Karol Wojtyla
The Acting Person

CHAPTER FIVE: INTEGRATION AND THE SOMA

Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4

Chapter 6
Chapter 7

END NOTES

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PERSON'S INTEGRATION IN ACTION

Integration as a Complementary Aspect of Transcendence

The preceding two chapters have exhibited the human person in a dynamic specificity that manifests itself in and through the action. The essential moment in the action is that of self-determination, a point that we have already thoroughly examined and analyzed. Further, the performance of the action depends, as we have seen, on self-determination. That analysis of self-determination as well as of the performing of an action and the fulfillment this brings confirms our view of the person as a highly specific structure, namely, the structure of self-governance and self-possession. This structure differentiates the person from a merely natural being, for the elements of self-determination, of freedom, and of the consciousness of it, are wholly alien to nature as is also the transcendence in action formed within the person by his freedom and his conscious efficacy. It is that efficacy which is derived from freedom as the essential factor in the dynamic reality of the person and revealed by the experience of "man acts." The experience of being the agent, of being the actor, makes of acting the action of the person and distinguishes it from the other, numerous manifestations of the human dynamism, in which the moment of a conscious efficacy of the personal ego is lacking. The dynamic specificity of the action, the specificity molded by conscious efficacy and freedom, is brought into even greater prominence in contrast with all that which only "happens" in man as the subject.

The notion of the "transcendence of the person in the action" does not, however, exhaust all the contents of the dynamic reality of the person; and though through transcendence we perceive the structure of self-governance and self-possession as something specific to the human person and to his actions, this structure manifests what seems a characteristic duality or bipolarity of aspects. To observe the duality it suffices to look attentively at the content of the concepts of "self-governance" and "self-possession," which expose the dynamic reality of the person through and together with the action. The concept of "self-possession" denotes the person both as the one who possesses himself and as the one who is in the possession of himself. Similarly, the concept of "self-governance" denotes the person both as the one who governs himself and as the one who is in a way subjected and subordinate to himself. Thus the structures which articulate and grasp the dynamic reality of the person, also point to something other than the transcendence alone. For we call "transcendence" the aspect that consists in one's governance and possession of oneself and these are connected with self-determination, that is, with will.

There still remains the other aspect or the other pole of the structure we are considering here. He who governs himself is at the same time subjected and subordinate to himself. He who possesses himself is simultaneously in the possession of himself; to be in the possession and to be subordinate are elements of the same structure, of the same dynamic reality that is determined by the person and the action. These elements though strictly cohesive and intrinsically correlated with transcendence are not identical with it. It is because of them that the other aspect is exposed within the whole constituted by the dynamic structure of self-governance and self-possession and thus also within the structure of the human action. We define this aspect by the expression "the integration of the person in the action," which is complementary to the notion of the "transcendence of the person in the action." "Complementary" is to be understood here not only in the sense that integration complements transcendence and that they thus form a dynamic "person-action whole"; its meaning is still deeper in the sense that without integration transcendence remains, as it were, suspended in a kind of structural void. This becomes apparent in light of our analysis of self-governance and self-possession. For there is no governing of oneself without subjecting and subordinating oneself to this governance; neither is it p05sible to have active possession of oneself without a passive response in the dynamic structure of the person.

Integration as a Complex Unity

The concept of "integration" has thus emerged in our considerations from that fundamental vision which pervades all our previous analyses; it is also indicated by the concept of "transcendence." If we go even further back, the idea of integration emerges also from considerations of the efficacy and the subjectiveness of the human ego in his acting. Man experiences himself as the agent of his action and is thus its subject. He also has the experience of himself as the subject, but the experience of subjectiveness differs from that of efficacy. Moreover, the human being also experiences all that only happens in him. While in the experience of subjectiveness there is a certain passivity, the experience of efficacy - being intrinsically active -determines the human action. Nevertheless, every action contains a synthesis of the efficacy and the subjectiveness of the human ego. Insofar as efficacy may be viewed as the domain where transcendence manifests itself, integration is manifested in subjectiveness.

In this first approach to the notion of the "person's integration in the action" we shall endeavor to relate it essentially to our previous analyses of that dynamic reality which is constituted by the person and the action. The term "integration" is derived from the Latin adjective integer which means whole, complete, unimpaired. Thus "integration" points to a whole or the wholeness of a thing. "To integrate" means to assemble component parts so as to make a whole; thus integration denotes a process and its result. But in psychology and philosophy the term "integration" is used to denote the realization and the manifestation of a whole and a unity emerging on the basis of some complexity rather than the assembling into a whole of what was previously disconnected.

Our considerations have shown that it is in the latter sense that we should envisage the person as integrated in the process of action. A certain complexity in the structure of self-governance and self-possession manifested in and through the action, or, strictly speaking, in self-determination, is a characteristic and noteworthy trait of the person. Transcendence of the person is but one aspect of personal dynamism; it exposes but one of its poles. When it is accompanied by the subjective unity and wholeness of the structure of self-governance and self-possession, then it manifests the integration about which we are speaking. In the analysis of the dynamism of man, transcendence of experience passes into the immanence of the experience of acting itself: when I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting, in that dynamization of the ego to which my own efficacy has contributed.

The fact that "I am wholly engaged in my acting" cannot be explained by transcendence alone but requires for its interpretation also the integration of the person in the action.

2. THE INTEGRATION IN THE ACTION MANIFESTED IN DISINTEGRATION

The Many Meanings of "Disintegration"

The first and most important meaning we have been giving to "integration" in the course of our considerations refers, as already noted, to the intuition of the structure of the person which the person manifests in his dynamic characteristic. We are of course referring to the structures of self-governance and self-possession. It bears also upon another concept, that of "disintegration," which in psychology and philosophy denotes a lack of cohesion, a deficiency or defect of integration. We shall have to consider both of them.

"Disintegration" is a term used in various contexts and presumably with different meanings in those fields of learning which have the human being as their object. This applies to the different social and cultural domains of human activities as well as to the human person. Disintegration is most often considered by those disciplines that are interested in the psychological aspect of the personality of man and identify disintegration with everything that in some way departs from or fails to attain to ordinary human standards. In this approach the integrated man is seen as simply the standard or "normal" man and the disintegrated man is sub- or abnormal. The question may well be asked what in these disciplines is regarded as "normal" or accepted as the standard of human normality. It seems that in most cases the standard is established intuitively; common sense discloses which man is normal and which one is not quite or not at all normal.

