THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
General Introduction For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, October 27, 1787
HAMILTON
TABLE OF CONTENTS
To the People of the State of New York:
FEDERALIST No. 1
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal
government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the
United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending
in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and
welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many
respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that
it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct
and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are
really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the
crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in
which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act
may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of
mankind.
2 This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to
heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the
event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate
of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected
with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than
seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many
particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve
in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views,
passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.
3 Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will
have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain
class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution
of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the
State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who
will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or
will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision
of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one
government.
4 It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am
well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the
opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them
to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit
that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be
doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may
hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if
not respectable -- the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived
jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which
serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see
wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the
first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would
furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their
being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this
respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that
those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their
antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many
other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon
those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there
not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than
that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties.
For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making
proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by
persecution.
5 And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already
sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of
great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let
loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to
conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions,
and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their
declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the
energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a
temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An
over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more
commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere
pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the
public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual
concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be
infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it
will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the
security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed
judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition
more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people
than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of
government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more
certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those
men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have
begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing
demagogues, and ending tyrants.
6 In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from
whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to
your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the
evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the
general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new
Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an
attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt
it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your
dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will
not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly
acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons
on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains
ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives
must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to
all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit
which will not disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars:
7 THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF
THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT
AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS
OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE
ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT
SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory
answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may
seem to have any claim to your attention.
8 It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility
of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body
of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no
adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private
circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are
of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort
to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.[1] This doctrine
will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough
to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those
who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an
adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will
therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the
certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed
from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next
address.
PUBLIUS
1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in
several of the late publications against the new Constitution.
FEDERALIST No. 2
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence For the Independent
Journal.
Wednesday, October 31, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a
question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that
ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very
comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident.
2 Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and
it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people
must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite
powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce
more to the interest of the people of America that they should, to all general
purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, or that they should
divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the
same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national government.
3 It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the
prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united,
and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens have been
constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear, who insist that
this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness
in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct
confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may
appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were much
opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the
arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and
declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at
large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that
they are founded in truth and sound policy.
4 It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not
composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile,
widespreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. Providence
has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions,
and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of
its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round
its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the
world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy
communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of
their various commodities.
5 With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been
pleased to give this one connected country to one united people -- a people
descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the
same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in
their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts,
fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established
general liberty and independence.
6 This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it
appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and
convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties,
should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien
sovereignties.
7 Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations
of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people each
individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and
protection. As a nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have
vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made
treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.
8 A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at a
very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve and perpetuate
it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay, at a
time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were
bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for
those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the
formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free people. It is not to
be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on
experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was
intended to answer.
9 This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still
continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they observed the
danger which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter; and
being pursuaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national
government more wisely framed, they as with one voice, convened the late
convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.
10 This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people,
and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue and
wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of men, undertook the arduous
task. In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they
passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally,
without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for
their country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by
their joint and very unanimous councils.
11 Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not imposed,
yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND approbation,
nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and candid consideration which the
magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to
receive. But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is
more to be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined.
Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes.
It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger
induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body
recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved their
wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with
pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not only many of the
officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but
others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of
former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond
with the public good, were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people
to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and
deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously;
and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.
12 They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced
men. That, being convened from different parts of the country, they brought with
them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information. That, in
the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the
true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge
on that head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and
prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty
to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they
really thought prudent and advisable.
13 These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on
the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their advice,
notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from it. But
if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of
whom had been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now
to respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it is well known that
some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since
tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old
in acquiring political information, were also members of this convention, and
carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.
14 It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding
Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the people
in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union. To preserve
and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that convention,
and it is also the great object of the plan which the convention has advised
them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are
attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance
of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be
better than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always
thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment
to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall
endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. They who promote the
idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan
of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put
the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the
case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good
citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have
reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO
ALL MY GREATNESS."
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 3
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, November 3, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the
Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for
many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That
consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which
the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance
of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with
sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.
2 The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to
have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are
cogent and conclusive.
