Karol Wojtyla
The Acting Person
END NOTES
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
1 In the phenomenological perspective the conception of experience received its full meaning. Following Husserl, we do not have reason to accept a restrictive interpretation of "experience." Experience should be considered as the source and the basis of all knowledge about objects, but this does not mean that there is one and only one kind of experience and that this experience is the so-called "sense" perception, which may be either "transcendent" or "immanent." In general, for phenomenologists "experience" means immediate givenness or every cognitive act in which the object itself is given directly - "bodily" - or, to use Hussen's phrase, is leibhaft selbstgegeben. Cpposmg the empiricistic reductionism there are, then, many different kinds of experience in which individual objects are given to be taken into account, for instance, the experience of the individual psychical facts of other selves, the aesthetic experience in which works of art are given, and so on.
The problem of experience and a broad range of related methodological questions were a major topic in a discussion of The Acting Person among philosophers active in Poland. Cf. Analecta Cracoviensia, V-VI (Cracow: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1973-1974) contributions by J. Kalinowski, M. Jaworski, S. Kamitiski, T. Styczeti, and K. Kl6sak. M. Jaworski, who differed with the position of J. Kalinowski, stressed the specific traits of the experience of man that underlies the understanding of his nature.
2 This approach seems to go counter to the views of M. Blondel in his classic work Action (Paris: F. Alcan, l%3).
3 It is interesting to note that in authors representing the so-called school of common language analysis in ethics, especially the Anglo-American exponents of this school, anthropological questions are almost entirely disregarded or limited to marginal remarks on the freedom of will and determinism. Cf~, e.g., C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944) and also Stevenson's chief critic, R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory: The Problem of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959).
4 The way this methodic procedure is employed in mathematics seems to illustrate sufficiently well in what sense and for what purpose "placing before brackets" will be used in this study. The aim is to exclude the essentially ethical problems in favor of the anthropological ones. It is to be stressed, however, that this does not entail that the essence is distilled and separated from actual existence, so characteristic for Edmund Husserl's phenomenological epoche. Thus this study does not follow the principles of a strictly cidetic method; and yet, throughout these investigations the author's intention has been to understand man as the person, that is, to define the "eidos" of the human being.
5 Phenomenologists speak of the cognition of what is essential (in this case it would be cognition of the essence inherent in the event "man-acts"). In their opinion this kind of cognition is a priori, remains correlative with a specific intuition, and is consequently not to be reached inductively. Ingarden, for instance writes, "Though... a phenomenologist does not essentially renounce the investigation of facts, the proper field of his inquiries is located elsewhere. His chief task is the a priori cognition of the essence of objects" (Zbadari nadjilozofia wsp6lczesnq, p.318, Warsaw: PWN, 1965). This one-sided emphasis is, however, one more reason why it seems absolutely necessary to bring forth again the role of induction as conceived of by Aristotle (in contrast with the conception of induction in the positivists).
6 The problem of practical knowledge in the Aristotelian and Thomistic approach with reference to Kant and contemporary philosophy has been studied by J. Kalinowski, Teoria poznania praktycznego (Theory of practical knowledge) (Lublin: Tow Nauk. Kul., l%0). In this study we do not intend to consider questions of practical knowledge as a specific source and the basis of human "praxis," though we will make use of the "praxis" itself as a source of knowledge of the man-person.
7 This seems to explain not only the ends that in the author's intention this study is to serve but also provides a comment to the previously mentioned question of priorities in the relation between theory and praxis. Indeed, we are also concerned with the sense itself of philosophical and scientific cognition, in which the ambition of this study is to share.
8 The author has given much thought to the work of M. Scheler, in particular his Ler Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Wersuch der Grundlegung emes ethisches Personalismus (Bern: Francke, 1966). The critique of Kant contained in that work is of crucial significance for the present considerations and was for this author the occasion for reflection and the cause of a partial acceptation of some of Kantian personalism. This refers specially to the "ethical" personalism expounded in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Ko'.nighche Preussischen Akademie der Wissensehaft (Berlin, 1903), IV, 387-483.
The discussion between Scheler (Der Formalism us in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik) and Kant was in a way the "starting ground" for the reflection underlying the analyses of the "acting person" contained in this study. The positions of these two philosophers directly referred to the conception of ethics but were inherently concerned with the conception of man, in particular the conception of the person, which philosophy - and theology - owes to Boethius, and thus became a challenge, if not an obligation, to search for a new approach to and a new presentation of the problem. These currents were also in one way or another reflected in the writings of Roman Ingarden. (The Polish edition of The Acting Person appeared before Ingarden published his U~ber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente [Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1970].) Some original writings by Ingarden as well as some major interpretations of his thought have appeared also on several occasions in Analecta Husserliana, The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel PubI. Co.). In particular see vol. IV, Ingardeniana and the treatise by A.-T. Tymieniecka, 'Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy with Husserl - The New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology' (pp. 241-418).
9 While writing this book (in the first, Polish version) the author attended the Second Vatican Council and his participation in the proceedings stimulated and inspired his thinking about the person. It suffices to say that one of the chief documents of the Council, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes), not only brings to the forefront the person and his calling but also asserts the belief in his transcendent nature. The Constitution asserts, "The role and competence of the Church being what it is, she must in no way be confused with the political community, nor bound to any political system. For she is at once a sign and a safeguard of the transcendence of the human person. Gaudium et spes 76, The Locuments of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Guild Press, 1966).
10 The original Polish term here used is "czyn," which as the author himself stresses, is not the exact equivalent of the Latin actus; nor is it the equivalent of the English act since its connotations stress deliberateness and purpose in human acting. This is why the translator has tended to render it by the term "action" rather than "act" (translator's note).
11 See Thomas Aquinas, Summae Theologiae I-Il, 'De actibus humanis,' qu. VI and fol., also Summa Theol. I, qu. LXXVII, 3. Cf. also J. de Finance: Etre et Agir dans Ia philosophie de Saint Thomas (Paris: Beauchesne, 1943).
