TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 5 THE SAME IS DEDUCED FROM THE END OF POLITICAL POWER
CHAPTER 6 THE SAME INFERENCE IS DRAWN FROM THE EFFICIENT CAUSE
CHAPTER 7 THE SAME IS PROVED FROM ANTIQUITY
CHAPTER 8 RULE OR DOMINION CAN EXIST AMONG WICKED MEN

Chapter V

THE SAME IS DEDUCED FROM THE END OF POLITICAL POWER

The third reason is deduced from the final cause. Political rule is so natural and necessary to the human race that it cannot be withdrawn without destroying nature itself; for the nature of man is such that he is a social animal; for indeed brutes are so endowed by nature that each is sufficient to himself, but man needs so many things that he can in no way live alone. For brutes are born clothed and armed, and they have an instinct so determined toward all those things which are beneficial for them that by nature, without any teacher, they know at once how to build nests, to seek for food, and even to make medicine for themselves; but man is born without clothing, without a home, without food, lacking all necessities, and although he has hands, and reason, by which he can prepare all instruments, nevertheless each one needs a long time to develop, and so long that it is impossible for one man to be sufficient to himself for all necessities, especially since we are born unskilled, and the arts are learned rather by instruction than by experience; therefore it is necessary that we should live in society, and that one should aid the other.

2 Besides, even were each one sufficient to himself for the necessities of life, yet he would never, unaided, be able to protect himself from the attacks of wild beasts and robbers, but for this purpose it is necessary for men to assemble and to ward off attacks with their combined strength. And granted that one man might prevail against an enemy, yet he would always remain ignorant, and destitute of wisdom and of justice and of many other virtues, although, indeed, we born for this very purpose, expressly to cultivate our mind and our will, for the arts and sciences were developed after a long time and by many men, and without a teacher they cannot be learned; it is impossible, moreover, to exercise justice except in society, since it is the virtue determining equity among many.

3 Finally, if man should live solitary, to what purpose has the gift of speech and of hearing, that is, of clearly perceiving words, been bestowed upon him? And so Aristotle rightly declares, that man is by nature a civil animal, more so than the bees and the cranes, and any beast whatever, and whoever lives in solitude is either a beast or a god, that is, either less or more than man; nor does this statement militate against our hermits.

4 For those who lived in complete solitude, as Paul, the first hermit, Mary Magdalen, Mary of Egypt, and others, if there be any, can be said to have been something more than man, not by nature, but by grace; for they were miraculously fed by God, as is known; others, moreover, even if they lived in solitude, nevertheless frequently met together, and were subject to their Abbots, as we have shown in the treatise on the Monks.

5 Now, truly, if human nature needs social life, certainly it also needs a rule and a ruler, for it is impossible for a multitude to hold together for any length of time unless there be one who governs it, and who is responsible for the common welfare; just as, if there were not in each one of us a soul to govern and unite the parts and powers and conflicting elements of which we are made, immediately all would disintegrate. Hence it is written, "Where there is no governor, the people shall fall." Finally, society is order among many, for a disorderly and scattered multitude is not called society; moreover, what is order other than a certain succession of inferiors and superiors? Therefore, rulers have been necessarily ordained, if society is to endure.

6 By this reasoning the third argument of the Anabaptists is answered, for they adopt a false position when they say that political rule was permitted to the Jews on account of their imperfection, but that it is not fitting for us, since baptism teaches us all things; for baptism teaches us, first of all, that it is necessary to have a ruler; nor does it suffice to know all things, but we must also make and prepare many things, which we cannot do without the help of others.

7 And, besides, from this very fact may be inferred that the statement is false which Cicero makes, namely, that there was formerly a time when men wandered about in the manner of beasts, then, through the eloquence of some wise orator, they were induced to assemble, and to live together. Indeed, whoever undertakes the praise of eloquence usually makes this statement even now. But that state of affairs never existed, nor could it have existed at any time. For Adam was a very wise man, and without doubt did not allow men to wander about like beasts, and Cain, his son, even built a material city; before Cain and Adam, man did not exist.

8 But it is no wonder that Cicero and other pagans say such things, for the pagans, since they thought that the world existed from all eternity, and since they saw, on the other hand, that all the arts were of recent date, and knowledge of them had existed for only a few years, supposed, for this reason, that for a very long time men had lived like animals, and the recollection of the things which they had done commenced at the time when they began to live like men; but it is certainly hard to understand how Christians, who have learned from the Revelation of God that six thousand years ago the world had not yet been created, and that the first men immediately built cities, dare to say that for a long time men lived like beasts, without a ruler and without cities.

Chapter VI

THE SAME INFERENCE IS DRAWN FROM THE EFFICIENT CAUSE

9 The fourth argument is taken from the efficient cause. For it is certain that political power is of God, from Whom proceeds nothing that is not good and lawful. St. Augustine proves this. For the Wisdom of God proclaims, "By Me kings reign." And below, "By Me princes rule." And, "The God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom, and strength, etc." And, "Thy dwelling shall be with cattle and with wild beasts, and thou shalt eat grass as an ox, and shalt be wet with the dew of heaven; and seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the most High ruleth over the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will."

10 But in this place other matters should be noted. First, political power considered in general, not descending in particular to Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy, comes directly from God alone; for this follows of necessity from the nature of man, since that nature comes from Him Who made it; besides, this power derives from the natural law, since it does not depend upon the consent of men; for, willing or unwilling, they must be ruled over by some one, unless they wish the human race to perish, which is against a primary instinct of nature. But natural law is Divine law, therefore, government was instituted by Divine law, and this seems to be the correct meaning of St. Paul when he says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God."

