TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 13  LAWFUL TO PUNISH DISTURBERS OF THE STATE WITH DEATH
CHAPTER 14  IT IS LAWFUL FOR CHRISTIANS SOMETIMES TO MAKE WAR
CHAPTER 15  HOW MANY, AND WHAT, ARE THE CONDITIONS OF A JUST WAR
CHAPTER 16  IS IT PERMISSIBLE FOR CHRISTIANS TO WAGE WAR AGAINST THE TURKS?

Chapter XIII

IT IS LAWFUL FOR A CHRISTIAN MAGISTRATE TO PUNISH DISTURBERS OF THE STATE WITH DEATH

Fourth proposition: It is lawful for a Christian magistrate to punish with death disturbers of the public peace. It is proved, first, from the Scriptures, for in the law of nature, of Moses, and of the Gospels, we have precepts and examples of this. For God says, "Whosoever shall shed man's blood, his blood shall be shed." These words cannot utter a prophecy, since a prophecy of this sort would often be false, but a decree and a precept. Hence in the Chaldaic paraphrase it is rendered, "Whosoever sheds blood before witnesses, his blood shall be shed by sentence of the judge." And Judas says, "Bring her out that she may be burnt." Here the patriarch Judas, as head of a family, condemned an adulteress to death by fire.

2 In the law of Moses there are many precepts and examples. "He that striketh a man with a will to kill him, shall be put to death." And Moses himself, Josue, Samuel, David, Elias, and many other very holy men put many to death. And as for "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword," these words cannot be rightly understood except in this sense: Every one who commits an unjust murder ought in turn to be condemned to death by the magistrate. For Our Lord rebuked Peter not because a just defense is unlawful, but because he wished not so much to defend himself or Our Lord, as to avenge the injury done to Our Lord, although he himself had no official authority, as St. Augustine correctly explains, and St. Cyril also. Besides, "If thou do that which is evil, fear: for he beareth not the sword in vain. For he is God's minister." St. Paul says that the sword is given by God to rulers to punish evildoers, therefore, if like men are found in the Church, why may they not be put to death?

3 Secondly, it is proved from the testimony of the Fathers. Innocent I., being asked whether it was lawful for a magistrate who had been baptized, to punish by death, answered that it was entirely lawful. St. Hilary says that it is certainly lawful to kill in two cases, if a man is fulfilling the duty of a judge, or if he is using a weapon in his own defense. St. Jerome says, "To punish murderers, and sacrilegious men, and poisoners is not a shedding of blood, but the administration of law." St. Augustine, "Those who, endowed with the character of public authority, punish criminals by death, do not violate that commandment which says, Thou shalt not kill."

4 Lastly, it is proved from reason; for it is the duty of a good ruler, to whom has been entrusted the care of the common good, to prevent those members which exist for the sake of the whole from injuring it, and therefore if he cannot preserve all the members in unity, he ought rather to cut off one than to allow the common good to be destroyed; just as the farmer cuts off branches and twigs which are injuring the vine or the tree, and a doctor amputates limbs which might injure the whole body.

5 To the argument of the Anabaptists from "An eye for an eye, etc.," there are two solutions. One, that the Old Law, since it was given to imperfect men, allowed the seeking for revenge, and only forbade that the retaliation be greater than the injury; not that it is lawful to seek revenge, but because it is less evil to seek it in moderation than inordinately; besides, Christ, Who instructed more perfect men, recalled this permission. Thus says St. Augustine, and St. Chrysostom and St. Hilary are of the same opinion regarding this passage; but since retaliation is prohibited, "Seek not revenge," and, we read, "He that seeketh to revenge himself, shall find vengeance from the Lord," we shall, indeed, reply correctly with St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure and some others, in their commentary on the third Sentence of Peter Lombard, when Our Lord says: "You have heard that it hath been said of old, an eye for an eye, etc.," He does not condemn that law, nor forbid a magistrate to inflict the poena talionis, but He condemns the perverse interpretation of the Pharisees, and forbids in private citizens the desire for and the seeking of vengeance. For God promulgates the holy law that the magistrate may punish the wicked by the poena talionis; whence the Pharisees infer that it is lawful for private citizens to seek vengeance; just as from the fact that the law said, "Thou shalt love thy friend," they infer that it is lawful to hate enemies; but Christ teaches that these are misinterpretations of the law, and that we should love even our enemies and not resist evil, but rather that we should be prepared, if necessary, to turn the other cheek to him who strikes one cheek. And that Our Lord was speaking to private citizens is clear from what follows. For Our Lord speaks thus: "But I say to you not to resist evil, but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, etc."

6 But it should be observed that when He says, "not to resist evil," just defense is not prohibited, but retaliation; for Christ commands not to strike him who strikes you, as Theophylactus rightly teaches. But he is said to strike who strikes to injure, not he who strikes to protect himself; and, briefly, revenge, not defense, is forbidden, according to "Revenge not yourselves, my dearly beloved," that is, not avenging yourselves. For thus it is in the Greek (?) whence it goes on to say: "But set aside wrath, for it is written: Vengeance is Mine, I will repay." But neither is revenge forbidden absolutely, if, indeed, it is sought from a lawful judge and for a good end, either because there is hope that the malefactor will be reformed by this punishment, or because his malice can be kept in check and restrained in no other way, and he will continue to do evil if he is allowed to go unpunished; therefore, what is forbidden is only that revenge which private citizens wish to take on their own account, and which they seek from a judge through the desire of harming an enemy, and of satisfying their own ill-will and hatred.