12 It has often been noted that man manifests himself through actions, through his acting, though these assertions did not necessarily refer to the structure of man as the person. E.g., M. Blondel expresses this in a rather general way when he says, "Le corps de l'action n'est pas seulement un systeme de mouvements manifestes par la vie organique dans le milieu des phenomenes; il est constitue par la synthese reelle et plus ou moms harmonisee des tendances multiples ou' s'expriment notre nature, notre spontaneite, nos habitudes, notre caractere." L'action (Paris: Beauchesne, l%3), II, 192-193. The proper perspective for this study is that of the person who discloses himself through the action. In this sense we are dealing with the ontological interpretation of the person through action as the action. By "ontological interpretation" we mean an interpretation that shows what the reality of the person is.
13 Though dynamism is repeatedly mentioned here, its appropriate philosophical interpretation is deferred till it emerges from further considerations.
14 The conviction that the traditional concept of "actus humanus" implicitly contains and, so to speak, conceals the aspect of consciousness, which in this study we are trying to disclose, is reinforced by an even more deeply rooted belief about the essentially continuous and homogeneous character of the whole philosophy of man, regardless of whether it is practiced from the position of the so-called "philosophy of being" or from those of the so-called "philosophy of consciousness." The action, as the keystone in revealing and understanding the reality that the person is, ensures that we reach this reality itself and do not stop at the level of consciousness alone, of absolute consciousness.
15 The problem of the identity of consciousness, like that of its continuity, recurs constantly in the entire Western philosophical thought from Plato, through Descartes, Kant, Husserl and the contemporary existential thought in its different currents. when in the context of this study we assert the continuity and the identity of consciousness we thereby conlirm our earlier assertion that consciousness plays a decisive part in establishing the reality of man as the person. The person is in a way also constituted by and through consciousness (though not "in consciousness" and not only "in consciousness"). The continuity and identity of consciousness reflects and also conditions the continuity and identity of the person.
16 Even while rejecting the intentional character of consciousness and of its acts this author does not deny that consciousness is always - as stressed by Brentano, Husserl, and generally the phenomenologists - the consciousness of something. E.g., Husserl wrote, "We understood under intentionality the unique peculiarity of experiences 'to be the consciousness of something'." Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. R. Boyce Gibson (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), p.242. Nevertheless, this author's concern is at present the acting person from the viewpOint of the aspect of consciousness, and thus consciousness seen in a broader perspective; hence the questions he must ask are, why (qua ratione) and in what way (quo modo) consciousness is always the consciousness of something. In this connection it seems proper to adopt a different, dynamic concept of the act - the concept associated with the Aristotelian tradition - and consequently also a different concept of intentionality. We thus regard as acts in the strict sense of the word only the manifestations of the real powers of the person. Thus when following the manner of speaking widely accepted in phenomenology we refer to "acts of consciousness," the reader has to remember that we are using the phrase only figuratively, for its convenience and not its adequacy. Similarly we i~nderstand "intention" as an active directing upon the object; thus strictly speaking consciousness, as here conceived, has no intentionality and so the term, as we use it, has only a secondary and derived meaning owing to the intentional acts of knowledge or self-knowledge as real faculties.
17 Here the "ego" means the subject having the experience of his subjectiveness and in this aspect it also means the person. The structure of the human person will be submitted to more comprehensive analysis when we come to the personal structure of self-determination. However, it has to be pointed out that the aim of our study is to show the reality of the person in the aspect of consciousness and not to analyze consciousness as such.
Because of self-knowledge the person - that is, the ego subjectively constituted by consciousness (self-consciousness) in the sense of the experience had of its own appropriate subjectiveness - has himself given as an object and simultaneously is objectively cognized by himself. This is why we can say of self-knowledge and consciousness that they are mutually consistent or cohesive. M. A. Krqpiec writing from the positions of existential Thomism sees self-knowledge as the knowledge of the existence of the ego. Cf. "Ja-czlowiek": Zarts antropologli jilozojicznej ("The Ego-Man": An Outline of Anthropological Philosophy) (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Polskiego Uniwersytetu Katolickiego w Lublinie, 1974), p.109.
18 The belief that knowledge has a general object springs from the Aristotelian tradition.
In connection with our discussion of self-knowledge it is worth noting that the position taken by J. Nuttin appears to come close to our analysis of self-knowledge. Nuttin wrote, "Cette presence cognitive de l'objet en face du moi implique, pour le moi, une certaine possession cognitive de soi-meme, et une possibilite de prendre possession de l'objet comme tel. Une telle perception de l'objet cree Ia 'distance' necessaire qui permet a Ia personnalit~ de se percevoir comme sujet percevant le monde, sans coincider avec cet acte". La structure de Ia personnalite (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), p.219.
19 The stream of consciousness is spoken of in philosophy from the times of James and Bergson. Husserl emphasizes the crucial role of the stream of consciousness with respect to the ego. In the Husserlian analysis, especially in Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations, the structure "stream of consciousness - acts - the ego pole" constitutes the existential foundation of the human being and his life-world.
When speaking of the "vitality" that is peculiar and pertains to consciousness we are not thinking solely of the vitality that manifests itself as the stream of consciousness; what we are trying to achieve is to reach the source itself of the stream.
A. Poltawski, in his essay 'Ethical Action and Consciousness,' Analecta Husserliana Vol. VII, The Human Being in Action (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978), pp. 115-150, has endeavored in a comprehensive and penetrating manner to compare the conception of consciousness presented in this study with that of the eminent French psychiatrist Henri Ey.