Using this intuitive standard the disciplines engaged in the study of human personalities have thoroughly examined and defined the different symptoms of disintegration each within its own peculiar dimensions. These dimensions are contained in the notion of "psychological personality," of which man's moral personality forms an intrinsic part. We know that the experience of morality is an indispensable component of the integral experience of man and that as such it plays a crucial role in understanding man as the person, especially in understanding the dynamic conception of man. In fact, the notion of "disintegration," as it is used in the human sciences, not excluding medicine or empirical psychiatry, very often relies upon facts that have an essentially ethical nature.

Disintegration as a Structural Defect of Self-Governance and Self-Possession

Apparently the most important implications of the psychic phenomenon of disintegration are to be found already in the current as well as scientific uses of the term. However, in any branch of science dealing with man, the meaning of "disintegration" is corollary to the meaning of "integration." Now, the fundamental significance of "integration" - it always in one way or another consists in the person's integration in the action - is strictly connected with the person's intrinsic structure of self-governance and self-possession. The structure is essential for the very being of the person as actualized in the action; it is its manifestation. What we call the "psychological" or the "moral (ethical)" personality is derivative, something secondary with respect to being a person as such; in a sense, it is but an aspect of "being a person." "Integration" in its principal sense and this applies also to "disintegration" - has to be considered with respect to the fundamental structure and not only as concerning the derivative structures, even though both terms also apply to the derivative structures. Indeed, it is only insofar as they relate to the fundamental structure that they apply also to the particular manifestations in the psycho-ethical dimension or psychosomatic dimension of man.

"Disintegration" in its fundamental sense signifies what in the structure of self-governance and self-possession of the person appears as a defect or a failing. The lower limit of disintegration is set by all the symptoms that reflect what is in fact a total absence of self-governance and self-possession. In this condition the creature, that is, a man and hence ontologically a person, is, or at least appears to be, completely destitute of the specifically "personal" structures manifested in and with the action; indeed, this condition consists in the disintegration of the person in the action. Such states of deep or complete disintegration, which are well known and have their particular scientific denotations, fall under various psycho-medical classifications. Since our objective is to grasp the meaning of "disintegration" in its fundamental sense rather than to provide a description of phenomena, these facts are mentioned here only as an illustration of our argument. Important here is the fundamental sense of "disintegration" which is, as already noted, connected with the dynamic structure of the person. Since the structure is essentially formed by self-determination, disintegration refers to self-determination. While self-determination means that man can govern himself and possess himself, disintegration on the contrary, signifies a more or less deep-seated inability to govern, or to possess, oneself.

The ability to govern, or to possess, oneself so strictly connected with self-determination, establishes - as we know from our previous discussion - the transcendent backbone of the human person. In some respects and in some cases disintegration may be considered as a collapse of this backbone, though even then it does not contradict or destroy the transcendence itself of the person in the action. A disintegrated person is incapable of governing, or of possessing, himself to the extent that this inability prevents him from subordinating himself and thus from remaining in possession of himself.⁶¹ He is characterized, so to speak, by an insubordinative and unpossessible ego and not by a straightforward abolition or limitation of the transcendent ego. The defects and defaults of integration become, however, the defects and defaults of transcendence; a fact clearly apparent when we keep in mind that transcendence and integration are two complementary aspects of the same dynamic person-action reality.

Disintegration Reveals the Significance of the Person's Integration in the Action

In disintegration there are more than a few peculiar symptoms and forms, which are the task of the particular branches of science to classify and qualify; disintegration also manifests different degrees of intensity. These degrees or stages correspond to the dynamic vision of man that has been developed by Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy. In its perspective we may distinguish three stages of disintegration: the actual, the habitual, and the "potential" (understanding disintegration itself as referring to the capacity of man). There is obviously a difference between, for example, a separate instance of not associating somebody's face or appearance with his name and the frequent or regular failure to associate the one with the other. The latter may have different causes. If we assume, however, that the failure to associate a person's name with his appearance is a symptom of disintegration, then a single, actual instance of such a failure corresponds to a lesser degree of disintegration than when it occurs regularly, that is to say, habitually. Yet another difference occurs between the habitual failure to associate a name with a face and a total inability to make this association correctly, for in the latter case we are dealing with man's capacity itself, that is, we touch upon the defects of this capacity.

There are innumerable examples that would illustrate more vividly that essential trait of disintegration which consists in the "insubordinativeness" or "unpossessibility" of the subjective ego. But this trait is noticeable also in our example because the inability to make correct associations is an essential basic defect of cognition itself which has its consequences in acting. An incapacity to correctly associate does not allow one to make correct choices and decisions; also, the self-determination of the person will be defective in one way or another, and the more serious this defect is the more strongly will it affect the person himself and the harder will it bear on the person's structures of self-governance and self-possession. We know from the observation of mental cases the tragic consequences of an incapacity to make correct associations.

In this way the concept of "disintegration" allows us a better insight into the fundamental significance of integration, as the aspect of the person's dynamic reality.

3. THE PERSON'S INTEGRATION IN THE ACTION IS THE KEY TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF MAN'S PSYCHOSOMATIC UNITY

Psychosomatic Unity and the Integration of the Acting Person

The crucial problem for understanding man's dynamic reality is to establish the fundamental significance of the integration and disintegration of the acting person. Very often man is defined as a psycho-physical unity and it is then assumed that this notion is sufficient to define and express adequately his essence. But in fact the notion expresses only everything that is accessible to the particular empirical sciences; all that makes man to be a person and allows him to realize himself as the person in the action undergoes, in this approach, a specific reduction. It is precisely the reason why in this study, in which we are trying to trace step by step the experience of the dynamic reality of the acting person, we have to abandon this approach and change drastically our way of looking at the problem.

An interpretation of the fundamental significance of integration as well as of disintegration may serve as a key to our point of view. In the light of the total experience of man the view that he is a psycho-physical entity presupposes the concept of the "person" who manifests himself first of all in action. It thus presupposes a comprehensive interpretation of the experience of "man acts" in which transcendence and integration are considered as mutually complementary aspects. It is only within the framework of that dynamic unity which is constituted by the person in the action that man can be seen as a psycho-physical unity.

The Person-Action Unity Has Precedence over the Psychosomatic Complexity

Such is the case especially with integration. This is clearly indicated by the fundamental significance of the integration as well as of disintegration of the acting person. The subordination of the subjective ego to the transcendent ego - that is to say, the synthesis of efficacy and subjectiveness - in itself implies the complexity as well as the unity of man as a psycho-physical entity. It seems, however, for reasons which will be discussed later, that the term "psychosomatic" is here more appropriate than "psycho-physical."