Chapter XIV

IT IS LAWFUL FOR CHRISTIANS SOMETIMES TO MAKE WAR

7 There follows the fourth question, which is on war. This dispute is divided into three parts. For first it must be shown that war is sometimes lawful for Christians. Secondly, the causes of a just war must be explained. Thirdly, because of Luther, it will have to be proved that it is lawful for Christians to take up arms against the Turks.

8 But, that we may begin at the beginning, there was an old heresy of the Manichaeans, who asserted that war was of its very nature unlawful, and therefore they accused Moses, Josue, David, and other Fathers of the old dispensation, who waged war, of being wicked men, as St. Augustine states. Some have revived this heresy in our own time; and, first of all, Erasmus, in various places, but especially in his annotations, in a lengthy argument contends that war is one of the evils that were tolerated, and permitted by God to the ancient Jews, but forbidden to Christians both by Christ and by the Apostles.

9 Moreover, Cornelius Agrippa, in his book on the emptiness of human knowledge, asserts that the practice of carrying on war is forbidden by Christ. John Ferus says the same in his commentary on St. Matthew, "He who takes the sword shall perish with the sword." The Anabaptists teach the same doctrine, as Melanchthon testifies. Alphonsus a Castro also attributes the same teaching to John Oecolampadius, under the heading war, which seems strange to me, since Zwingli, his colleague, approved of war to such an extent that he perished on the field of battle, and in like manner Calvin, and Melanchthon, and other heretics of this time, by word and by deed teach that war should be carried on.

10 But we, as the universal Church has always taught, both by word and by deed, say that war is not of its nature unlawful, and that it is lawful not only for Jews but also for Christians to carry on war, provided that those conditions of which we shall treat afterwards are fulfilled. This is proved by the testimony of the Scriptures, "These are the nations which the Lord left, that by them He might instruct Israel, and all that had not known the wars of the Chanaanites: That afterwards their children might learn to fight with their enemies, and to be trained up to war."

11 These words certainly show not the permission, but the absolute Will of God. Likewise, "Thus saith the Lord of hosts: 'I have reckoned up all that Amalech hath done to Israel: how he opposed them in the way when they came up out of Egypt. Now therefore go, and smite Amalech, and utterly destroy all that he hath: spare him not, etc.'" Here also we see not a permission, but a command. And the Old Testament is filled with similar instances. Likewise, "And the soldiers also asked him, saying: And what shall we do? And he said to them: Do violence to no man, neither calumniate any man; and be content with your pay." The Anabaptists, according to Melanchthon, says that John permitted war to the Jews as imperfect men, but Christ taught far otherwise.

12 But on the contrary; for John was preparing the way of the Lord, therefore he should not have permitted that which Christ was soon to set aside; for neither could the Jews avail themselves of that concession, since Christ was to come in that same year and forbid war, as our opponents themselves contend; and besides men might have thought that Christ and John did not agree together, which would have been most absurd.

13 Erasmus answers, on the contrary, that this command was given to the soldiers, not that, by keeping it, they might live well, but that they might live less evil lives, as Theophylactus would seem to explain.

14 But on the contrary; for John had previously said: "Bring forth fruits worthy of penance," and "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, shall be cut down and cast into the fire." Then the repentant publicans and soldiers asked what was this good fruit which they ought to bring forth; therefore, either John deceived them, or soldiers can be saved if they observe those commands which John laid upon them.

15 As to Theophylactus, I make two answers. First, that he did not say that war was evil, but merely that John was exhorting the multitude, which was free from sin, to good works, that is, to the sharing of their goods with others; but the publicans and the soldiers, who were incapable of this degree of perfection and could not do works of supererogation, he urged to abandon sin. For Theophylactus thought that for the man who had two coats to give one to him who had none was a work of counsel and of supererogation, otherwise he would not have called the people to whom he was speaking free from sin, nor would he have distinguished this act as good rather than evil; for if it is a command not to keep two coats, to keep them is evil.

16 I say, secondly, that Theophylactus does not rightly interpret this passage, for he calls those people free from sin to whom John said, "Ye offspring of vipers," and "Bring forth fruits worthy of penance." And besides, to have two coats is to retain what is superfluous, as St. Jerome says, but it is a sin to keep what is superfluous. Besides, Our Lord teaches that tribute should be paid to Caesar; but certainly tribute is not owed to kings unless they can pay soldiers to defend the State, which St. Paul explains, "For therefore," says he, "also you pay tribute. For they are the ministers of God, serving unto this purpose," namely, that they may put to death disturbers of the public peace, for he had previously said, "For he beareth not the sword in vain. For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath."

17 Our proposition is proved secondly by the examples of the saints, who waged war; for if war were evil, certainly it would not have been waged by the saints. We read in the Old Testament that Abraham, Moses, Josue, Gideon, Samson, David, Josias, and the Maccabees waged war, thus earning great praise. In the New Testament, when the centurion said to Christ, "I have under me soldiers, and I say to this one, Go, and he goeth, etc.," Our Lord praiseth his faith and did not command him to give up the military life. Moreover, Cornelius the centurion is called "a religious man and fearing God." And so he even merited to see an angel, nor, afterwards, when he was being taught the way of salvation by St. Peter, was he told to desert the military life. Then, as Tertullian teaches, where he narrates the great miracle worked by Christian soldiers when they were waging war in Germany under Marcus Aurelius, after the Ascension of Christ into heaven there were in military life some Christians holy and pleasing to God, even under pagan rulers; these men certainly would not have been fighting if it were evil, nor, if they had been fighting in this circumstance, would they have been so pleasing to God that they could work miracles. St. Basil also teaches in his sermon in honor of the forty martyr soldiers that there were many saints in the camps of pagan Emperors; and St. Gregory Nazianzen teaches the same towards the middle of his first sermon against Julian.