20 The question may well be asked whether apart from experience - that is, experience of subjectivity, which we have here related to the reflexive function of consciousness -it is at all possible to know that it is the ego who is the subject. In view of what was said before about experience (see Introduction), the answer should be that while the experience of man (as an outer experience) allows us to some extent to ascertain him as the subject of existing and acting, it is the experience of one's own ego - an inner experience - that gives that special manifestation to this conviction and at the same time establishes its new dimension, that is, the dimension of the experienced subjectivity. It seems that according to E. Levinas a kind of "enjoyment" ('ouissance) belongs to the essence of experience. He writes, "Le monde dont je vis ne se constitue pas simplement au deuxi~me degre apres que la representation aura tendu devant nous une toile de fond d'une r~alite' simplement donn~e et que des intentions 'axiologiques' aient prete a' cc monde une valeur qui le rende apte a' l'habitation. Le 'revirement' du constitut~ en condition s'accomplit des que j'ouvre les yeux: je n'ouvre les yeux qu'en jouissant de'ja' du spectacle." Totalite et InjinL Essai sur l'exte'riorite; 4th ed. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), p.103. Further: "La sensibilite met en rapport avec une pure qualite sans support, avec l'element. La sensibilite' est jouissance. L'e'tre sensible, le corps, concretise cette facon d'e'tre qui consiste a' trouver une condition en ce qui, par ailleurs, peut apparattre comme object de pens~e, comme simplement constitue" (ibid., p. 109). If this position were accepted, then the only possible interpretation of the function of consciousness would be that it conditions experience and not that it constitutes experience.
21 This approach has persisted in philosophy from Berkeley through Kant to Hussert, though of course with many subtle modifications.
22 We could venture to say that as for Bergson "cognition," so here "experience" appears as this definitive and ultimate shape. We may also remark that in this approach consciousness, as the direct condition of having the experience of one's own ego, becomes the essential factor of realism in the conception of man. Here "realism" is used not only in the sense of simply ascertaining the objective "beingness" of man but also of carrying the analysis to the ultimate limits of the possible interpretation of that man in his unique concreteness.
23 Scheler shows moral values as appearing "auf dem Rlicken" of volitions directed toward different objective values (materiale Werie). Cf. M. Scheler, Der Formalism us in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Bern: Francke, 1966), pp.45-51, particularlY the passage, "Der Wert 'gut' erscheint... an dem Willensakte. Eben darum kann er nie die Materie dieses Willensaktes scm. Er befindet sich gleichsam 'auf dem Ru~cken' dieses Aktes, und zwar wesensnotwendig; er kann daher nie in diesem Akte intendiert scm" (pp.48-49). while it is impossible not to admire the subtlety of Scheler's analysis it is equally impossible to dismiss the suspicion that it somehow relaxes or perhaps even disregards the bonds connecting the subject - that is, one's own ego - given in experience as the agent with those very values of which he is the agent and not only the subject. Consequently the moment of a certain "identification" of the subject with the goodness or badness that he himself performed seems to disappear from the experience of morality, in which it plays a crucial role; indeed, it is this moment that determines the thoroughly personal character of these values.
These problems have on various occasions been critically considered by this author, among others in 'The Intentional Act and the Human Act, that is, Act and Experience,' Analecta Husserliana, vol. V (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), pp.269-80.
24 In this way we attribute to consciousness, and especially to self-consciousness, a certain function that in the structure of the person consists in the possession of oneself. This view is shared by other writers, among them also Nuttin, who says, "Cette perception et connaissance, ou conscience, de soi est une forme de possession de soi, qui constitute un element essentiel d'un psychisme personnalise." La structure de la personnalite (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), p. 22. The question remains, however, whether "self-consciousness" has the same meaning for Nuttin as it has in this study.
It is on the assumption, according to which possession of oneself and self-control of oneself are in the structure of the human person conditioned by consciousness, that the emotionalization of consciousness is here analyzed. The joint and in a way homogeneous function of consciousness and self-determination - i.e., of will - in the integral structure of the person and the action will become even more evident when in the course of subsequent considerations self-possession or self-control are directly related to self-determination or will (cf. Chap. 3).
25 Berkeley distinguishes two ways of existing: the esse of things is equivalent to percipi and the esse of spiritual beings is equivalent to percipere et velle. when considering the views of different philosophers it is essential to pay careful attention to the meaning each of them gives to the word "consciousness," because sometimes it may simply denote a conscious being.
26 The sense in which "dynamism" is used here will still emerge in the course of further analyses. The term is related to the Greek "dynamism" and its genesis reaches back to Plato and Aristotle, from whom it passed to medieval philosophy kpotentia). In modern philosophy dynamism (Leibniz) is opposed to mechanism (Descartes). Dynamism is closely connected with dynamics, which is most often understood as the opposite of statics; it is in this sense that it is used in the context of this study.
27 Beginning our analysis of the dynamism pertaining to man with the distinction between "man-acts" and "something-happens-in-man" as fundamental structures we reach to what appears to be the most primitive in experience. This distinction is also given in experience and thus appears as directly evident to human cognition. We may add that the differentiation between the two structures seems to have as its equivalent in Aristotelian metaphysics the two separate categories: Metaphysics, IX-Ol, 1046a, 19-22.
The author wonders whether the starting point for the analyses adopted in this study is not in some way close to P. Ricoeur's Le volontaire et l'involontaire, Paris: Aubier, 1949.
28 See Metaphysics, IX-Ol, 1045b, 34-35; 1046a, 1-2; or Metaphysics, XII-(5, 1071a, 4-5 and other passages); Summ. Theol. Ia, S. Tomm.: "In uno et codem, quod exit de potentia in actum, prius sit tempore potentia quam actus, simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia, quia quod est in potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu" (III, 1; III, 8) and "Potentia, secundum iUud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde Oportet rationem potentiac accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur" (LXXVII 5).
29 In connection with this problem R. Ingarden wrote, "In dem Bereich seiner mo~glichen Verwandlungen ist das Subjekt der Schopfer seines SeibsI. Es gabe diejenige Gestalt seines Wesens nicht, die sich letzten Endes in semen Leben realisiert, wenn es seine Taten und Verhaltensweisen in den Beziehungen zu seiner Umwelt nicht gegeben hatte. Unter den Menschen unseres Jahrhunderts hat das zuerst und am konkretensten R. M. Rilke gesehen, nach ihm erst Max Scheler, dann Heidegger und die Existentialisten." Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, II, 2 (Ttibingen: Niemeyer, 1965), p.299, n. 30. This conception of constructing oneself through the action leads to more specific questions about the so-called "auto-creationism" in the philosophy of man. It invites confrontation with the conception of "man as creator" by A.-T. Tymieniecka, summarized in her critical work 'Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy with Husseri - the New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology,' Analecta Husserliana, Vol. IV (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), pp.241-418, especially Part 4: 'The Contextual Phase of Phenomenology and its Program. Creativity: Cosmos and Eros.' (Tymieniecka's theory of creative activity has been presented in a challenge to the classic phenomenology of "constitution" in her book Eros et Logos, esquisse de Ia phenom~nologie de l'interiorite criatrice, Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1961. Editor's note.) Cf. also by the same author: 'Initial Spontaneity and the Modalities of Human Life,' Analecta Husserliana, Vol. V (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), pp. 15-37.