The subordination of the subjective ego to the transcendent ego also includes both the psychosomatic complexity and unity of man. The same applies to the integration of elements and functions within the structure of self-possession. An analysis of integration imposes, on the one hand, the necessity of assuming the existence of these personal structures - this we have already done - but on the other hand, it also makes absolutely necessary an insight into the psychosomatic complexity of man. This complexity has here a special importance because ultimately man owes his psychosomatic unity to the integration as well as to the transcendence of the person in the action. This insight does not receive adequate or sufficient prominence in interpretations conducted solely along the lines of inductive thinking characteristic of empirical sciences.

The crucial fact in the total experience of man is that it is in action that the whole psychosomatic complexity develops into the specific person-action unity. This unity has precedence relatively to both that complexity and the psycho-physical unity, if the psychosomatic unity is understood as a kind of sum total of the somatic and the psychical as well as of their appropriate natural dynamisms. Action comprises the multiplicity and diversity of the dynamisms that belong to the soma and to the psyche. In relation to them action constitutes that superior dynamic unity. This is, in fact, what the integration of the person in the action - as the complementary aspect of transcendence - consists in; for the human action is more than a sum of those other dynamisms; it is a new and superior type of dynamism, from which the others receive a new meaning and a new quality that is properly personal. They do not possess this meaning and this quality on their own account and, insofar as they are but the natural dynamisms of the psyche and the soma, they attain these only in the action of the person.

Consequently we may say that only the person's integration in the action justifies an insight into the elements of that natural dynamic multiplicity constituting the psychosomatic totality of man. This insight allows us to construct an image of man as a psychosomatic unity. But as the image presupposes that more fundamental view of the person-action unity which is given in the experience of "man acts" it also draws from this experience its features and significance. The notion of the "person's integration in the action" supplies, in fact, the key to this significance.

There are indeed various dynamisms of man at both the psychical and the somatic levels that take part in human action.⁶² In every action these dynamisms are "blended" together, but blending implies forming a whole from more or less homogeneous elements, and this is not the case with action. What does actually happen has more import; the dynamisms of the psyche and the soma take an active part in integration, not at their own levels but at the level of the person. By being the complementary aspect of transcendence, integration of the person in the action allows the realization of the person's structure of self-governance and self-possession. Thus also in this case integration means introduction to a higher level of unity than that indicated in the expression "psychosomatic unity" taken in its empirical sense.

Integration Introduces Psychosomatic Activations into the Dynamic Unity of Action

At this higher level of the person-action unity the dynamism belonging to man's psyche and soma seem to disappear. They fuse together. This does not mean, however, that they cease to be in some way distinct. On the contrary, they continue to exist in their own right and essentially co-create the dynamic reality of the person's action. In every particular case the manner of their participation is different depending on the individual character of the action. For instance, when an action involves a definite movement of the body as the visible element of its individual character, then the somatic dynamisms, without which the movement would be impossible, collaborate to produce the action. On the other hand, we know from experience that when the action is wholly internal and consists, let us say, in making the final decision on some important issue, then the different psychical dynamisms of an emotional nature play their role in the individual character of the action and determine its concrete form.

We saw in our earlier analyses that these dynamisms are not as such an "acting"; they are rather to be identified with the experience of "something-happens-in-man" and not with that of "man-acts." A close examination of the dynamic elements in man's psychosomatic complexity allows an analysis of the diverse "happenings" or of what we then called the various "activations," this term being used both by analogy and in opposition to the action, which alone corresponds to the experience of "man-acts." At the same time the person's integration in the action introduces the various activations of the psychosomatic structure of man into the action. In the action they reach a new and superior unity, in which they play an active part, but apart from action, when they are only the dynamisms of the soma or the psyche, they only "happen" in the man-subject. The function of integration consists in this overstepping of the dividing line between what only "happens" and "acting."

The integrating function is necessary to bring about, in and through the action, the personal structure of self-governance and self-determination. Without the integration function taking place in action only man's subjectivity would be realized in his ontic basis, but not his efficacy. We know from experience, however, that it is efficacy that dominates in the ontic structure of man. Efficacy and the freedom that we discover in this experience as the constitutive elements of the action draw all the psycho-physical dynamism into that unity in which the ego becomes for itself the first object of its acting. Owing to integration these dynamisms play an active role in self-determination, that is, in making the human person's freedom emerge.

The Fundamentals of Man's Psychical and Somatic Dynamisms

The aspect of integration in the analysis of the person and the action is, as stated above, strictly connected with the need for a deeper insight into the psychosomatic complexity of man and into the complexity of the dynamisms of both his somatic and his psychical aspects. In this respect our investigations must come very close to the particular sciences that see man - his body and his psyche - as an independent epistemological object. The knowledge obtained by them serves various practical applications concerning man as a psychophysical being. In particular, it is to be found in medicine with its many specialized fields. Our investigations into the integration of the person in the action come close to the specialized sciences but can never be identified with them; the reason is, of course, the previously mentioned difference in the specific way of looking at the object of study.

Thus the aim of our subsequent analyses is not to gain insight into the dynamisms of man's psychosomatic complexity of the type pursued by the particular sciences. First, because the particular sciences are very much concerned with details, which would lead us away from viewing our object, namely, the person-action relation as a whole. Second, they seem to be preoccupied in investigating the different psychical and somatic dynamisms as such and, as it were, for their own sake. In doing so they overlook that specific personal totality which is essential to our approach. Our investigation into the dynamisms appropriate to the psyche and the soma of the human being will in contrast deal mainly with the essentials of these dynamisms, and with the characteristic nature the dynamisms assume because of their integration in the person's action. Our description can neither depart from the data supplied by the particular sciences nor be in any way inconsistent with them, nor can it accept their reliance on minute details and the methods they employ. We thus see what is to be in principle our characteristic of the psychosomatic dynamism of man, to whom we attribute reactivity as well as emotivity, the former corresponding more to the soma and the latter to the psyche.

We must here emphasize that trait of the dynamism which determines its inner content and makes possible its unity (or integration). Man in his psychosomatic complexity constitutes a highly diversified manifold, the particular elements of which are strictly interrelated, in such a way that they mutually condition each other and depend on each other. The most important of these interrelations is the conditioning of the psychical by the somatic, the dependence of the dynamism appropriate to the psyche on the soma.