18 Finally, it is evident that war was waged by Constantine, Theodosius, Valentinian, Charlemagne, St. Louis, King of France, St. Maurice with his Theban legion, and by other very saintly Christians, whom the holy bishops never reproved; nay, more, Theodosius asked the Abbot John for advice concerning the outcome of a war, as St. Augustine relates.

19 Our proposition is proved, thirdly, by the fact that God often aids just wars, which He certainly would not do if war were unlawful; for evils may be permitted, but aid may not also be given in carrying them out. It was said by Melchisidech to Abraham, when he had vanquished four kings with only 318 of his household: "Blessed be the most high God, by Whose protection the enemies are in thy hands." In answer to the prayer of Moses, God gave the Jews the victory over Amalech. When Josue was fighting the sun stood still, and God rained great stones from the sky, and God slew more with hailstones than the sons of Israel slew with spears and swords. Angels in the likeness of horsemen fought for the Maccabees, and we read that God gives victory to those worthy of it, not according to the might of their arms, but as is pleasing to Him.

20 Eusebius, in the life of Constantine, testifies that Constantine was victorious in war through the aid of God, through clearly proved miracles, and in his history, that St. John fought, and Theodoret testifies that St. Philip the Apostle fought openly with Theodosius against his enemies, and Socrates writes that angels fought against the Saracens for Theodosius II. St. Augustine writes, that the army of Honorius by a Divine miracle won a wonderful victory over the Goths. Numberless similar examples could be brought forward.

21 Our proposition is proved, fourthly, from reason. Granted that it is lawful for the State to protect its citizens from disturbers of its peace from within, by executing them with various forms of torture, then this is also lawful when there is no other possible way of defending those same citizens from external enemies; since, in order that the State may be preserved, it is necessary that all enemies, internal as well as external, may by kept off. And since this is the law of nature it is incredible that it should be set aside by the Gospel.

22 Lastly, our proposition is proved by the testimony of the Fathers. Tertullian says, "With you we are sailors, and soldiers, and farmers, and merchants." St. Gregory Nazianzen, in his sermon on peace, says, "Granted that there should be a reason for both states, seeing that following the law and authority of God, war, clearly, may sometimes be undertaken, only, however, as long as you grant that we should be more disposed to peace, for this is higher and more Divine."

23 St. John Chrysostom, in his sermon on the Gospel of the Marriage Feast, says among other things, "You adorn the military state, and you say, I cannot be devout. Was not that centurion a soldier, and yet his military life did him no harm?"

24 St. Ambrose says, "Not to fight is a neglect of duty, but to fight for the sake of plunder is a sin." And he numbers among the virtues courage in war, and he proves by many examples that it was not lacking in us. Likewise, in the sermon on the death of Theodosius, he earnestly commends Theodosius for his prowess in war.

25 St. Augustine says, "For if Christian discipline condemned all war, to soldiers seeking salvation it would rather have been said in the Gospel that they should lay down their arms and give up the military life altogether; but the advice given is, trouble no man, make no false accusation, be content with your pay." He commands that their pay should suffice, but does not forbid them to follow a military life. And, he says, "Do not think that no man who serves as a soldier can be pleasing to God, etc."

26 St. Gregory says, "In this life the Lord of victories makes Your Excellency as a shining light before your enemies in war, and so it is necessary for Your Excellency to oppose the enemies of the Church with all your powers of mind and body, etc.," and, "If such great success in waging war had not come to Your Excellency as a reward of faith, through the grace of the Christian religion, there would be small reason for wonder, but when you have made provision for future victories (God granting) not by carnal wisdom, but rather by prayer, this becomes matter for surprise, that your glory comes not through earthly wisdom, but from the gift of God above."

27 St. Gregory of Tours says, "Would, O kings, that you would fight battles as your fathers, that by your power you might curb the peoples included within your peace."

28 St. Bernard says, "But, indeed, the soldiers of Christ fight without anxiety the battles of their Lord, fearing nothing, either sin because of the slaying of the enemy, or danger of being slain, seeing that death, whether endured or inflicted for Christ, both contains nothing wrong, and merits a high degree of glory."

29 But, on the other hand, there are objections. First, from the Scriptures, and to begin, "Vengeance is Mine, I will repay." And, "Revenge not yourselves, my dearly beloved . . . . for it is written, Revenge is Mine, I will repay."

30 I answer that the vengeance which public officers inflict is rightly called the vengeance of God, for they are the ministers of God, serving Him in this very matter. Hence St. Paul, after he had said, "Revenge is Mine, I will repay," adds, "But if thou do that which is evil, fear; for he beareth not the sword in vain. For he is God's minister; an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil."

31 Then they add that passage from Isaias, "They shall turn their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into sickles: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they be exercised any more to war." These things are predicted of the Christian era.

32 I answer that in this passage is foretold only that perfect peace to come at the time when Christ was to be born, as St. Jerome explains, and we know that this prophecy was fulfilled in the reign of Augustus Caesar. For the word ultra does not mean forever, but for a long time. Besides, even if this prophecy had not been fulfilled, nothing could be concluded from that; for Isaias does not forbid war, in case there is an enemy who troubles us, but he prophecies that there will be no enemies. Therefore, while there are enemies war may also be waged. For it can be said that it was predicted that the kingdom of Christ would be a peaceable kingdom, seeing that it is not of this world nor concerned with temporal affairs, and in this it is distinguished from the kingdom of the Jews, which was to be strengthened and preserved by war and slaughters.