30 Cf. J. de Finance, Etre et Agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas (Rome: Presses de l'Universit~ Gregorienne, 1965).
31 Cf. Boethius, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi, Migne, Patrol. Lat., vol. LXIV, 1343 D: "Persona proprie dicitur naturac rationalis individua substantia."
32 Reaffirming the traditional position that "nature" is the basis for the integrity of the person we have to admit that it would be difficult to disregard that "paradox of freedom and of nature" of which P. Ricoeur wrote: "Derriere ces structures est Ic paradoxe qui culmine comme paradoxe de la liberte et de Ia nature. Le paradoxe est, au niveat) meme de l'existence, Ic gage du dualisme au niveau de l'objectivite'. II n'y a pas de procede logique par Icquel la nature procede de Ia liberte, (I'involontaire du volontaire), ou Ia liberte de Ia nature. II n'y a pas de systeme de Ia nature et de Ia liberte.
"Mais comment Ic paradoxe ne serait-il ruineux, comment Ia liberte ne serait-elle pas annulee par son exces meme, Si elle ne riussissalt pas a recuperer ses liaisons avec une situation en quclques sorte nourriciere? Une ontologie paradoxale n'est possible que secritement riconcilice. La jointure de l'etre est apercue dans une intuition aveuglee qui Se reflechit en paradoxes; dIe n'est jamais cc que je regarde, mais cela ti partir de quoi s'articulent les grands contrastes de Ia liberte et de Ia nature." Le volontaire et l'involontaire (Paris: Aubier, 1949), p.22.
The integration of the human nature in and through the person has something in common with Ricocur's "ontologie paradoxale" that "n'est pas possible que secritement reconcili6e" because of the moment of freedom, which is essential and constitutive for the action; and it is the action that in a special way reveals the person.
The treatment of the problem of the person's relation to nature in The Acting Person was critically discussed by J. Kalinowski in the previously mentioned discussion published in Analecta Cracoviensia.
33 The notion of the potentiality of man - like the concept of the actus, to which it is strictly related - belongs to the heritage of the Aristotelian tradition. On the ground of these conceptions a certaln systematization has been obtained of the powers accessible to man (cf. Aristotle, De anima, III, 8, 432, and particularly III, 9, 432b; see also S. Thomm., Summa TheoL, qu. LXXVII-LXXXIII). In our approach this systematization is omitted; for only what is given as the most primitive element of experience - namely, the difference between the experience of "man-acts" and that of "something-happens-in-man" - appears to have an essential significance for revealing, and thus also for understanding, the reality of the person, of his transcendence as well as his integration in the action.
34 The need to distinguish between the unconscious and the subconscious was stressed by C. Tresmontant: "Dans l'inconscient de l'homme, il n'y a donc pas seulement ni meme d'abord ce que j'ai 'refou1e~,' des souvenirs que je ine dissimule a moi-meme. II y a d'abord l'inconscient biologique, organisateur, qui Opere en moi, dans l'organisme que je suis, sans que je sache comment. C'est un premier niveau de l'inconscient, un premier ordre ou domaine de l'inconscient." Le probleme de 1'ame (Paris: Seuil, 1971), p.186. It is to be noted, however, that the unconscious as a structural element of man can be spoken of meaningfully only if we accept man's virtuality and when we are discussing the relation between the virtuality and consciousness. Otherwise the unconscious does not seem to denote anything that would form part of the real structure of the human subject; it is but a negation of consciousness.
35 The assertion that the threshold of consciousness not only divides but also connects consciousness and subconsciousness may be accepted only so far as we consider them on the ground of their relation to man's virtuality. It is perhaps necessary to ask how this fits in with Freud's conception that "There are two paths by which the contents of the id can penetrate into the ego. The one is direct, the other leads by way of the ego-ideal; which of these two paths they take may, for many mental activities, be of decisive importance.
"The ego develops from perceiving instincts to controlling them, from obeying instincts to curbing them. In this achievement a large share is taken by the ego-ideal which indeed is partly a reaction-formation against the instinctual processes in the id." The Ego and the Id (London: Hogarth Press, 1950).
36 The problem of connecting the existential status of man with time, giving primacy to time, is especially attractive and important for phenomenologists and existential philosophers. E.g., J.-P. Sartre, 'La temporalit~,' in Etre et le Neant, Essai d'ontologie phenomenologique (Paris, 1943), pp.150-218; D. v. Hildebrand, Wahre Sittlichkeit und Situations-Ethik (Dusseldorf: Pathmos, 1957), pp. 103-4; E. Levinas, 'La relation ~thique et le temps,' in Totahte et l'Injini (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp.195-225. Let us recall that the impulse came from Martin Heidegger. The traditional philosophy of man constructed on the ground of the philosophy of being did not occupy itself directly and explicitly with this problem. It was however, implicitly contained in the concept of the "contingency" of beings which referred to the human being as well as to all other derivative (i.e., created) beings.
The author admits that in this study the aspect of the contingency of man has not received sufficient attention and this is all the more true of the historical aspect of man.
37 In view of the changeability of both man's body and his psyche philosophers have often debated the question of his identity in time. Their answers were of course different depending on the metaphysical position they adopted. Here we may quote, for example, Shoemaker who examined, among others, the causes allowing us to speak of man's identity in time. In this respect he assumes the knowledge (significant solely for men and not for things) that need not make use of any criteria and then goes on to say, "There is noncriterial knowledge of the identity (or persistence) of persons, namely, that expressed in memory statements," and then adds, ..... persons are spatiotemporally continuous entities that can know their own pasts without using spatiotemporal continuity (or anything else) as a criterion of identity." Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca, 1963), pp.258-59.