3 Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to
direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to be the
first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of
circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to
those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.
4 At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from FOREIGN
ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic
causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be
the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are
not right in their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national
government, affords them the best security that can be devised against
HOSTILITIES from abroad.
5 The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will
always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes,
whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this remark be just,
it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be
given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that
United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this
respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with
other nations.
6 The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of
treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no
less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime,
and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with
Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in
addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
7 It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of
nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be
more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be
either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.
8 Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best
men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be
appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted
influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice,
or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents
and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the
national government, -- especially as it will have the widest field for choice,
and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some
of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political
counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more
wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and
consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more
SAFE with respect to us.
9 Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as
well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed
in the same manner, -- whereas, adjudications on the same points and questions,
in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or
be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and
judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different
local laws and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the
convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of
courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be
too much commended.
10 Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but
those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little
or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless,
and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with
Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
11 Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist
such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from
circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great number of the
inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent
the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national
government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be
induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent
or punish its commission by others.
12 So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties
and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be
apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in
that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the people.
13 As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government
affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived
from any other quarter.
14 Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the Union.
Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present
federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian
hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States,
who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given
occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
15 The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States
and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to
the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who, under the
impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury,
will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and
nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government, whose
wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the
parties immediately interested.
16 But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle
them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as
well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending
State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to
justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or
repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in such cases,
will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor
to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the
difficulties which threaten them.
17 Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation,
which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or confederacy
of little consideration or power.
18 In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV., endeavored
to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief
magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon
and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace.
Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like
humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 4
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, November 7, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be
best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of
war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not
only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a
national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little
confederacies.
2 But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force
depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to other
nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation
as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are
PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.
3 It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations
in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by
it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get
nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst
for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts
to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a
variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often
lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests
of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more
prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there
are others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on
examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circumstances.
4 With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can supply
their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to
prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish.
5 With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation
and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of
them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade cannot increase
without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will
be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it.
6 In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation,
inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner
monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used
to purchase from them.
7 The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to
any nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the
cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of
vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will
give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than
consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.
8 Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one
side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will
either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become
the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.
9 From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with
prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and
uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations,
and that we are not to expect that they should regard our advancement in union,
in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and
composure.
10 The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of
these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present, and that
whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation,
pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do
they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep
them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and
discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense,
and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the
country.
11 As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be
provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire
whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question, more
competent than any other given number whatever.
12 One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of
the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on
uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the
several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and
precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest
of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that
of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense
of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State
governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and
unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by
putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief
Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby
render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four
distinct independent companies.
13 What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the
government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland,
and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose an invasion;
would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their
respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single
government of Great Britain would?
14 We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are
wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national
government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a
nursery for seamen -- if one national government had not called forth all the
national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder
would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet --
let Scotland have its navigation and fleet -- let Wales have its navigation and
fleet -- let Ireland have its navigation and fleet -- let those four of the
constituent parts of the British empire be be under four independent
governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into
comparative insignificance.
15 Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if
you please, into three or four independent governments -- what armies could they
raise and pay -- what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked,
would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its
defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by
its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline
hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of
whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to
see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless,
be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds
with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened
would, under similar circumstances, happen again.
16 But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and money
be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of them shall
he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of
disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various
difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation;
whereas one government, watching over the general and common interests, and
combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free
from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.
17 But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national
government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign
nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us
accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well
administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and
disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit
re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more
disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the
other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each State
doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three
or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one
inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps
played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will
America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their
contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experience
proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against
themselves.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 5
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, November 10, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament,
makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between
England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with
one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid
foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and
property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and
differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches,
and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and
free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL
ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and
unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a
happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future
happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will
doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS
UNION."
2 It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at home
would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us
from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This
subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
3 The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best
acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their
experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems
obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one
nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those
three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.
Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was
really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations,
their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of
years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and
assisting to each other.
4 Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations,
would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in
like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection"
and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and
jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial
interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America,
would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other
BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or
live in the constant apprehension of them.