33 Finally, they formulate an objection from those words, "If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other," and, "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." And, "Whosoever taketh the sword shall perish with sword." Words similar to these are found n St. Paul, "To no man rendering evil for evil," "Revenge not yourselves, my dearly beloved, etc."

34 I answer that, in times past, Julian the Apostate made the same objections against the Christians, as St. Gregory Nazianzen sets forth in the first sermon against Julian, toward the middle. But we say, first, that all these sayings, whether commands or counsels, were given to private individuals; for neither Our Lord nor St. Paul ever commanded a judge not to punish a man who had done injury to another, but Our Lord commanded each to bear patiently his own injuries; but war pertains to public justice, not to private revenge; and just as the love of enemies, to which all are obliged, does not hinder a judge or an executioner from fulfilling his duties, so it does not hinder soldiers and commanders from fulfilling theirs.

35 I say, moreover, that even to private individuals these were sometimes commands, sometimes counsels; they are always commands as regards readiness of spirit, so that thus a man is prepared to turn the other cheek, and to offer his coat, to one who demands his cloak, rather than to offend God; but we are commanded to fulfill it only in this case, when the necessity for God's honor exacts it, otherwise it is only a counsel, and sometimes not even a counsel, as when from the fact that I turn the other cheek no good follows, but my enemy sins a second time.

36 Secondly, there may be offered in objection three decrees of the Church. The first, were most severe penances are laid upon those who resume the military life once they have renounced it.

37 The second is in a statement of St. Leo to Rusticus, and it is also contained in the Canon Contrarium on penance. "It is contrary to the laws of the Church," says St. Leo, "to resume the secular military life after doing penance." And below, "He is not free from the chains of the Devil, who wishes to bind himself to a secular military life."

38 The third is in that canonical distinction of St. Gregory, Falsas, where he says that those who are engaged in a career which cannot be carried on without sin are not capable of penance unless they renounce that career, and St. Gregory gives a soldier as an example.

39 I answer to the first objection that it is a question of those who for confessing their faith were deprived of their military status by Diocletian or by Licinius, and who afterwards sought to regain their rank, being prepared to deny their faith.

40 To the second and third I say that it is a question of those who had committed many sins in the occasion of military life, and who were in need of penance. For those do evil if they return to military life, in which they have found by experience that they cannot live without sin, not from the badness of military life, but from their own wickedness, and then, indeed, they do wrong; particularly when commanded by the priest not to return to military life. And that those canons in reality do not absolutely forbid military life is clear from the end of the canon Falsas, where after it was said that those do wrong who return to military life after doing penance, it is added, except on the advice of Bishops zealous for the defense of justice.

41 Thirdly, many passages from the Fathers are offered in objection by Erasmus, to which we add two, one from Tertullian, the other from St. Jerome. In his book, On the Crown of a Soldier, beyond the middle, Tertullian asks whether the military life is becoming for a Christian, and he answers: "Are we to believe that it is lawful for a human bond to be added to the Divine, and to serve another lord after having served Christ? Will it be lawful to take up the sword after Our Lord has said that he who takes the sword shall perish by the sword? And shall that son of peace, who cannot with propriety engage in a lawsuit, engage in battle?"

42 I answer that Tertullian does not condemn military life as evil in itself. This is evident, first, from the passages cited above.

43 Secondly, since in that book, On the Crown of a Soldier, he admits that those who were soldiers before baptism could remain soldiers even after baptism, and he teaches merely that he who is free should not adopt the military life after baptism: "Clearly," says he, "if faith afterwards comes to those who have already entered upon a military career, their condition is different from that of those whom John admitted to baptism, as those most faithful centurions, one of whom Christ commends, and the other St. Peter instructs, when he had received the faith and been baptized, he should either have given up his military life immediately, as was done by many, or else he should have taken care in every way lest he commit any sin against God."

44 Thirdly, it is clear, that the chief reasons which he gives why Christians should not follow a military career are on account of the danger of idolatry, since at that time nearly all the rulers were pagans. And so Tertullian judged war to be accidentally evil at that time: "Shall we keep watch," asks he, "over the temples which he has renounced? And shall he dine in that place which is displeasing to St. Paul? And shall he defend by night those demons from whom he routed by exorcisms by day? And shall he also bear a standard opposed to that of Christ, etc.?" Besides, his other reasons offered above are only those of congruity, as is evident.

45 St. Jerome says, "Formerly it was said to warriors, Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, O most mighty one; now it is said to Peter: Put up thy sword into the scabbard, etc."

46 I answer that he means that in the Old Testament wars were commanded by God, and were necessary for taking possession of and holding the land of promise; in the New Testament not war, but rather peace, is commanded, since military force is not necessary for winning the kingdom of heaven; yet it does not follow that Christians, as citizens of a temporal state, cannot wage war against those from whom they have received an injury.

47 Besides these, Erasmus offers in objection some of the other Fathers, and especially Origen, who says that Christ ended all wars; and, explaining that passage in Luke, "And he that hath not, let him sell his coat, and buy a sword." He says that this passage is harmful to those who interpret it in a carnal sense, who truly think that a coat should be sold in order to buy a sword.

48 I answer that in the preceding passage there is nothing in support of the position of Erasmus; for when Origen says that Christ ended all wars he does not mean that Christ forbade wars, but that His Providence brought universal peace to the world at the time of His birth; there is in this passage, on the other hand, that which contradicts Erasmus; for Origen says that by the Providence of God it was brought about that when Christ came the whole Roman Empire was in a state of subjection, since, if there had been many kings, many wars would have been necessary by which some might repel the assaults of others.