38 It is necessary to note here the ~ossible!) ambiguity of the term "self-determination." It may be understood as meaning "I am the one who determines," and then the meaning of "self-determination" would coincide with the freedom of will, with "I may but I need not" (this was discussed in the preceding section). But it may also mean that "I am determined by myself" (this will be discussed in the next section). In the former sense the will manifests itself first of all as a power while in the latter it is a property of the person. We may presume that these two meanings (thus also two paths in the development of the philosophy of the will) derive from two dimensions and also two "moments" of the same experience rather than from two different experiences.
39 Cf. ..... Liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus: quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum." Summa Theol. 83, 1 ad 3. For St. Thomas the will appears to be first of all a power, which makes man determine his own actions.
40 In a sense Kant is the exponent of "the apriorism of freedom." His whole notion of the categorical imperative is constructed so as to allow "pure freedom" (autonomy) to mark its role in man's action, because it is only in "pure freedom" that "pure morality" can be actualized. At the same time it would be difficult to deny that it was Kant who contributed to the personal meaning (and indirectly the personal structure) of self-determination; though perhaps the decisive role in this matter was played by the so-called "second imperative" rather than by his theory of a priori freedom. Cf. "Handle so. dass du die Menscheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person cines jeden andern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloss als Mittel brauchest." Grundlegung zur Methaphysik der Sitten (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam, 1904), p.65. Kant points out that self-determination is a right of the person. A right, however, cannot be suspended in the void, it must have a real structure to correspond to. By means of this structure the person - that is, that which in itself is subjective - becomes his own first object. It is this relation that we have called "self-determination." This author is convinced that it cannot be expressed in terms of the intentionality itself of an act ol will (I will something).
41 This is not transcendence "toward something," transcendence directed toward an object (value or end), but one within the frame of which the subject confirms himself by transgressing (and in a way Outgrowing) himself. This kind of transcendence appears to be represented by Kant rather than by Scheler.
42 Cf. ..... quamvis liberum arbitrium nominet quendam actum secundum propriam significationem vocabuli; secundum tamen communem usum loquendi, liberum arbitrium dicimus id quod est huius actus principium, scilicet quo homo libere iudicat. Principium autem actus in nobis est Ct potentia et habitus Oportet ergo quod liberum arbitrium vel sit potentia, vel sit habitus . Guod autem non sit habitus Thomas, Summa 83, 2c.
43 According to A.-T. Tymieniecka, "The initial spontaneity makes itself ascertain, within the complete phenomenological framework of inquiry, as the authentic counterpart of the ordering systems in which it represents the elemental ground of the primitive forces and the subliminal source of man's passions, drives, strivings and nostalgias." 'Initial Spontaneity and the Modalities of Human Life,' in: Analecta Husserliana Vol. V (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), p. 24. Elsewhere she writes, ... 'Brute' Nature could hardly by itself explain in its universally designed progress the differentiation of the initial spontaneity as it flows into the act of human experience. ... Once bound into the orchestration of human functions these blind energies of Nature may stir from below its apparatus and supply it with 'forces.' However, it is the intermediate 'territory' of spontaneity, differentiating, and endowed with specijic virtualities - territory which we call 'subliminal' - that is, postulated in order that the functional progress and its articulation may come about" (ibid., p.34).
44 It seems right and correct to draw a distinction, as does Ingarden, between "intention" and "intent." Cf. R. Ingarden, Studies in Contemporary Philosophy (Warsaw: PWN, 1963), p.364, n. 1.
45 See N. Ach, Uber den Willensakt und das Temperament (Leipzig, 1910), A. Michotte and N. Pru~ mm, 'La choix volontaire et ses ant~ce dents immediats, Arch. de psych., 10 (1910). In Poland the analysis of the will was developed in a similar direction by, e.g., M. Dybowski: How Execution Depends on the Traits of the Willing Process (Warsaw, 1926); On the Types of WilL Experimental Researches (Lvov-Warsaw, 1928).
46 when in this study we point to the moment of decision we do so because of previously adopted assumptions; we consider the will primarily as self-determination (personal structure of self-determination) and only, so to speak, secondarily as a power. It is noteworthy that Ricoeur also incorporates the problem of choice (le choix et les motifs) into the analysis of decision (d~cider or rather "Se decider"); cf. Le volontaire et l'involontaire, (Paris: Aubier, 1949), p. 37ff.
47 See also K. Woityla, 'Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego' ('The problem of will in the analysis of the ethical act'), Roczniki Filozojiczne, 5, no. 1(1955-1957), 111-35, and '0 kierowniczej lub sluzebnej roli rozumu w etyce. Na tie poglqd6w Tomasza z Akwinu, Hume 'a i Kanta' ('The directing or subservient role of reason in ethics discussed in relation to Thomas Aquinas, Hume and Kant'), Roczniki Filozotczne, 6, no.2 (1958), 13-31.
This juxtaposition is meant to reflect the conviction that, in spite of the diametrical difference between metaphysical realism (Thomas) and a priori rationalism (Kant), it is still possible to find in the conception of man some common ground for comparison.
48 The transcendence of the person in the action is thus ultimately constituted as the "transgressing of oneself in truth" rather than "toward truth" (see note 41 above).
49 Cf. "En pervertissant l'involontaire et le volontaire, Ia faute altere notre rapport fondamental aux valeurs et ouvre le veritable drame de Ia morale qui est le drame de l'homme divise. Un dualisme ethique dechire l'homme par dela tout dualisme d'entendement et d'existence. 'Je ne fais pas Ic bien que je veux, et je fais Ic mal que je ne veux pas'." P. Ricocur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, (Paris: Aubier, 1949), p.24.