The Outerness and Innerness of the Human Body

When speaking of the somatic element we refer to the human body, first in the current prescientific sense and then in the sense the term has in its scientific usage. The body is material, it is a visible reality, which is accessible to sense; the access to it is first of all from the "outside." The outer shape of the human body determines in the first place what is visible in man, it decisively affects his individual appearance and the definite impression that he makes. So conceived, the human body is composed of different members, each of which has its place and performs its proper function. For the moment we are considering only the functions "outwardly" discernible. In this way the human body forms outwardly a whole that is membered in a specific manner appropriate to man alone. This applies not only to the special distribution of bodily members but also to their mutual coordination in the whole of man's outward form. The noun "shape" has its corresponding adjective "shapely," which qualifies man from the point of view of the arrangement and the coordinations of the members forming his body.

This outwardly discernible entirety, however, by no means accounts for all the reality constituting the human body, just as it does not in the case of the animal body or of plants. The body has, in fact, simultaneously its own particular inwardness; on account of this inwardness we speak of the human organism. While the complexity is outwardly reflected by the diversity and the mutual coordination of bodily members, its inward reflection is in the diversity and the mutual coordination of the bodily organs. The organs determine that vitality or dynamism of the body which has somatic virtuality as its counterpart. The term "somatic" refers to the body in the outer as well as the inner aspects of the system; thus when we speak of somatic dynamism we refer both to the outer reality of the body with its appropriate members and to its inner reality, that is, the organism: to the system and the joint functioning of all the bodily organs.

The Principle of Man's Psychosomatic Integrity

The somatic side of man and his psychical side are strictly interrelated, the relation between them consisting in the fact that the psychical functions are conditioned by the sum total of the somatic functions and especially by some particular somatic functions. The term "psyche" applies to the soul, though not immediately in the metaphysical sense; its first application is in a "physical," or phenomenal, sense. Thus "psyche" and "psychical" apply to the whole range of manifestations of the integral human life that are not in themselves bodily or material, but at the same time show some dependence on the body, some somatic conditioning. For instance eyesight, feelings, emotions are not in themselves corporeal, but they show a measure of dependence on and a connection with the body. The important sphere of psychical facts is not difficult to distinguish and isolate from the total dynamism of man; but when distinguishing the psychical from the somatic, from what in itself is corporeal, it is also impossible not to notice how strictly it is related to and conditioned by the soma, by the body as an organism. The recognition of the differences as well as of the interrelations dates as far back in the history of human knowledge as does anthropology itself. In this respect we have profited most from the philosophy of Aristotle and his realistic approach to the physical world, the approach that gave a different basis to the metaphysics and the anthropology of the Stagirite than did Plato's attitude toward the world.

The person's integration in the action rests on the conditioning of the psychical by the somatic; it is from this conditioning that man's integrity is derived. This integrity is not limited solely to the presence in him of all the elements from the somatic and the psychical sphere, but it also entails a system of their interrelations and mutual conditioning that allow the functioning of each sphere in the specifically human manner. Thus the integration of man is not static; on the contrary, its nature is dynamic. As to the direction of these conditionings we see that in a way they operate from the outside and are directed inward (in the case of psychical functions conditioned by the somatic ones), and from the inside outward (in the case of the somatic expression of psychical functions). Psychology, or rather the Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology, distinguishes in the former of these directions two alternatives: the somatic conditioning of psychical functions may be either internal (as is the case with all sense functions) or solely external (as are conditioned somatically by man's spiritual functions). This is so because spiritual functions are seen as remaining internally independent from matter. The integrity of man is, in the empirical sense, verified dynamically by the correct operation of functions, and this depends on the conditionings in general of what is psychical by the somatic and - in the direction of expression - of what is somatic by the psychical. The person's integration in the action is based upon this dynamic totality, while any defects in this domain we characterize as disintegration.

5. THE PERSON AND THE BODY

Reminiscences of Hylomorphism

It seems that we have now satisfied all the necessary preliminary conditions for embarking upon the discussion of the person and the body; in a sense we have already begun our investigation. Moreover, there is apparently no danger of so isolating the body and its role in the dynamic whole of the acting person as to risk attributing an absolute significance to this one aspect. Obviously, we cannot discuss the human body apart from the whole that is man, that is, without recognizing that he is a person. Neither can we examine the dynamisms and potentialities proper to the human body without understanding the essentials of action and of its specifically personal character. In this connection it seems appropriate to recall the vision of the human reality advanced in the traditional philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas, which from the likeness of man to the other beings of the visible world discovers in him alongside of the hylic or material element also the element of morphe or form; hence the theory of hylomorphism and the analysis of the human being carried out within its frame. To accept the general principles of this vision, however, does not ~'mply that we intend to repeat once again the formulations of the hylomorphic doctrine. So far all our discussions have reflected clearly enough the effort to rethink anew the dynamic human reality in terms of the reality of the acting person.

The Somatic Constitution and the Person

To begin, the problem of the body in its strict relation to the human person may as well be considered in a somewhat static approach. Its relation to the human person is absolutely necessary, so much so that it is contained even in that often used definition which sees man as a rational animal; in this definition "animal" denotes the body as well as corporality. It is the body that gives man his concreteness (this fact is in a way reflected in the classic metaphysical doctrine of man's individualization by matter). At any rate, this is so in the external experience, which allows us to grasp what is visible in man; we may equate here the "visible" with the "external." Man manifests himself - even from the static point of view - through his body, its specific, strictly individual build. The term sometimes used in this connection is "constitution," but it does not coincide exactly with the externally visible build of the body and seems to extend also to the internal system of bodily organs, which accompanies and, indeed, determines the external somatic whole. The notion of "constitution" includes not only the external shape of the body but also the dynamic system of the internal organic and structural factors that contribute to this shape. Although apparent already in the static approach, the constitutive trait of man reaches also to his dynamic aspects; it is manifest in the mobility that is characteristic for all human beings. Mobility is externally manifest and even from observing it we may infer certain differences between people. These differences have from ancient times inspired anthropologists with the idea of constitutive resemblances, of certain, somatically distinguishable, human types. Moreover, in relation to what was said previously about the human psyche being conditioned by the soma, these resemblances and human types also apply to the psyche. Hence the whole problem of temperaments, which has persisted throughout the history of anthropology from Aristotle to our days.⁶³

The Human Body as the Person's Means of Expression

We have thus passed from the static image of man formed by the body to his dynamism. The anthropological knowledge is in this respect extensive, detailed, and highly ramified. But when we want to define the relations between the body and the person, everybody - not excluding the mate rialists - seems to agree that the problem lies essentially in finding out what exactly are the links between man's visible outwardness and his invisible inwardness. We are not concerned here solely with what is "contained inside" the body itself, that is, with the organism as the somatic foundation of the constitution. It is generally recognized that the human body is in its visible dynamism the territory where, or in a way even the medium whereby, the person expresses himself. Strictly speaking, the personal structure of self-governance and self-possession may be thought of as "traversing" the body and being expressed by the body. We already know that this structure manifests itself in action and is realized through action. It is intimately connected with the person's specific power of self-determination exercised through choice and decision, which establishes the dynamic subordination to truth. In this way the dynamic transcendence of the person - spiritual by its very nature - finds in the human body the territory and the means of expression. This is confirmed time and again by the actions, visible or at least perceptible manifestations of self-determination - that is, of the person's efficacy - in and by the body. In this sense, the body is the territory and in a way the means for the performance of action and consequently for the fulfillment of the person.