49 In a later passage, also, nothing is said against war; for we do not acknowledge that the words of Our Lord are to be interpreted thus stupidly, that each one ought of necessity to sell his coat and buy a sword, but only that, according to that way of speaking, Our Lord wished to explain that at the time of His Passion the Apostles would be in such great trouble and difficulty as are those who sell their coat and buy a sword to defend themselves.

50 But what is to be argued here against war? For since Our Lord in this passage did not command the Apostles really to buy swords, is it to be inferred that He therefore forbade war? Origen likewise says that the statement that carnal wars should not be waged by Christians means that Christian warfare under Christ as leader is not a carnal strife against men, as was the fighting of the Jews under Josue, but a spiritual combat against the Demons, yet it does not follow from this that it is not lawful for Christians, as citizens of a political State, to wage war.

51 In the same manner are answered those objections which Erasmus proposes from St. Chrysostom, St. Basil, and Theophylactus, taken from the Catena of St. Thomas on Luke, for they teach merely that Our Lord did not command the Apostles really to buy swords.

52 Then he offers in objection St. Ambrose, who, explaining that passage, "And he that hath not, let him sell his coat, and buy a sword," says, "O Lord, why dost Thou command me to buy a sword, when Thou dost forbid me to kill? Why dost Thou command me to have what Thou dost forbid me to use? Unless, perchance, that provision may be had for defense, not that revenge is necessary; and that I may seem to have been ready, but unwilling to retaliate; yet the law does not forbid one to strike, and hence, perchance, to Peter offering two swords Thou sayest: It is enough, as if it were lawful up to the promulgation of the Gospel, that under the old law there might be discernment of justice, but under the Gospel the perfection of virtue."

53 I answer, first, that in this passage nothing is said concerning that war which is carried on by public authority, but it is a question of private defense or revenge. Second, I say that, according to the opinion of St. Ambrose, even private defense does not come under the prohibition of a command, but under the perfection of a counsel, as these words clearly show: "That under the old law there might be discernment of justice, but under the Gospel the perfection of virtue."

54 Erasmus also offers in objection a passage from St. Augustine, who, he says, contradicts himself, and if he undertook the defense of war in one place, yet in another he wrote against war; for he writes, "We should not pray that our enemies may die, but that they may be converted," and he wrote many things against war, indeed, he begs this same Marcellinus to punish the heretical Donatists without bloodshed.

55 I answer that Erasmus seems to have thought he was talking to children; for what have these things to do with the question? For he condemns hatred of enemies, by reason of which some pray to God for the death of their enemies. For who denies that it is wrong to hope for the death of an enemy because of desire for vengeance? Yet to hope for the death of an enemy and even to accomplish it according to the order of justice is not wrong, provided there be no hatred of the man, but only desire for justice and for the common welfare. Indeed, in his fifth epistle there is nothing against war, but rather much in favor of it, as we stated above, and I do not know what Erasmus was dreaming about. He begs the judge to spare the lives of those wretches who were being held captive, and who had confessed their guilt, a plea which the Bishops were at times accustomed to make, but what has this to do with war? Or does any one who begs that a robber shall not be hung consequently forbid war?

56 Erasmus also offers in objection the example of St. Martin, who, as Sulpicius relates in his Life, said to the Emperor Julian: "Let him who is about to fight accept your bounty. I am a Christian; it is not lawful for me to fight."

57 I answer that Erasmus does not recount the words of St. Martin with sufficient accuracy, for the latter does not say, "I am a Christian; it is not lawful for me to fight," but, "Thus far I have fought for you, now permit me to do battle for God. I am a soldier of Christ; it is not lawful for me to fight," by which words he did not mean that he was a Christian only, but also, by reason of his vow and resolution, a monk, which is the meaning of the words, "permit me to do battle for God," and, "I am a soldier of Christ." Whence Sulpicius had written a short time previously that St. Martin, after he had been baptized, still led a military life for two years, not because he did not desire to renounce the world at once, but because the tribune of the soldiers, whose tent-mate he was, had promised that when his term of office expired he also would say farewell to the world, that is, that he would become a monk with St. Martin. And so he asserted that war was forbidden not to the Christian, but to the monk, since he himself, as a Christian, had followed the military life for two years.

58 Finally, Erasmus urges this, that the arms of the Church are the sword of the Word of God, the shield of faith, the helmet of salvation, the breast-plate of justice, and the javelins of prayer, as St. Paul teaches, and therefore Christians ought not to fight with a sword and with weapons.

59 I answer, first, that St. Paul is not describing war against men but against demons, as is clear from that very passage, "For our wrestling is not, etc." Second, I say that the principal arms of Christians are faith and prayer, but that arms of steel are not therefore unnecessary, for we read that through the prayer of Moses and the fighting of Josue the victory over Amalech was given by God to the Israelites, and we know that the Maccabees fought with both prayer and arms, and St. Augustine writes to Boniface, "Take arms in your hands, let prayer assail the ears of God." And to the same Boniface he writes, "Some by praying for you fight against invisible enemies, you labor for them by fighting against visible barbarians."

60 But, they say, war is opposed to peace, and peace is good and the effect of charity, therefore war is evil.

61 I answer that war is opposed to peace in this wise, that it may be also a means towards peace, but this is the difference between a just war and an unjust one, that an unjust war is opposed to a good peace and leads to an evil peace, and therefore such a war is harmful; but a just war is opposed to an evil peace and leads to a good peace, just as the wounds made by a surgeon are opposed to that evil and imperfect health which sick people have, but lead to good and perfect health as an end.