50 See M. Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, mainly Das Apriori-Materiale in der Ethik (p. 99ff.). In this context the assertion that the moment of truth about a good is essential in the experience had of value has meaning primarily so far as it allows us to bring out the personal structure of self-determination and also the transcendence of the person in the action. The author is fully aware that this assertion can be considered only against a broad background of investigations dealing specifically with the theory of value and knowledge (the cognitive experiencing of value). Cf. D. v. Hildebrand, Ethik, in Gesammelte Wetke, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Habbel-Kohlhammer, 1974), pt. 1, especially 'Die Realitlit der Werte wider ihre Verlichter' and 'Wesentliche Aspecte der Wertsphlire,' pp. 83-174, or the English translation entitled Christian Ethics (New York: McKay, 1952). See also N. Hartmann, Ethik (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1926), Part 4: 'Vom Wesen der ethischen Werte,' pp.107-53, especially chap. 16: 'Gnoseologisches Ansichsein der Werte,' pp. 133-35.
51 There seems to be a strict relation between acknowledging the results of an intransitive action and acknowledging the reality of the goodness or badness - of moral values - within the personal subject that man is. This relation has a crucial significance for the meaningfulness of the whole of our discussion over the relation of self-determination to fulfillment. when in the coming discussions we are using the phrase "man fulfills himself" (or fails to fulfill himself), we are aware that fulfillment itself has in a way an absolute sense. The absolute dimension of the fulfillment of oneself, however, is never mentioned either in this chapter or throughout this book. No concrete action in the terrestrial experience of man can actualize such an absolute dimension. Nevertheless, every action discloses to some extent the structures of personal fulfillment, just as it discloses the structures of personal self-determination. Since in the preceding chapter we inspected the structures of self-determination it is now necessary to examine the structures of personal fulfillment in connection with the action.
The discussion of what is transitive and intransitive in the action must be related to the traditional philosophy of being and acting (l'etre et agir).
52 At this point it is perhaps necessary to recall M. Scheler's critique of the Kantian ethics, in which he saw "pure obligation" (Pflicht aus Pflicht tun) instead of obligation itself as a specific fact and thus also a specific experience. The important thing about this experience is that it must be adequately rooted in value. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the Kantian imperatives (especially the so-called second imperative) do not in a way presuppose a turn toward values lying at the basis of obligation, or even pertaining to obligation.
In the course of this analysis the author's prime concern is to reveal the roots, from which both the experience of value and obligation develops, so to speak, organically. Values are "normogenic."
53 The discussion of the interrelation of "truthfulness and consciousness" is strictly connected with the debate in Chapter 1, 'The Acting Person in the Aspect of Consciousness.' The whole process, whereby the person with his constitutive structures is gradually disclosed by the action, forces us to concentrate attention on truthfulness; for consciousness can be identified only in its broad and, so to speak, secondary sense with "moral conscience."
54 The question refers to the basis of the dynamic structure of self-determination, which is connected with man's fundamental striving to be good and not to be bad. The position taken by Scheler - who maintains that to make moral values the object of desiring would be a hypocritical attitude - is understandable in the light of his assumptions; for "to want to be good" and "to want to have the experience of being good" are two entirely different things and a dose of hypocrisy may indeed be suspected in the latter. See also this author's 'The Intentional Act and the Human Act, that is, Act and Experience' in Analecta Husserliana, Vol. V (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), pp. 272-73.
In the light of these analyses we become convinced that the role of the will in the structure of the person and the action is to be considered from the point of view of self-determination and not of "intentionality" (see Chap. 3, 'The Personal Structure of Self-determination').
55 These views about the nature of ethical judgments relate to the metaphysical belief that values have no real existence (evaluational nihilism) or to the epistemological belief that values are not an object of cognition (acognitivism). These beliefs are apparent in the emotivism of A. J. Ayer. Cf. Language, Truth and Logic (London: Gollancz, 1936) as well as in the prescriptivism of R. M. Hare,> The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1952). Hare, however, tries to attenuate this extreme emotivism in favor of objectivism in ethical judgments and maintains that moral norms can be justified though this does nOt consist in demonstrating their truthfulness.
56 Rom. 12:1.
57 Ricoeur writes, ..... en me reveillant de l'anonymat, je de'couvre que je n'ai pas d'autres moyens de m'allirmer que mes actes memes. 'Je' ne suis qu'un aspect de mes actes, le p6le-sujet de mes actes. (En ce sens Husserl dit que hors de son implication dans ses actes le moi n'est pas 'un objet propre de recherche': 'Si l'on fait abstraction de sa facon de se rapporter (Beziehungsweisen) et de Se comporter (Verhaltungsweisen), it est absolument depourvu de composantes cidetiques et n'a meme aucun content) qu'on puisse expliciter; il est en soi et pour soi indescriptible, moi pur et rien de plus (Ideen, I, 160). Je n'ai aucun moyen de m'affirmer en marge de mes actes. C'est ce que me revele le sentiment de responsabilite." Le volontaire et l'involontaire, (Paris: Aubier, 1949), p.56.
58 It seems that this sort of misconception lies at the root of the so-called "hedonistic calculus" constructed according to the principle of maximum pleasure and minimum pain: see J. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). Too much attention can never be given to the way in which the old Greek concept of eudaimonia has been evolving in the course of history: see W. Tatarkiewicz, Analysis of Happiness (Warsaw: PWN, 1976). The stand taken in this study has emerged from reflections influenced both by Kant's criticism of Bentham's utilitarianism and by Scheler's analysis of human emotionality: see Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Bern, 1954), pp.256-67, 341-56
59 R. Ingarden in his Uber die Verantwortung (Ihre ontischen Fundamente) (Stuttgart: Reclam Universal-Bibliothek, 1970) makes the following assertions:
(I) Responsibility presupposes that there is a definite and not some one or other theory of the person. He writes, "Alle Theorien, welche die Person auf Mannigfaltigkeiten reiner Erlebnisse reduzieren, sind fUr die Kla.· rung der ontischen Fundamente der Verantwortung unzureichend. Nur sofern man den Menschen und insbesondere seine Seele und seine Person fUr emen realen, in der Zeit verharrenden Gegendstand ha~lt, der eme spezielle, charakteristische Form hat, ist es mo~glich, die Postulate der Verantwortung zu erfUllen" (p. 66).