This common manifestation of the person's integration in the action, that may be thought of as "traversing" the body and being expressed in it, provides perhaps the simplest demonstration of the way the body belongs and is subordinate to the person. The problem of the relation between "body and soul" has been the theme of countless speculations and theories beginning with Plato, who conceived of man as a spiritual substance endowed with a material body for his terrestrial existence, and Aristotle, whose position was that of the "substantial unity" of soul and body (that is, of form and matter) within the individual human being. In our present discussion the problem is for the time being envisaged only from the point of view of expression. It thus also becomes - conformably to what was said in the conclusion to the analysis of the person's transcendence in the action - the territory and the means for the manifestation of the soul, of the specific dynamism of its spiritual nature, and of freedom in its dynamic relation to truth. The integration of the person in the action, taking place in the body and expressed by it, reveals simultaneously the deepest sense of the integrity of man as a person. It is the soul, indeed the spiritual soul, that appears to be the ultimate principle of this integrity. The person is not to be identified solely with the body as such. It seems that even behaviorists never go so far as to posit such an identity, all the more so as in their psychology they are preoccupied only with the external "manifestations" of man and do not seek any "inner" understanding. Behaviorism may serve as a descriptive approach to action but not as a method of interpreting man's acting.

The Man-Person Has and Uses His Body when Acting

The fact of the externalization of the person in and by the body, which takes place first of all in the action, has as its consequence the moment of objectification already discussed in Chapter 3. The person becomes the object of his own acting. In this objectification the body participates in a special manner. Whenever the person externalizes himself by means of the body he becomes simultaneously the object of his acting. The objectification of the body then becomes an integral element in the objectification of the whole personal subject, to whom the body "belongs" and of whose subjectivity it forms a structural part. The body is not a member of the subjective ego in the way of being identical with the ego; man is not the body, he only has it.~ To "have" his own body leads to its objectification in actions and at the same time it is in this objectification that it expresses itself. Man has his body in a special way and also in a special way he is aware of his "possession," when in his acting he employs his body as a compliant tool to express his self-determination.

Such a compliance of the body also serves to attain the integration of the person in the action. The ability to objectify the body and to employ it in acting is an important factor of the personal freedom of man. It is through this somatic moment - and also somatic factor - in the personal subjectification that the specific structure of self-governance and self-possession of the human person is accomplished and manifested. Man as the person "possesses himself" in the experience of his embodiment precisely because it entails the feeling of possessing his body, and he governs himself because he controls his body. It is to this extent that the relation of the person to the body becomes "externally" apparent in the action of the person. This has various important implications in the psychology of acting and in ethics.

6. THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PERSON AND THE REACTIVITY OF THE BODY

The Dynamism of the Body and the Total Dynamism of Man

The external experience does not, however, account fully for the relation that exists between the body and the person, in particular insofar as his acting, or the action, is concerned. The experience has to take us, so to speak, to the interior of the body, so as to allow us to feel its own inwardness. It is only then that the relation is seen more completely and its image becomes more mature. Our earlier analyses have prepared us to make a clear distinction between an insight into the person, who is man, and an insight into the interior of the human body; for the body, as we have already noted, has its own, purely somatic inwardness. But it is not this inwardness that we have in mind when we refer to the human body (and also that of animals) as an organism. The human body in its inwardness has a purely somatic dynamism of its own, on which the external dynamism of the body, its purely natural mobility depends; the two dynamisms in nowise prevent the human body from serving as means for the person's expressing himself in his actions. Now we have only to look into the purely somatic inner dynamism in order to grasp and understand more precisely the integration of the person in the action. This integration depends in the first place on the somatic organization of man, in which the somatic dynamism is an important if not the decisive element; we may say that it is the dynamism of the body as such.

Is it at all possible to distinguish this dynamism? It seems that in view of the generally accepted distinction between the body and the soul, or even more so between the somatic and the psychical, such a distinction is possible. But the discrimination of the somatic dynamism in the whole of the human dynamism presents a task that demands a high level of cognitive precision. These high standards are required from those who investigate the body itself as well as from those who with the methods of the particular sciences study the human psyche or at still another level of abstraction endeavor to define more accurately the nature of the soul and of its proper relation to the body. Our investigations into the human person cannot avoid dealing with this last problem, which has always been one of the most difficult in the history of human thought. Admittedly, it is not the aim of this study to involve itself in questions concerning the nature of the soul and its relation to the body; but in the course of an analysis of the acting person these questions arise and have to be considered.

The Reactivity of the Somatic Dynamism

At this stage of our considerations we are not concerned with that kind of knowledge of the human body which is the subject of investigation of the particular sciences but with certain characteristic aspects of the body. The starting point in this approach is the assertion that, because of his body, the man-person genuinely belongs to nature. This implies, on the one hand, his similarity to the rest of nature and, on the other, his partaking in the whole of the external conditions of existence that we also refer to as "nature." Man's position in nature comes closest to animals, in particular the so-called higher animals. The previously mentioned classic definition of man as rational animal contains a fundamental assertion about human nature, it is constantly being confirmed in the field of natural sciences and lies at the origin of the well-known evolutionary theory of the origin of man. These questions, however, have but a secondary bearing on our argument and there is no need to examine them here.

However, the close connection existing between the human organism and nature, so far as nature constitutes the set of conditions of existence and life, helps us to define the somatic dynamism of man. It seems that this dynamism may be contained and expressed in the concept of "reactivity" and also by the attribute reactive. "Reactivity" would refer to the human body as such. The purely somatic dynamism of man can be viewed as being "reactive," and we may also speak of the potentiality lying at its roots as reactive.

Why Can the Somatic Dynamism Be Called Reactive?

The human body has the ability to react like other bodies in nature. The notion of "reaction" is often used with reference to the whole pattern of human behavior; it is what we have in mind when we say someone reacted in such-and-such a manner to a piece of news, though in so saying we are not referring to the somatic reaction but to the psychical reaction that expresses itself in a definite emotion and is thus an "emotive reaction." But the colloquial "to react" often implies something more than just an emotive response; it may often denote a choice or decision and hence a definite response of the will to a presented value. There is no doubt that the term "reaction" can be adequately applied to various obviously differentiated components of human behavior and modes of acting. This indicates that the somato-reactive element is very deeply rooted in all human acting.