5 The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably
suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of
strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that
to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such
equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and
increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert
to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably
distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative
equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be
presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would
uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of
years.
6 Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would,
that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of
political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would
those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would
lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish
her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance
or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her
to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose
confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable
to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and
kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid
imputations, whether expressed or implied.
7 The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances
render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would,
at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the
others. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite
the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it
formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash
conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the
more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate
neighbors.
8 They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies
will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no
other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would
neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to
discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us
exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz.,
FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.
9 From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly
mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed
between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of
wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in
a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.
10 When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly
divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign
enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would
have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their
productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so
would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns
must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political
attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and
probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy
might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the
most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to
their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed,
would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.
11 Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions,
would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our distance from
Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger
from one another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them
should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign
alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between
themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive
foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is
to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and
others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the
same character introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to
protect.
12 Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any given
number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the
hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States For the Independent
Journal.
Wednesday, November 14, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of
the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms
and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a
different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind -- those which will in all
probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from
domestic factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances
slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full
investigation.
2 A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that,
if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial
confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have
frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for
such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that
men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of
harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same
neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to
set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.
3 The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some which
have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of
society. Of this description are the love of power or the desire of pre-eminence
and dominion -- the jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety.
There are others which have a more circumscribed though an equally operative
influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of
commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous
than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions;
in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals
in the communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the
favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the
confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have
not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or
personal gratification.
4 The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute,[1] at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his
countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the SAMNIANS. The
same man, stimulated by private pique against the MEGARENSIANS,[2] another
nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an
accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,[3] or to get rid of the
accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the
state in the purchase of popularity,[4] or from a combination of all these
causes, was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in
the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various
vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the
Athenian commonwealth.
5 The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII., permitting his
vanity to aspire to the triple crown,[5] entertained hopes of succeeding in the
acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To
secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he
precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates
of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the
kingdom over which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if
there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal
monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once
the instrument and the dupe.
6 The influence which the bigotry of one female,[6] the petulance of
another,[7] and the cabals of a third,[8] had in the contemporary policy,
ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that
have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.
7 To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the
production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to
their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who have but a
superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will
themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a tolerable
knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights to form their
opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a
reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be
made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been
a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have
been plunged into a civil war.
8 But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this
particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand
ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though
dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is
pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and
to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars.
Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in
ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest,
and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.
9 Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all
nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be
their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary,
invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a
more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote
considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in practice been
less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as
well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and
desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not
popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment,
jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not
well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in
whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the
passions and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything
more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering
and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as
many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing
system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or
dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new
incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience,
the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to
these inquiries.
10 Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens
and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars,
offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta
was little better than a wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage
and conquest.
11 Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very war
that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of
Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in
the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.
12 Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till,
becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II. found means to
accomplish that formidable league,[9] which gave a deadly blow to the power and
pride of this haughty republic.
13 The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took
a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests
with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most persevering
and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.
14 In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one
branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant
pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently
engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in
numerous instances, proceeded from the people.
15 There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal
wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives
have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them
in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real
interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the
rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is
well known that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the
ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,[10] protracted the war
beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in
opposition to the views of the court.
16 The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure grown
out of commercial considerations, -- the desire of supplanting and the fear of
being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the general
advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even the more culpable desire
of sharing in the commerce of other nations without their consent.
17 The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of the
British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish main. These
unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on the part of the
Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which were not more justifiable,
because they exceeded the bounds of a just retaliation and were chargeable with
inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the English who were taken on the Spanish coast
were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a spirit
of resentment, the innocent were, after a while, confounded with the guilty in
indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a violent
flame throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the House of Commons,
and was communicated from that body to the ministry. Letters of reprisal were
granted, and a war ensued, which in its consequences overthrew all the alliances
that but twenty years before had been formed with sanguine expectations of the
most beneficial fruits.
18 From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose
situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we
have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of
peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state
of separation? Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance
of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from
the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is
it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a
practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as
the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of
perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?
19 Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and credit
have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill
administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State of North
Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual
insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare -- !