Chapter XV

HOW MANY, AND WHAT, ARE THE CONDITIONS OF A JUST WAR

62 Those who treat of such matter usually enumerate four conditions of a just war, lawful authority, a just cause, a good intention, and a suitable method. But each must be discussed by itself.

63 The first condition, then, is lawful authority. For St. Augustine says, "The proper order among human beings, adapted to peace, demands this, that there be authority for undertaking a war and deliberation on the part of the leader, but the soldiers owe to common peace and safety the duty of carrying out orders." And reason proves this; for private citizens, and those who have a superior, if they are injured by any one, can have recourse to the superior, and seek judgment from him. But if rulers suffer anything at the hands of another ruler, they have no common tribunal before which they may accuse the aggressor, and therefore it is lawful for them to oppose public wrongs by war.

64 Moreover, this authority for declaring war resides, according to common opinion, in all rulers, and in nations, who in temporal affairs have no superior, such as are all kings, likewise the Republic of Venice and similar States, and likewise some Dukes and Counts who are subject to no one in secular matters; not, however, those Dukes and Counts who are immediately subject to kings, for those who are subject to others are not in themselves heads of the State, but rather members. Note, nevertheless, that this authority is not requisite for defensive war, but only for offensive; for it is lawful for everyone to defend himself, whether he be a ruler or a private citizen, but to declare war, or to invade the territory of an enemy, is lawful only for the supreme head.

65 The second condition is a just cause; for war cannot be declared for any offense at all, but only for the purpose of warding off an injury. Thus St. Augustine says: "Just wars are usually defined as those in which injuries are avenged, when any nation or city which is to be attacked in war has either to satisfy for what has been wickedly done by it, or to return what has been unjustly taken."

66 The reason for this is that a ruler is the judge of his own subjects only, therefore he cannot punish any crimes committed by the subjects of others, but only those which happen to the harm of his own subjects; for even if he is not the ordinary judge of others, yet he is the defender of his own people, and by reason of this obligation it comes to pass that he is also to a certain extent the judge of those who do harm to his people, so that he can punish them with death. Indeed, it should be observed that the cause of war should be neither trivial nor doubtful, but weighty and certain, lest, perchance, the war bring about more harm than the hoped-for-good, hence if there is any doubt a distinction must be made between the ruler and the soldiers, for the ruler himself sins, without doubt; for war is an act of retributive justice, but it is unjust to punish any one for a cause not yet proved; but the soldiers do not sin unless it is plainly evident that the war is unlawful, for subjects ought to obey their superior, nor should they criticize his commands, but they should rather suppose that their ruler has a good reason, unless they clearly know the contrary; just as when the offense of some particular individual is doubtful, the judge who condemns him sins, but not the executioner who carries out the sentence of death imposed on the condemned; for the executioner is not bound to criticize the sentence of the judge. So teaches Pope Boniface. "Whoever," says he, "carries out the orders of a judge seems to have done no wrong, since he is under the necessity of obeying." And St. Augustine says, "Thus it is that a just man, if perchance he is fighting under a wicked king, can justly fight under his orders, preserving the order of civic peace, provided he is certain that what he is commanded is not against the command of God, or even when it happens that he is not certain, so that while perhaps the wickedness of the command makes the king a criminal, the duty of obeying proves the soldier to be guiltless."

67 Note, however, that this is to be understood of soldiers who are bound to a prince who is waging war, namely, that they are his subjects, and also of those who receive a regular salary from him even in times of peace, but not of those who come from another place when war is to be carried on; for these are not obliged to fight, nor can they take part in the war with a safe conscience unless they know the war is just; but those who give no thought to the matter, but are ready to fight whether the war is just or not, provided they are paid, are on the road to damnation.

68 The third condition is a good intention. For, since the end of war is peace and public tranquillity, it is not lawful to undertake war for any other end, hence those sin seriously, whether rulers or soldiers, who begin a war either to injure someone, or to extend their empire, or to show warlike prowess, or for any other cause than the common good, even if lawful authority and a just cause are not lacking. So St. Augustine, in the Epistle to Count Boniface, says "The will should esteem peace, necessity only should bring about war, that God may deliver us from the necessity of war and preserve us in peace; for peace is not sought in order that war may be waged, but war is waged that peace may be attained. Be ye, therefore, desirous of peace even in war, so that those whom you are fighting may be brought by conquest to the unity of peace." And, "Desire of injuring, cruelty in avenging, an unpacified and implacable spirit, fierceness in renewing war, lust for power, and any similar faults, these are the things which are rightly condemned in war."

69 Two things, however, should be noted. First, since war is a sort of means to peace, but very hard and dangerous, therefore war should not be begun in haste, when there is cause, but peace should first be sought by some easier means, namely, by peacefully seeking the reparation due from the enemy. "If at any time thou come to fight against a city, thou shalt first offer it peace, etc." And St. Augustine says, "The will should esteem peace, necessity only should bring about war."