The reason why we are here restricting the use of the term "reactivity" to the soma, that is, to the dynamism of the body alone, lies in the direct connections of the body itself with nature; the psychical and emotive factors are only indirectly connected with nature by means of the soma and its somatic dynamism. In the notion of "reaction" there is of course presupposed the notion of some action or acting that has its source and its cause in nature viewed as the set of factors conditioning the existence and the activity (i.e., reactivity) of the human body. The ability to react is apparent already in inanimate bodies (e.g., the ability to expand under the influence of heat or contract in the cold). A comparable ability is observed in animate creatures, but their reactivity is manifested at the level of life. While the study of the reactivity at the level of inanimate beings is the task of physics or chemistry, at the level of animate creatures it belongs to biology. We find that reactivity is at that level a manifestation of life and to some extent even its principle, that is to say, the principle of formation, subsistence, and development. It is also the distinctive feature expressing man's somatic virtualities and consequently his bodily vitality. Hence, within its frame we have to attempt to trace the manifestations of the somatic dynamism, that is, the reactions of the body that constitute the body's own vitality.

The Relation between Reactivity and Vitality of the Human Body

The vitality of the human body is of an essentially vegetative nature; the life of the body itself is vegetative. In fact, the vegetation of a human being begins with conception and ends with death. The external conditions of the body's vegetation are similar to those of the vegetation of other bodies; they are determined by the natural environment - the climate, the atmosphere - and the food and drink as the means of vegetative process and regeneration. The body as an organism is by nature, that is to say, by the power of its innate endowment, adapted to vegetation and reproduction. Reproduction is made possible by the sexual differentiation of the human body, by those of its organs which physically enable the conception of man, his development until the moment of his entrance into the world, and finally his birth to a biologically autonomous life. The dynamic fabric of all the vegetative vitality of the human body consists of a sequence of purely instinctive reactions, that is, reactions that follow the way of nature itself. These reactions take place, that is to say, they happen, in the person without any special influence of the will, without participation in the person's self-determination. Consequently, they happen in the person but they are not the acting of the person, they do not constitute his action. The body activates itself according to the inner design and purpose of vegetation and reproduction; the character of this activation of the human body is reactive.

In this case "reactivity" denotes an instinctive and dynamic relation to nature conceived as a definite biological "environment," as a system conditioning both vegetation and reproduction. The relation is purposeful inasmuch as the particular, instinctive somatic reactions have as their object either vegetation or reproduction.

At this point we are already entering upon the question of the so-called instincts, which we consider below. The ability to react to stimuli is a particular feature of man's somatic system. This ability de erves special attention inasmuch as it imparts a specifically active character to the reactivity of the human body. The active nature of the body's reactivity in response to stimuli is clearly apparent when contrasted with the passive submissiveness of the body to the influence of external conditions insofar as its physico-chemical functioning is concerned. In the human organism the ability to react to stimuli is directly related to the nervous system, which serves the whole body and determines the particular directions of its reactive dynamism as well as of the somatic virtualities lying at its roots.

7. ACTION AND MOTION

The Meaning of the Body's Subjectivity

As we have indicated, the dynamism of the human body as such does not depend on the self-determination of the person. It is instinctive and spontaneous. The body as an organism constitutes its dynamic source, that is, its effective cause; the will is not its cause, for the dynamism of the body does not proceed from the person's self-determination. This is why we do not disclose it directly and immediately in the experience "man-acts," which reveals the efficacy of the person, but it is to be found in the experience "somethinghappens-in-man," where the efficacy of the person is absent. In reaction and reactivity the person's efficacy does not enter; we may then only speak of some kind of efficacy of the body and pertaining to the person only on behalf of the ontic unity of man. Moreover, the fact that the body's efficacy differs experientially from the efficacy of the person brings sharply into evidence the ontic complexity of man. We shall see presently that this complexity cannot be wholly comprised in the conception of a psycho-physical or psychosomatic being.

It is because of the autonomy of the body with its instinctive dynamism with respect to the self-determination of the person that in the totality of the personal structure of man his body is in a way a basis, an underlayer, or a substructure for what determines the structure of the person; of course the substructure itself forms part of the unity of the human being and thus of the unity of the person. What is more, in view of internal bonds and mutual conditionings the body seems to determine the integrity of this complex being. The unity and the integrity are not hampered by the fact that the reactive dynamism and the vegetative vitality appropriate to the body happen within the person independently of his self-determination and without any active participation of the will. They occur in spite of the fact that the normal course of the whole vegetative vitality and somatic reactivity of man seems to lie beyond the reach of his consciousness. This circumstance, let us reemphasize, by no means contradicts man's personal unity; on the contrary, in its own way it is a characteristic of this unity; we thus see that there is, intrinsically built into the personal structure of man's unity, a structure that exists and is dynamized according to nature - in a different way than the way of the person. Obviously, the human body does not constitute a separate subject standing apart from the subject that is the man-person. The unity of the body with the ontic subjectivity of man - with the human factor - cannot be doubted. The experience of oneself as the subjective ego, the experience of one's own subjectivity, is, however, related to the reflexive function of consciousness, which tends to include only the specific aspects of the body and its mobility; this seems to be sufficient for man to have experience of his own subj ectivity.

We already noted that to have this experience man needs to be aware neither of the internal reactions of his organism nor of his whole, vegetative vitality. Neither does he need to be the active agent, the actor. (We know that the ascetic practices of the Yogis have as their aim the conscious control also of the internal reactions of the organism, but to control is not the same thing as to engender, which is always a matter of the efficacy of the body itself.)

The Synthesis of Action and Motion

From the preceding remarks we can see that within the frame of the integral subjectivity of the person - the subjectivity that is also reflected in consciousness - the body seems to have a somewhat separate "subjectivity" of its own - without, however, affecting in any way the ontic unity of man. Its subjectivity thus exists only in the sense that the body as such is the subject solely of reactions; hence its subjectivity is reactive, vegetative, and external to consciousness. The integrity of the man-person consists therefore in the normal, indeed, in the possibly perfect matching of "somatic subjectivity" with the efficacious and transcendent subjectivity of the person. Such integrity is the condition of the person's integrity in the action. Any defects in this respect are a threat to man's unity and may lead to his disintegration; that which is like the body's own subjectivity, the reactive and vegetative subjectivity of the body, is then out of tune with the person as the efficacious subject. We may say that it breaks out from the control of the person and gains a disadvantageous "independence." We then observe a kind of abnormality, something that seems contrary to nature; for it appears natural for the reactive and vegetative subjectivity of the body to be in tune with the person, the efficacious subject who is conscious of himself - at least in the sense in whicb such harmony corresponds to the human nature of the person.