20 So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of
those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility
between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long observation
of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or
nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent
writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect: "NEIGHBORING
NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common
weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution
prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret
jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of
their neighbors."[11] This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL
and suggests the REMEDY.
PUBLIUS
1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the
connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
5. Worn by the popes.
6. Madame de Maintenon.
7. Duchess of Marlborough.
8. Madame de Pompadour.
9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France, the
King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.
10. The Duke of Marlborough.
11. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbé de
Mably.
FEDERALIST No. 7
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the
States)
For the Independent Journal.
Thursday, November 15, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could
the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full
answer to this question to say -- precisely the same inducements which have, at
different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But,
unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are
causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of
which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had
sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected
if those restraints were removed.
2 Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile
sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that
have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist
among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the
boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and undecided claims
between several of them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation
for similar claims between them all. It is well known that they have heretofore
had serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the lands which
were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the
name of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments
they were comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have
contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union;
especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual
possession, or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected
to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in
the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to
the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy
of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make
cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far
accomplished as, under a continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect
of an amicable termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy,
however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject.
At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at
least, if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that
were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal
compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the
lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by
right of representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could
not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in territory acquired or
secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If,
contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had
a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be
surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would be
set up by different States for this purpose; and as they would affect the
opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a
pacific adjustment.
3 In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample
theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to interpose
between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the future, we shall
have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as
the arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to
be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles
of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a
federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of
Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with
that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till, by
negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss
she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey
the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely
believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States, like
individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their
disadvantage.
4 Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions which
attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the district of
Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from States not
interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest the
danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this
State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that
opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the
interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had
obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district. Even the
States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more
solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions.
These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode
Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of
Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between
Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small
States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In
a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be
likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious
destiny to become disunited.
5 The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention.
The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the
disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more
fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system
of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions,
preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of
intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed
since the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those
causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this
circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE
IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A
DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial
part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not
at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those
regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure
exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations,
on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would
naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.
6 The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary
to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the
tributary States. The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New
Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of
revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must
be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers
of what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this
advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be
remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable,
if there were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in
our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New
York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the
quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we
derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so
oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of
Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New Jersey on the
other? These are questions that temerity alone will answer in the affirmative.
7 The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between
the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance,
and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of
ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of
apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed
which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be
exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar
views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public
debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national
credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the
question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the
domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties
of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are
creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State in the total amount of
the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective
provision. The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of
the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be postponed by
real differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the States
interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of
their just demands, and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double
contingency of external invasion and internal contention.
8 Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the
apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule agreed
upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States than upon
others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation
of the burden. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which
was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would
be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their
contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these
States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and
altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of
its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States
would result from a diversity of other causes -- the real deficiency of
resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the
management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with
which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the
exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate
wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints,
recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb
the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for
any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is
an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is nothing men differ so
readily about as the payment of money.
9 Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the
rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as
another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to expect that a
more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the
individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we
have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. We
have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in
consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island;
and we reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a
war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches
of moral obligation and social justice.
10 The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or
confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation
upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding
papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this
conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the
feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation
of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious
labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of
the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the
artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et
impera[1] must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.[2]
PUBLIUS
1. Divide and command.
2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be
laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week -- on
Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.
FEDERALIST No. 8
The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, November 20, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in
case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out
of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes
of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen
to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us
enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a
situation.
2 War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence,
would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those
countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The
disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they
bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been
productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable,
and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war
prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the
same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places,
which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three
frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar
impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress
of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a
neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be
received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on
the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to
frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in
that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires
overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of
retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.
3 In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of
military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of
fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would
facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun
their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as
difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.
PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of
individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would
characterize our military exploits.
4 This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not long
remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of
national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way
to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war,
the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will
compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to
institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.
To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less
free.
5 The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent
appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not
provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they
may exist under it.[1] Their existence, however, from the very terms of the
proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it
may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy.
Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant
preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confederacies
would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their
more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of
population and resources by a more regular and effective system of defense, by
disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be
necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their
constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of
the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative
authority.