70 But some one may ask, if the enemy at first is unwilling to make satisfaction, yet almost immediately after, when the war has been begun, seeks peace and offers reparation, whether in such a case his opponent is bound to give up war. Cajetan, under the heading Bellum, says that he is not bound to give it up when the war has already been begun, although before it was begun he was bound to accept satisfaction. But (with due deference to any better opinion) it seems that we ought to say that he who has a just cause is never bound in justice to accept satisfaction, either before the beginning of the war of after; yet by reason of charity he is bound in both cases, unless something to the contrary intervenes. The reason for the first is that a ruler having just cause for war bears the character of judge with regard to the other ruler who has done him an injury, but a judge is not bound in justice to pardon a criminal from the death penalty, even if he offers satisfaction, although, if he is the supreme judge, he can pardon him out of mercy. For example, a king is not bound to spare the life of a thief who makes restitution, although he may do so through mercy. The reason for the latter is that war is a most severe infliction, by which not only he who has offended is punished, but incidentally many innocent persons are also involved. Therefore, Christian charity seems always to exact this, that the war should end when he who has done the injury offers the satisfaction due, unless by chance something has accidentally intervened, that is, unless the enemy against whom war is being waged be such that it is expedient for the common good either that he be made subject to another or that he be utterly destroyed, and such were the Amalechites whom God ordered to be utterly wiped out.

71 Secondly, it should be noted that this third condition differs from the two preceding, because if these are absent they make the war unjust, but if this last is absent it makes the war evil, but not, strictly speaking, unjust. For whosoever begins a war without authority or without a just cause, sins not only against charity, but also against justice, and he is not so much a soldier as a robber; but he who has authority and a just cause, and yet makes war from a love of revenge, or the desire of increasing his domain, or for any other evil motive, does not act against justice, but only against charity, and is not a robber, but a wicked soldier. From which it follows that when this third condition alone is lacking, neither soldiers nor kings are bound to any restitution, but only to repentance; but when the first or the second is lacking, all are bound to repair the damage inflicted, unless they are excused by reason of invincible ignorance; for just as gross and culpable ignorance does not excuse from sin, so neither does it excuse from restitution, as appears in the last chapter on injuries and the loss inflicted. But he who acts in invincible ignorance is not bound to restitution while he so acts, but when he recognizes that the war is unjust he is bound to restitution, not for injury inflicted during the war, but he is if through that war he has acquired anything that does not belong to him; and if he has taken no money, but yet has become richer by the sale of goods, he is bound to make restitution to the extent to which he has enriched himself; for he cannot retain the property of another, even if by reason of ignorance he has acquired it without sin, but restoration should be made either to the original owner, if he is known, or to the poor.

72 The fourth condition is the suitable manner, which consists chiefly in this, that no innocent person be harmed, as John the Baptist explains, "Do violence to no man; neither calumniate any man; and be content with your pay." By these words he forbids the injuries which soldiers usually inflict on the innocent, either by violence or by trickery, whether to person or to property. When he says, "Do violence to no man," he forbids the injury which open violence inflicts on one's person, as when soldiers kill peasants who do not readily obey. When he says, "neither calumniate any," he forbids the injury done by fraud and calumny, as when soldiers say that a certain man is a traitor or an enemy although they know that the contrary is true, and on this charge they either rob him themselves, or they kill him, or they bring him before the ruler or the prefects. And when he adds, "and be content with your pay," he forbids the injury done not to the person, but to his property, as when soldiers rob and plunder wherever they can, or even exact and extort from those from whom they should not.

73 But it must be observed that there are three classes of persons on whom soldiers cannot inflict injury, according to the rule of John the Baptist. The first class is that of all those who are not enemies of the State; by reason of which soldiers cannot be excused who inflict injury on citizens, or friendly peasants on whom they are quartered, or through whose property they are passing, and they are not excused if they say that their salary has not been paid to them; for the goods of private citizens are not therefore due them, nor should they inflict punishment on a citizen or a peasant, if the king or the ruler sins by not paying the wages to the soldiers, unless by chance, for just cause, the men of some certain place have been condemned to this punishment, namely, that they must maintain the soldiers, which, however, happens more rarely than otherwise.

74 The second class is that of those who, even if they are in some way enemies of the State, yet are excused in the canon Innovamus, on truce and peace, where it is written thus: "We decree that priests, monks, those in religious houses, pilgrims, merchants, farmers either going to or returning from market, or employed in agriculture, and the beasts with which they plow or carry seed to the field, are to enjoy fitting security." Here by the name merchants are not meant those who live in the country of the enemy, and form a certain part of the State, but only those who are passing through or who are coming for the market-day, who are not members of the State.

75 The third class is that of those unfit for war, such as are children, old men, and women; for such, even if they can be seized and robbed, since they are part of the State, yet they cannot justly be killed, unless perchance they are slain unintentionally or accidentally; as when a soldier casts a javelin against a battalion of the enemy, and by chance a child, or a woman, or even a priest, is killed, the soldier does not sin, but he sins when he kills intentionally, and can, if he wishes, refrain from killing; for both natural reason teaches this, and God has also commanded this to the Jews, namely, that they should spare the children and the women, and Theodosius was seriously reproved by St. Ambrose because, when he wished to punish the Thessalonians, he ordered all those whom he met to be killed without discrimination, as Theodoret relates. But if Moses sometimes ordered even women and children to be killed, this is not therefore lawful for our soldiers; for Moses clearly knew from the Revelation of God, that God, to Whom no man can say, "Why dost Thou thus?" so willed it.

Chapter XVI

IS IT PERMISSIBLE FOR CHRISTIANS TO WAGE WAR AGAINST THE TURKS?

76 This question of a war against the Turks could have been omitted if Luther had not raised it, among his other paradoxes, and attempted to defend it: that it is not licit for Christians to wage war against the Turks, as is manifest in article 34, condemned in the Bull of Leo. Theodore Bibliander appears to agree with Luther, in Tabula 13 of the Chronology, where he says: ''Urban, or rather one more savage than a mob impelled by an evil spirit delighted by homicides, urged a war aimed at recovering Judaea.''