To speak meaningfully of the body as if it were on its own is possible only because of the specific autonomy with respect to the person's self-determination - its conscious efficacy - of the somatic dynamism and the related vegetative vitality of man. It is against the background of this specific autonomy, which can be seen as the instinctive spontaneity of the somatic dynamism, that we can see more clearly how the realization of every action, which in a visible (i.e., "external" or a purely "internal") manner incorporates this spontaneous bodily dynamism, rests on a specific integration. Integration of the person in the action presupposes the integrity of the body. We may say that at the moment of self-determination man puts into operation the reactive dynamism of the body and in this way makes use of it, or, putting it differently, that at the moment of self-determination he consciously uses it by taking part in its operation.

This becomes apparent when we observe the dynamic synthesis of an action with a motion. Since external actions, that is, actions concretely and visibly manifested by the motions of the body, are very numerous, the synthesis is of frequent, indeed commonplace occurrence. A bodily motion is in itself something somatic and strictly related to the reactive potentiality of the body, to its ability to react to stimuli. This ability reaches deep into the inner system of the human body and is displayed as a distinctive power or skill, the vis motrix or motor power. Coming as a reaction to some definite stimulus a motion may be wholly spontaneous, instinctive, and is then called an "impulse." The occurrence of impulses in man seems to be an external indication of a certain measure of independence of the body from the will as well as of its potential ability and dynamic specificity. In a normal individual the synthesis of the action and motion takes place ceaselessly; while impulses may be viewed as activations of the body alone that lack the moment of personal efficacy, this moment is always present in the synthesis of the action with motion. In such a synthesis a given motion being dictated by the will may itself constitute the action or it may form part of an action that consists of a broader dynamic whole (for instance, the action of going to school includes many motions, in particular those of walking). The human body, as already noted, is for the person the territory and the means of his expression.

The Moment of Skill in the Action-Motion Synthesis

The element of skill or proficiency is a very important trait in the dynamic action-motion synthesis. The term "skill," as the equivalent of the Latin habitus, seems highly adequate here inasmuch as habitus denotes both a skill and a virtue; of these the latter refers to the habitus of spiritual life and the former, conformably with everyday use, to the body. Man may have a skilled or unskilled body and this is always reflected in his motions. The mobility of the body is innate in man and strictly connected with his somatic reactivity, which in turn may be converted in the appropriate nerve centers into definite motor impulses. The conversion itself is also instinctive and spontaneous. Bodily motions are the territory in which man develops his first skills, the earliest motor habits being formed in connection with instinctive reactions and impulses. At an early stage of motor development this process begins to be influenced by the will, which is the source of motor impulses coming from the interior of the person, of impulses that bear the mark of self-determination. When this happens we have that synthesis of the action with motion which functions as the frame wherein various skills continue to develop.

The presence of skill makes the whole motor dynamism, the whole of human mobility so spontaneous and fluent that in most cases we never notice the causative effect of the will in the synthesis of actions and motions. Our awareness is aroused only in the rare instances of motions that are exceptionally difficult or important and significant, for example, in mountain climbing, during a surgical operation, or for quite other reasons while performing liturgical functions. In such special circumstances nearly all our attention concentrates on making the necessary motions, and then we have a more or less clear experience of conscious efficacy. In ordinary and customary motions the element of proficiency or skill reduces the role of attention and thus weakens the experience of conscious efficacy. Habitual motions are made as if the will did not enter into play. It is a different question whether they can be treated as mere impulses, whether the efficacious engagement of the will played its part in developing the necessary habit or motor skill.

The Somatic Constitution and Human Mobility

There is still another point worth noting in connection with the question of motions and the mobility of man, namely, that in every individual case his mobility constitutes a specific, in a way phenomenological whole with the structure of the body, that is, with his entire constitution. This dynamic whole manifests itself outwardly but its origin has to be sought within the human body, in its reactivity, with the specific ability of the individual to transform stimulations into motor impulses. Mobility as the manifestation of the somatic reactivity, which is partly innate and partly acquired through early developed skills, corresponds to and derives from the specific traits of the organism. This presumption seems to have lain and still to lie at the origin of all the attempts to classify people according to their temperaments, though of course besides the somatic elements these classifications also account for the psychical aspects. Indeed, the definitions of the various temperaments are primarily concerned with the psychical rather than the somatic dispositions of man, albeit they also clearly attempt to establish a relation between the one and the other.

Finally, as a conclusion to these remarks on the dynamic action-motion synthesis, we should note that in this domain we sometimes observe various forms of disintegration that may be defined as purely somatic. Such disintegration may take the form of the absence of a certain organ or member of the human body resulting in the disability to make certain motions, or it may be due to an absence of some, purely somatic reactions or skills leading to impediments or disorders of human acting. These defects are to some extent outwardly observable, but their source always lies inside the human body. It is perhaps necessary to stress that the purely somatic obstacles as such have but a physical and in nowise a moral significance. A man who has lost an arm or has had a lung removed is subject to very definite limitations or difficulties in his acting, but these are external in the sense that they do not in themselves distort his consciousness or prevent his self-determination. On the contrary, very often a human being with a high degree of somatic disintegration may represent a personality of great value.

8. INSTINCT AND THE PERSON'S INTEGRATION IN THE ACTION

The Complex Nature of Instinct

Before we end our discussion of the person's integration in the action viewed from the somatic and reactive point of view, we have still to consider the question of instincts. The term "instinct" in the current usage stresses the drive aspect of impulse; it is in this sense that the term has been used in this study. Indeed, while we may perhaps speak of "instinctive reactivity" with reference to the human body or "instinctive movements" (reflexes), it would be difficult to associate them with the drive aspect or the urge inherent in instincts. Hence instinctive reactions are indicative of a dynamization that is appropriate to nature itself, while instinct with its inherent drive tells of nature's dynamic orientation in a definite direction. This is what we mean when speaking of the instinct of, or urge for, self-preservation and of the sexual or reproductive instinct or drive. So conceived "instinct" does not refer to any particular reaction as a purposeful activation of the somatic subject, which is what we have in mind when in everyday speech we call such a reaction "instinctive": the term seems to refer to the resultant of several instinctive reactions of the body and thus to a trait of nature itself in its dynamic and clearly defined directing towards an end; obviously we are now speaking not of nature in the abstract but as a concrete existing reality, that reality existing in the person which we tried to describe earlier in this study. It is from the standpoint of this reality that man is equipped with his proper instincts.