(2) He then goes on to stress that among the essential conditions of responsibility there is the freedom of the person performing an action. But freedom itself, he explains, presupposes a definite formal structure of the person and of the real world, in which the person acts. The one and the other must form a relatively isolated system; it is in the notion of such systems that the solution to the so-called problem of freedom has to be sought for.
(3) The relation between responsibility and obligation can be deduced from what Ingarden says about the ontic foundations of responsibility. For him one of these foundations consists of values, of which he says elsewhere that their nature is that of obligation. "Die Existenz der Werte und der zwischen ihnen bestehend Zusammenha~nge ist die erste Bedingung der Mbglichkeit sowohl der Idee der Verantwortung als auch des Sinnvollseins des an den Tliter gerichteten Postulats, die Verantwortung fUr seine Tat zu ubernehmen und ihre Forderungen zu erfUllen," U~ber die Verantwortung (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1970), p.38.
In the discussion on The Acting Person published in Analecta Cracoviensia (vols. 5-6) some participants pointed to certain methodological analogies between this study and R. Ingarden's Uber die Verantworiung op. cit. See M. Jaworski, 'Koncepcja antropologii filozoficznej w ujec,iu Kardynala Karola Wojtyly' ('The conception of philosophical anthropology in the approach of Cardinal Karol Woityla'), pp.103-4, and T. Styczeti, 'Metoda antropologii filozoficznej w Osobie i czynie' ('The method of philosophical anthropology in The Acting Person') (Cracow: Analecta Cracoviensia, Vols. V-VI, 1973-74), pp. 113-15. Yet the methodological affinity of the two has its source in Scheler.
60 The analyses of Ingarden seem also to indicate that the "experience of the soul" is given only indirectly and not directly; this experience he sees contained in the "pure ego." Cf. Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt (TUbingen: Niemeyer, 1965), pp. 320-322.
61 The concept of disintegration has been applied in different branches of anthropological science. In Poland, for instance, the so-called positive disintegration has been used in attempts to interpret the whole of the psychical phenomena: (see the following by K. Dqbrowski: La desinte'gration positive. Prnble'mes choisis (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1964); Personnahte; psychonevroses et sante mentale d'aprls Ia theorie de Ia desintegration positive (Warsaw: Patistwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1965); Psychothersipie des nevroses et psychonevroses. L'instinct de mort d'aprls Ia theorie de Ia desintegrarion positive (Warsaw: Patistwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1965); also other works of same author brought out by the same publishers.
62 In the above quoted discussion on The Acting Person attention was directed to the significance that the philosophical conception of man as the person who "possesses and governs himself" has in psychiatric research and practice: see W. Pal' tawska, 'Koncepcja samoposiadania podstawq psychoterapii obiektvwizujqej - w swietle ksiqzki Kardynala Karola Woityly' ('The concept of self-possession as the basis of objectifying psychotherapy - in the light of the book by Cardinal Karol Wojtyla'), Analecta Cracoviensia vols. 5-6, pp. 223-41.
63 Cf. E. Kretschmer, Ko'rperbau und Charakter. Untersuchungen zum Konstitutionsproblem und zum Lehre von den Temperamenten, 24th ed. (Berlin: Springer, 1961).64 Luijpen, in criticizing views which treat the body as an object of having (he is of course speaking of "having" in the literal sense of the word), says, "My Body is Not the Object of 'Having.' ... I 'have' a car, a pen, a book. In this 'having' the object of the 'having' reveals itself as an exteriority. There is a distance between me and what I 'have.' What I 'have' is to a certain extent independent of me. . . My body is not something external to me like my car. I cannot dispose of my body or give it away as I dispose of money.... All this stems from the fact, that my body is not 'a' body, but my body ... in such a way that my body embodies me" (Existential Phenomenology, 3d ed. (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1963), p. 188. To explain the relation between the conscious subject and the body Luijpen remarks: "In the supposition that I 'am' my body, I am a thing and wholly immersed in a world of mere things. But then the conscious self is reduced to nothing, and, consequently, also my body as 'mine,' as well as the world as 'mine.' Accordingly, I neither 'am' my body nor 'have' it. My body is precisely mid-way between these two extremes. It constitutes the transition from the conscious self to the worldly object. It is the mysterious reality which grafts me on things, secures my being-in-the-world, involves me in the world, and gives me a standpoint in the world" (ibid., pp.189-90).
65 Bergson, on the other hand, is inclined to believe that it is the spirit that uses the body. For instance, he asserts, though in a different context, that ..... c'est a dire aussi que Ia vie de l'esprit ne peut pas etre un effet de Ia vie du corps, que tout Se passe au contraire comme Si le corps etait simplement utilise' par l'esprit, et que des lors nous n'avons aucune raison de supposer que Ic corps et l'esprit soient inse'parablement lies l'un a' l'autre." L'e'nergie spirituelle, 5th ed. (Paris: F. Alcan, 1920), pp.57-58.
In connection with these different views the present author thinks it necessary to stress that when he affirms, "man is not the body, he only has it," this statement is the consequence of the belief that man "is" his own self (i.e., the person) only insofar as he possesses himself; and, in the same sense, if he has his body.
66 We find this expression in D. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature and in many other authors subsequent to him. Today it is of virtually universal occurrence in both specialist and popular literature. The expression also presupposes a definite anthropology; it is this line of thinking that we have followed when dealing here with the problem of "integration and the psyche."
67 In this study the problem of constructing - or rather, of self-constructing - the personal subject has only been sketched in rough outline, but actually it seems to deserve a much more thorough investigation. The distinction drawn between the somatic and the psychical "subjectiveness" within the frame of the integrated personal subjectiveness seems to Support the notion of "strata" in the philosophy of man. See N. Hartmann, Ethik, 4th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1962), especially part-3, chap. 2, sect. 71: 'Zur ontologischen Gesetzlichkeit als Basis der Freiheit,' pp.675-85.