6 The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or
confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors. Small
states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous governments, and with
the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large states, or
states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute of these
advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or
confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and
adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by
which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence.
Thus, we should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country
the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World.
This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our reasonings will
be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this
standard.
7 These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects in
a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of a people, or
their representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from
the natural and necessary progress of human affairs.
8 It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not standing
armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient
republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may be given to
this question. The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed
in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and
commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was
the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue, which
have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the
arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern
times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution
in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the
body of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
9 There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one which
is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the
former can have a good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot
armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These
armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for
interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military
subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military
exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor
confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness
of the army renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it;
and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for
protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery;
they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and
stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice
of their rights.
10 The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress
a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to
enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the
people.
11 In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this
happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always
prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense.
The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the
soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military
state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often
the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their
rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the
people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as
their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering
them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to
prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual
resistance to usurpations supported by the military power.
12 The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular
situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the
possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army
within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent,
till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has been
deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public
opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic
establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for the
operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the consequences of
internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree,
contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in
spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had
been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been,
by that situation, to make her military establishments at home coextensive with
those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all
probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man. It
is possible, though not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved
from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable
as that which has been usually kept up within the kingdom.
13 If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great
distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too
much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance.
Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our
security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either
remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two
or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the
predicament of the continental powers of Europe -- our liberties would be a prey
to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each
other.
14 This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves
the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of
whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate
dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they will
contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they
will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the
rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The
airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its
adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers,
real, certain, and formidable.
PUBLIUS
1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it will be
shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this
subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any
constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which contain
no guard at all on this subject.
FEDERALIST No. 9
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection For the
Independent Journal.
Wednesday, November 21, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the
States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible
to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling
sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were
continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they
were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and
anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived
contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of
felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the
reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the
tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break
forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting
brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of
government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright
talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that produced them
have been so justly celebrated.
2 From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates
of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican
government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried
all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged
themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for
mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have
flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy
sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other
edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of
their errors.
3 But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of
republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they were
taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more
perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to
abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of
politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The
efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not
known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of
power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and
checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices
during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by
deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made
their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and
powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be
retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of
circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil
government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one
more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems
are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the
consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter
is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will,
however, be of use to examine the principle in its application to a single
State, which shall be attended to in another place.
4 The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the
internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force and
security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different
countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers
on the subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great
assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity
of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have
been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of
his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which
they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.
5 When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he
had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of
these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North
Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he
reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take
his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the
alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of
splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous
commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable
objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward
on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and
have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a
desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might,
by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not
qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal
intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of
America.
6 Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has
been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that, in the sense
of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would
only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the
Union, but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one
confederate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of
which we are at present interested.
7 So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a
general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a confederate republic
as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling
the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
8 "It is very probable," (says he[1]) "that mankind would have
been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single
person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal
advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical
government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."
9 "This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES
agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It is a kind
of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by
means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be
able to provide for the security of the united body."
10 "A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may
support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society
prevents all manner of inconveniences."
11 "If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would
alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free
might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and
overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation."
12 "Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states
the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are
reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and
not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates
preserve their sovereignty."
13 "As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is
possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large
monarchies."
14 I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages,
because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor
of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions which a
misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at
the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this
paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic
faction and insurrection.
15 A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a
CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential characteristic of
the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in
their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they
are composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern
with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage
between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a
confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are
supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that
governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the
distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there
have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to
prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject.
And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as
the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable
disorder and imbecility in the government.
16 The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an
assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into one
state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere
matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be
not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local
purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority
of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of
states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national
sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves
in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign
power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the
idea of a federal government.
17 In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or
republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those
of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the
appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was
certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their internal
administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively appropriated to
the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet
Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says: "Were I to give a model of
an excellent Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we
perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation
of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the
novel refinements of an erroneous theory.
PUBLIUS
1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.
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