that is easily proved: We may
observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are
born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them
late enough.
109 Excellent, I said, and you may see
passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are
saying. And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted
by us,
110 "He smote his breast, and thus
rebuked his soul;" for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which
reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is
rebuked by it.
Very true, he said.
111 And so, after much tossing, we have
reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State
exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.
Exactly.
Must we not then infer that the individual
is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?
Certainly.
112 Also that the same quality which
constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the
State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?
Assuredly.
113 And the individual will be acknowledged
by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?
That follows of course.
We cannot but remember that the justice of
the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?
We are not very likely to have forgotten, he
said.
We must recollect that the individual in
whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his
own work?
Yes, he said, we must remember that too.
114 And ought not the rational principle,
which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited
principle to be the subject and ally?
Certainly.
115 And, as we were saying, the united
influence of music and gymnastics will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the
reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the
wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?
Quite true, he said.
116 And these two, thus nurtured and
educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the
concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most
insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the
fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined
to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born
subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?
Very true, he said.
117 Both together will they not be the best
defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one
counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his
commands and counsels?
True.
And he is to be deemed courageous whose
spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought
not to fear?
Right, he replied.
118 And him we call wise who has in him that
little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed
to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the
whole?
Assuredly.
119 And would you not say that he is
temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling
principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire, are equally agreed
that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?
Certainly, he said, that is the true account
of temperance whether in the State or individual.
And surely, I said, we have explained again
and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.
That is very certain.
120 And is justice dimmer in the individual,
and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?
There is no difference, in my opinion, he
said.
Because, if any doubt is still lingering in
our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.
What sort of instances do you mean?
If the case is put to us, must we not admit
that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be
less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would anyone
deny this?
No one, he replied.
121 Will the just man or citizen ever be
guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?
Never.
Neither will he ever break faith where there
have been oaths or agreements.
Impossible.
No one will be less likely to commit
adultery, or to dishonor his father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?
No one.
And the reason is that each part of him is
doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?
Exactly so.
122 Are you satisfied, then, that the
quality which makes such men and such States is justice, or do you hope to discover some
other?
Not I, indeed.
123 Then our dream has been realized; and
the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some
divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified?
Yes, certainly.
124 And the division of labor which required
the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own
business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?
Clearly.
125 But in reality justice was such as we
were describing, being concerned, however, not with the outward man, but with the inward,
which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the
several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work
of others--he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and
at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him,
which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the
intermediate intervals--when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but
has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act,
if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in
some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which
preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition just and good action, and the
knowledge which presides over it wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition
he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.
You have said the exact truth, Socrates.
126 Very good; and if we were to affirm that
we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of
them, we should not be telling a falsehood?
Most certainly not.
May we say so, then?
Let us say so.
And now, I said, injustice has to be
considered.
Clearly.
127 Must not injustice be a strife which
arises among the three principles--a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a
part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a
rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal--what is all
this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance, and cowardice, and ignorance,
and every form of vice?
Exactly so.
128 And if the nature of justice and
injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of
acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?
What do you mean? he said.
Why, I said, they are like disease and
health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.
How so? he said.
Why, I said, that which is healthy causes
health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.
Yes.
And just actions cause justice, and unjust
actions cause injustice?
That is certain.
129 And the creation of health is the
institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body;
and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this
natural order?
True.
130 And is not the creation of justice the
institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul,
and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the
natural order?
Exactly so, he said.
131 Then virtue is the health, and beauty,
and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease, and weakness, and deformity, of the
same?
True.
And do not good practices lead to virtue,
and evil practices to vice?
Assuredly.
132 Still our old question of the
comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more
profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods
and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?
133 In my judgment, Socrates, the question
has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no
longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all
wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital
principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be
allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire
justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as
we have described?
Yes, I said, the question is, as you say,
ridiculous. Still, as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest
manner with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.
Certainly not, he replied.
134 Come up hither, I said, and behold the
various forms of vice, those of them, I mean, which are worth looking at.
I am following you, he replied: proceed.
135 I said: The argument seems to have
reached a height from which, as from some tower of speculation, a man may look down and
see that virtue is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four
special ones which are deserving of note.
What do you mean? he said.
I mean, I replied, that there appear to be
as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State.
How many?
There are five of the State, and five of the
soul, I said.
What are they?
136 The first, I said, is that which we have
been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy,
according as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.
True, he replied.
137 But I regard the two names as describing
one form only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors
have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State
will be maintained.
That is true, he replied.