77 It should be noted, however, that Luther did not deny that a war against the Turks is licit, because he judges in general that every war is illicit; for, in the assertion of the same article he urges a war against the Pope whom he says is the most Turkish of Turks; nor because he thinks Christians have no just cause; for it is manifest to everyone that the Turks had no right to occupy Christian kingdoms and that they want to occupy more every day. For it is clear that they want to obliterate every [non-Muslim] religion and that they make every effort to bring to about that men be changed from being Christian to being Muslim. Finally it is clear that former Pontiffs, like Urban the Second, Paschal the Second, Eugene the Third, and many others, and, in addition, General Councils, like the Lateran, Lyons, Vienne, and others, declared war on the Muslims, and that Saint Bernard and other holy men urged people to undertake this war, and that their sermons were confirmed by miracles, as Bernard modestly indicates at the beginning of Book II, de Consideratione. Nor does Luther deny any of this. But there are three reasons why he felt that it was not licit to go to war against the Turks.

78 First, because it seems to be the will of God that we are punished by the Turks, as it were by a kind of scourge, nor is it permissible for us to resist the will of God. That it is the will of God, moreover, he proves in the assertion of article 34, from the experience that has taught that no benefit has resulted to Christians from warring against the Turks.

79 But this first argument is worth little, for even if it were the will of God that our sins be punished by the Turks, it is not His will that we should cease to resist the Turk; rather, it is His will that we resist. This is proved by the purpose intended. For God does not permit the Turk to be enraged so that we perish but that we be converted. Then, however, we are led to conversion when we strive to resist the Turks who wage war against us. When we struggle to resist the attacks of the Turks, we recognize from our struggle our weakness and then we turn to God with our whole heart and implore His help. Therefore, from the purpose for which God permits the Turks to be enraged against us, it manifestly follows that He wills that we resist the Turks. Moreover, the warfare of the Turks is a scourge of God on the sense that a pestilence is, or hunger, or heresy, or incitements to sin, and the like. But no one is so stupid as therefore to think that there should be no search for medicines to fight pestilence, nor that the earth be not cultivated lest we die of hunger, nor that heresy or occasions of sin should not be resisted.

80 Nor is what Luther says true, that experience teaches that war against the Turks is ineffective; for if I omit the many victories reported for the Turks, certainly as soon as war was waged in the land of promise, a most gratifying outcome was our recovery of Jerusalem and a Christian rule over it for eighty-eight years. And they recovered more and more until conflicts broke out between the Christian Princes themselves, so that the Turk now occupies more by reason of discord among ours rather than by enemy power. And the most powerful source of these disagreements was Luther himself. For, as is clear from John Cochleus, in his Acts of Luther, of the 1526, Hungary perished because the Germans, called upon to help by the King of Hungary, preferred to obey Luther who was then preaching opposition to the war against the Turks. At least the war had this amount of good, that the Turk was prevented from doing as much harm as he wanted. Unless he was fought up to this point, he would already have obtained everything.

81 His second reason is that tribulation and persecution are more beneficial to the Church than victory and tranquillity; there, in a sermon on matrimony, he finds fault with the custom of the Church to pray for peace and quiet when instead there should have been prayer for tribulation. But, we reply, that tribulation and persecution are indeed useful but also perilous and, therefore, not be sought but to be tolerated when it could not be otherwise. Whence, in Matthew, chapter VI, we are commanded to pray: ''And lead us not into temptation '', and in I Timothy, II, the Apostle commands prayer for kings, in order that we may lead a peaceful and tranquil life. And St. Augustine, in book X of the Confessions, in chapter 28, says that deplorable things are to be tolerated not to be loved, nor desired nor sought.

82 A third cause, and this appears to be the principal one, a hatred for the Pontiff, for with so great a hatred did Luther pursue the Pontiff that he clearly wished to see the Turk occupy all the kingdoms of Christendom, so that at least in that way the name of the Pontiff would be extinguished. Nor do we conjecture that this was his wish and desire but we conclude this from his words. For in his book addressed to the nobility of Germany, in chapter 25, that there was no more attractive regime up to now than that among the Turks who were governed by the laws of the Koran, and none more evil than the regime among Christians who are ruled by Canon and civil law. And in the assertion of Article 34, he says that the Pontiff and Pontifical acts are much more evil and more hostile than the Turks and that it is stupid to fight for more evil ''Turks '' against their betters, and in a certain letter opposed to two Imperial commands: ''I beg, '' he writes, all ''devout Christians, that we in no way support nor enter into the military, nor give anything against the Turks, since the Turks are ten times more prudent and more honest than our Princes are.'' By which words what else did he try to urge but that the Turks are to be helped against Christians?

83 But this opinion carries so great an absurdity and impiety that even the same Luther, when his fury had somewhat cooled, clearly wrote the contrary. For he thus writes in a book on a Saxon visit: ''Some preachers, '' he says, ''dangerously cry out that the Turks should not be resisted. This talk is seditious and should neither be held nor permitted. The powers, therefore, are obliged to resist the Turks who not only long to devastate the provinces but to violate and kill wives and children and also to violate and abolish provincial rights, the worship of God, and every good ordinance. Because of this especially, rulers must wage war. '' And, in the same place: ''It would be much more tolerable for a good man to witness the death of his children than to see them imbued with the customs of the Turks: for the Turks neither know nor care for any decency whatever.''