Instinct with its inherent drive is a form of man's dynamism on account of nature and, so far as man forms part of nature, so far as he remains in intimate union with nature; but at the same time instinct does not consist solely of the somatic dynamism in man. This is why its interpretation in somatic terms alone can never be complete. In fact, instinct as a definite dynamic trait affects also the human psyche, and it is in the psyche that it finds its proper expression. This is certainly true in the case of the instinct of self-preservation and perhaps even more vividly in that of the sexual drive. The psychical aspect of instinct is expressed in the specifically emotive urge that assumes the specific type of orientation of the particular instinct and even to some extent generates this orientation. The experience itself of this urge, of an incitement or an objectively felt necessity, has a psycho-emotive character while the reaction of the organism only supplies it with the somatic ground. Since we are at present concentrating upon the somatic side of man and its share in the person's integration in the action our concern is mainly with the somatic aspect of human instincts, but we must remain aware that they are not simply and solely a somatic dynamism.

The Relation of Instincts to Somatic Reactivity

The basic conditionings of instincts are, nevertheless, to be looked for in the human body, in the body's specific reactivity. So far as the instinct of self-preservation is concerned it constitutes something akin to a resultant; it is also the common element of several vegetative reactions; for the instinctual end of these reactions is to preserve vegetative life and to maintain its proper development. The maintenance and development of vegetation entail the need for its preservation, hence also the need for self-protection and self-defense against anything that could impair or destroy it. The human organism is equipped with the necessary mechanisms of self-protection which functions automatically, that is to say, according to the rules of nature without engaging conscious awareness or the person's efficacy. In this respect the human body's own efficacy is self-sufficient; its contact with consciousness is maintained by means of the so-called "bodily sensations." In such common statements as "I'm fine" or "I'm sick" we refer precisely to these sensations. Such assertions may often inform us also about man's spiritual condition though usually they serve to describe his physical state. Sensations of health or illness, of strength or weakness have a self-protecting significance: through them not only the body but also the instinct of self-preservation, which is strictly connected with the body's vegetative vitality, manifests itself. The elementary sensation of hunger and thirst - as well as their satisfaction - springs from the instinct of self-preservation; in addition, the enormous progress in medical science and art may be related to this instinct. Clearly the instinct is not restricted to the somatic but constitutes a dynamic trait of the human being and existence as a whole.

The Instinct of Self-Preservation

The full significance of this dynamic trait is metaphysical and so the understanding of instinct must also account for it. At the origin of the instinct of self-preservation there is indeed a principle and a fundamental value: existence itself constitutes this principle, and this value, for the instinct of self-preservation expresses the compulsion to exist, that "subjective necessity" to exist which pervades the whole dynamic structure of man. All the somatic dynamisms preserving the vegetation of the individual are subservient to this compulsion as well as to the emotive urge felt whenever the vegetation and with it the whole physical existence of man (his material existence) is threatened. This feeling meets the intellectual affirmation of existence, the awareness that "it is good to exist and to live" while it would be "bad to lose one's existence and one's life"; the fundamental value of existence is reflected in this intellectual affirmation. Hence the instinct of self-preservation becomes a consciously adopted attitude, a primary concern of man and a fundamental value. In his mind, man, as we well know, may reject the value of his own existence and substitute negation in the place of affirmation, which shows that the instinct of self-preservation has no absolute control over the person. However, even in this respect the question emerges whether the intent of those who commit suicide is not to exist at all or perhaps only cease to exist in a way that seems to them unbearable.

The Instinct of Sex and Reproduction

Even a brief analysis of the instinct of self-preservation shows how difficult it would be to reduce it in man to its somatic aspects alone, how powerfully it is reflected in the psyche, and how great is the share of consciousness in the shaping of the processes that it generates. The same applies, perhaps even in a greater degree, to the sexual drive. The drive of sex, which relies on the momentous division of mankind into male and female individuals, stems from the somatic ground and also penetrates deeply into the psyche and its emotivity, thereby affecting even man's spiritual life. While the desire to maintain the existence of one's own being derives from the instinct of self-preservation, likewise the desire for sharing with another human being, the desire that springs both from close similarity and from the difference due to the separation of the sexes is based on the instinct of sex. The sexual drive in its integral dynamism and purposefulness becomes the source of the propagation of life; hence it is simultaneously the instinct of reproduction, to which man owes the preservation of his species in nature. This natural desire is the basis of marriage and through marital life becomes the foundation of the family.

The reproductive, procreative trait is most clearly manifested at the somatic level of the instinctual dynamism, the dynamism manifesting itself in strictly defined reactions of the body that to some extent automatically or spontaneously happen in man. In spite of all their specificity and automatism, however, these reactions remain sufficiently conscious to be controllable by man. Essentially, this control consists in the adaptation of the body's instinctual dynamism of sex to its proper end. Though possible, the control of the sexual drive may, and often does raise many difficult problems, especially for individuals whose sexual desire is unusually strong; this does not consist in somatic reactions alone but also in a special psychical urge of the emotive type. The point of view of ethics on the need for controlling the sexual drive was discussed more fully by the author in another book, the theme of which is human love and the ensuing responsibilities,⁶⁵ where also the purely somatic structures, whereby the instinct of sex manifests itself, are considered. The structures, whose roots reach deep into the human organism, determine the significant somatic differences between men and women.

The Correct Interpretation of Instincts

These considerations suggest that the problem of instincts, here limited to two examples, is not a purely somatic one, even though both the instincts of self-preservation and of sex are rooted deep within the human body and its natural reactivity. Does the significance of instincts in the person derive first of all from the subjective force of those somatic reactions as such which are liberated because of instincts, or is it rather the outcome of the objective value of the ends, to which man is urged and directed by instincts? It is a separate problem, which cannot be discussed here. It suffices to say that in view of the rational nature of the human person it seems more plausible to accept the latter alternative. Since in this chapter we have been dealing with the relation of the somatic to the integration of the person in the action the problem of instinct is considered mainly from the point of view of the subjective reactivity of the body, in which both the instinct of self-preservation and that of sex are very clearly apparent. In this approach the integration of instincts in the actions of the person is but an element of the more general problem, which is presented by the integration of the natural dynamism of the body in the action. We have seen, however, that this one particular element does not provide the full solution to the question of the integration of instincts, a question requiring a broader look at the psycho-emotive element.