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Question: 44 [<< | >>]
St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
TREATISE ON THE CREATION
(Questions 44-49)
THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of the procession of
the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This
consideration will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the
distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government. Concerning the first
point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode
of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of
things.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?
(2)
Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with
Him?
(3)
Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?
(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 44 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Whether it is necessary that every
being be created by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is
not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing
from being without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found
without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be
essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they can
exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
God.
Objection 2: Further, a thing
requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does
not require an efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever
necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary things in
existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things
have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not
made by the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3);
therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Rm. 11:36): "Of Him, and by
Him, and in Him are all things."
I answer that, It must be said that
every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by
participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron
becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Question [3],
Article [4])
when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being;
and also it was shown (Question [11],
Articles [3],4)
that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one,
since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are
not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things
which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less
perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.
Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that
unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is
greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth;
just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the
relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows,
as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has
being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without
being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to
be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for
us to find a being uncaused.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection
has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is
manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes
of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are
some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an
efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because
the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true,
whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.
Reply to Objection 3: The science of
mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it
is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient
cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of mathematics has an
efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought
under the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that
object from its efficient cause.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 44 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Whether primary matter is created
by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that
primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of
something else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary
matter cannot have been made by God.
Objection 2: Further, action and
passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so
the first passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles
divided against each other, neither of which is from the other.
Objection 3: Further, every agent
produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it
follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in
potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of primary
matter to be a thing made.
On the contrary, Augustine says
(Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto
Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh unto nothing"---viz. primary
matter.
I answer that, The ancient
philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth.
At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except
sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it except as
regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by
union and separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was
uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance,
affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when they
understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, which
latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place
in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain
universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according to Aristotle (De
Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter
is contracted by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain
species, is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for
instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered
"being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as
"such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others
there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned
a cause to things, not as "these," or as "such," but as
"beings."
Therefore whatever is the cause of
things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are
"such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by
substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any
way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal
cause of things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher
(Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form
to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to
their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself
is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.
Reply to Objection 2: Passion is an
effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the
effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one
perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii,
text 40).
Reply to Objection 3: The reason
adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form;
for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary
that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is
created.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 44 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Whether the exemplar cause is
anything besides God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the
exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But
creatures are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is by
participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to
fire, as stated above (Article [1]).
But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This
appears from the fact that in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the
species, but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species.
Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for instance, a "per
se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the
exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
Objection 3: Further, sciences and
definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular
things, because there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there
are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and these
are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
Objection 4: Further, this likewise
appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before
self-subsisting life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
On the contrary, The exemplar is the
same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (Questions. 83, qu. 46), are "the
master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the
exemplars of things are not outside God.
I answer that, God is the first
exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production
of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a
determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the
exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar
interiorily conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive
determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its
first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists
in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the
types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in
the divine mind (Question [15],
Article [1]).
And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart
from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely
by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all
things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the
reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of
imitation.
Reply to Objection 1: Although
creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species,
as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,
forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the house in
the architect's mind.
Reply to Objection 2: It is of a
man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore
although this particular man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be
reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as
separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars.
Reply to Objection 4: As Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he
sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not
any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 44 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Whether God is the final cause of
all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that God
is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the
end. But God needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, the end of
generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys.
ii, text 70), because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is
the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause of all things.
Objection 3: Further, all things
desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him.
Therefore God is not the end of all things.
Objection 4: Further, the final cause
is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it
follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has
made all things for Himself."
I answer that, Every agent acts for
an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the
agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as
such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the impression which the agent
intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some
things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents,
and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it
does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some
end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every
creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine
perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.
Reply to Objection 1: To act from
need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient.
But this does not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal
giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The form of the
thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the
form of the generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form
of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, since the end is more noble
than the means to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: All things
desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be
intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and
desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.
Reply to Objection 4: Since God is
the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is
from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this
does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him, some of which come into
our mind before others.
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