68 See M. Scheler, ..... WertgefUhle (z B. 'AchtungsgefUhl' usw) dUrfen diese nur darum heissen, weil in der primiren Gegebenheit des 'vollen Lebens' die Werte selbst noch unmittelbar gegeben waren, derentwegen allein sie ja den Namen 'WertgefUhle fUbren'." Der Formalism us in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Bern: Francke, 1966), pp.209-10.
69 The distinction between the concupiscent and irascible appetite is also to be found in P. Ricoeur, when for instance he says, "'irascible' ne Se revele empiriquement qu'a' travers les passions d'ambition, de domination, de violence, de meme que le 'concupiscible' se revele empiriquement a' travers les passions du plaisir et de facilite'." Le volontaire et l'involontaire (Paris: Aubier, 1949), p.112.
70 Cf. M. Scheler, Der Form alism us in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Bern: Francke, 1966), especially 'Zur Schichtung des emotionalis Lebens', pp.331-45.
71 The position taken here differs from that of M. Scheler (cf. op. cit., especially 'Formalismus und Apriorismus', pp. 82-84). Indeed, it seems necessary to draw a distinction between even the most intimate "proximity" of the subject and with values - this being the function of emotion - and their adequate "cognition."
72 This belief appears to be also contained in what Aristotle says of the power of the intellect and the will over emotions having a "political" (or "diplomatic") rather than an absolute character (cf. Politics, bk. 1, chap. 3; Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 4, chaps. 3-5). We may also add that one of the elements of the "political" nature of this power is to know when it is to be exercised in an "absolute" manner.
73 In the course of the history of philosophy the question of the soul-body relation has been raised time and again and has received many different answers.
74 This distinction has often been used throughout the history of Christian ethics and ascetics; it derives from St. Paul (cf. Rom. 7:15-24, and 6:6; 1 Cor. 15:47-49).
In the present context the "higher man" refers to the subject who manifests himself in the experience of both transcendence and integration; thus the "lower man" applies to the same subject - if he manifests himself as such - who because of the transcendence appropriate to the actions of a person still requires integration.
75 The last chapter of this study of the acting person is but a comment to what was said hitherto and must be regarded as such. This comment, however, appears to be indispensable and without it our study would be incomplete. Having begun our discussion with the experience "man-acts" we must at least take note of the circumstance that usually - if not always - he in one way or another acts "together with others." From the point of view of the person this circumstance has many different implications, which it would be impossible to expose here; we intend to concentrate on only one of them, namely, on the one that appears to be historically the most important.
The heading of the chapter is 'Intersubjectivity by Participation.' When Husserl speaks of Intersubiektivita~t he stresses primarily the cognitive dimension of intersubjectivity. In the fifth Cartesian Meditation he analyses step by step the way in which consciousness is constituted by means of the Fremderfahrung of the community conceived of as the intermonadologische Gemeinschaft, the decisive step being apparently the constituting of the intersubjective nature (die intersubiektive Natur). (Cf. 'Vorgemeinschaftung der Monaden und die erste Form der Objektivita~t: Die intersubjektive Natur': E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vonrige (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), Meditation 5, sect. 55, p. 149.
In the approach adopted in this study it is the action that serves as the fundamental source for the cognition of man as the person. Since in fact man acts "together with others" it is also necessary to extend on the same basis our knowledge of man in his intersubjectivity. In this way in the place of "intersubjectivity" as a purely cognitive category we have now, so to speak, introduced "participation." We thus have man who in acting "together with others," that is, by participating, discloses a new dimension of himself as the person. It is this dimension, which we have here called "participation," that we are now going to submit to a brief analysis. This road, we hope, will bring us to a more complete - or, at any rate, more complementary - understanding of human intersubjectivity.
76 This and the following section have previously appeared in the Phenomenology Information Bulletin, 2 (1978), published by The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, Belmont, Mass. (Editor's note).
77 We cannot be too emphatic in stressing the specific sense in which we are here speaking of participation. This is all the more necessary in view of the different meanings, or rather shades of meanings, that this term has had for different traditional and contemporary philosophical schools. In this study participation may be said to emerge at the very beginning of the analysis of man's acting "together with others" as that fundamental experience whereby we are trying to grasp man as the person. The person - as that "man who acts together with others" - is in a certain manner constituted through participation in his own being itself. Thus particip~ation is seen as a specific constituent of the person.
In the discussion published in Analecta Cracoviensia, vols. 5-6 (Cracow: Pol. Tow. Teol., 1973-74) this specific meaning of participation was accepted with appreciation but it also aroused some controversy; see L. Kuc, Uczestnictwo w czlowieczeflstwie "innych" ('Participation in the humanity of "other selves"). A counterproposition was suggested with regard to both the substantial and the methodic approach in The Acting Person~ From the position of this counterproposition the essential knowledge of man as the person is the knowledge that emerges in his relations to other persons. while acknowledging the validity of this epistemological position this author - after due consideration to the arguments for and against - still holds that a sound knowledge of the. subject in himself (of the person through the action) opens the way to a deeper understanding of human intersubjectivity; indeed, it would be entirely impossible to establish the right proportion in the understanding of the person and his interrelations with other persons without such categories as self-possession and self-governance.
78 The discussion that follows is an attempt at a reinterpretation - though still in the form of but a rough sketch or mere outline - of the concept of the "common good." The critical nature of this interpretation (made in a definite historical context) will obtain its specific significance when considered together with the subsequent tentative analysis of authentic and nonauthentic attitudes.
79 An attempt at a broader interpretation of this problem is to be found in 'Participation or alienation?' Analecta Husserliana vol.6 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), pp.61-73.
We have to emphasize once again that the whole of Chapter 7 is but a comment and no more than an outline of the problem. The analyses it contains have led us to the conclusion that participation as a property of man, who exists and acts "together with others," lies at the roots of two different dimensions of human intersubjectivity. One dimension refers to the "man~ther man" (I-you, soi-autrui) relation and the other is to be found in the "we" relation (community). Either form of intersubjectivity demands a separate analysis; for participation understood simply as participating, or taking part, in the humanness of others is quite a different thing than participation seen as the correct membership in different communities (societies) in which man's destiny is to exist and act "together with others."
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