11 Note, secondly, that this power resides, as in its subject, immediately in the whole state, for this power is by Divine law, but Divine law gives this power to no particular man, therefore Divine law gives this power to the collected body. Furthermore, in the absence of positive law, there is no good reason why, in a multitude of equals, one rather than another should dominate. Therefore, power belongs to the collected body. Finally, human society ought to be a perfect State, therefore, it should have the power to preserve itself, hence, to punish disturbers of the peace, etc.

12 Note, in the third place, that, by the same natural law, this power is delegated by the multitude to one or several, for the State cannot of itself exercise this power, therefore, it is held to delegate it to some individual, or to several, and this authority of rulers considered thus in general is both by natural law and by Divine law, nor could the entire human race assembled together decree the opposite, that is, that there should be neither rulers nor leaders.

13 Note, in the fourth place, that individual forms of government in specific instances derive from the law of nations, not from the natural law, for, as is evident, it depends on the consent of the people to decide whether kings, or consuls, or other magistrates are to be established in authority over them; and, if there be legitimate cause, the people can change a kingdom into an aristocracy, or an aristocracy into a democracy, and vice versa, as we read was done in Rome.

14 Note, in the fifth place, that it follows from what has been said that this power in specific instances comes indeed from God, but through the medium of human wisdom and choice, as do all other things which pertain to the law of nations. For the law of nations is a sort of conclusion drawn from the natural law by human reason; from which are inferred two differences between the political and the Ecclesiastical power, one in view of the subject, for political power resides in the people, and Ecclesiastical power in the individual, as it were immediately in the subject (on whom it devolves); the other difference is in view of the efficient cause, because political power considered in general is by Divine law, but considered in particular it is by the law of nations. Ecclesiastical power, however, considered from every point of view, is by Divine law, and immediately from God.

15 On the basis of these proofs, in answer to the fourth argument of the Anabaptists, I maintain that by their argument they prove their point only in respect to particular forms of government, not to political power in general; but we wish in this place to establish the principle of political power in general, not any particular form of government.

16 I add, secondly, that very often governments are both just and unjust, of God, and not of God; for, on the part of those who hold and usurp authority, governments are thievish and unjust, hence not from God; yet, on the part of Divine Providence, which makes use of the evil intent of men and directs it either to the punishment of sin or to some other good end, or to the reward of good deeds, governments are just and lawful. For God, by an admirable decree of His Providence, sometimes deprives some of power and bestows it upon others in such wise that he who falls from power over the kingdom falls justly; and God Himself, in His own time, will inflict most just punishments for that invasion.

17 For God gave the possession of Palestine to the sons of Israel for a far different reason from that for which He afterwards gave it to Salmanasar or Nabuchodonosor, inasmuch as the sons of Israel, under the leadership of Josue, fought with praiseworthy obedience against the people of Palestine, and when many of these latter had been slain in battle, appropriated their lands, whereas Salmanasar and Nabuchodonosor, by a most wicked sacrilege, led into captivity the people of God; for in this they sought to follow not the Divine command, but their own wicked desire, yet even though they were ignorant of it, God made use of them for that end which, most justly, He willed to be attained.

18 St. Augustine and Hugh of St. Victor explain this matter accurately, nor is the testimony of the Scriptures wanting. For in Isaias we read as follows: "The Assyrian is the rod and the staff of My anger, and My indignation is in their hands. I will send him to a deceitful nation, and I will give him a charge against the people of My wrath, to take away the spoils, and to lay hold on the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets. But he shall not take it so, and his heart shall not think so." In this place God speaks of Salmanasar and Sennacherib, who with evil intent seized the lands of Israel, yet God, without their knowledge, made use of their deeds to punish the Israelites.

19 Thus Isaias, "Thus saith the Lord to my anointed Cyrus, whose right hand I have taken hold of, to subdue nations before his face, and to turn the backs of kings, and to open the doors before him, and the gates shall not be shut. I will go before thee, and will humble the great ones of the earth: I will break in pieces the gates of brass, and will burst the bars of iron. And I will give thee hidden treasures, and the concealed riches of secret places: that thou mayest know that I am the Lord Who call thee by thy name, the God of Israel. For the sake of My servant Jacob, and Israel My elect, I have even called thee by thy name: I have made a likeness of thee, and thou hast not known Me."

20 From this passage it appears that Cyrus had obtained a kingdom for himself through his desire for domination, and not for the sake of God's service; and yet God aided him, and gave him the kingdom he was seeking, that He Himself might liberate the people of Israel from the Babylonian Captivity.

21 Jeremias, "I have given all these lands into the hand of Nabuchodonosor, king of Babylon, My servant; moreover, also the beasts of the field I have given him to serve him. And all nations shall serve him, and his son, and his son's son: till the time come for his land and himself: and many nations and great kings shall serve him. But the nation and the kingdom that will not serve Nabuchodonosor the king Babylon, and whosoever will not bend his neck under the yoke of the king of Babylon: I will visit upon that nation with the sword, and with famine, and with pestilence, saith the Lord." And yet who doubts that Nabuchodonosor subdued so many kingdoms with bad intent?

22 Ezechiel also says, "Nabuchodonosor, king of Babylon, hath made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre. . . . and there hath been no reward given him, or his army for Tyre, for the service that he rendered Me against it." And below, "I have given him the land of Egypt, because he hath labored for Me, saith the Lord God."

23 In like manner the Romans sought empire not for the sake of God, but through a desire for worldly glory, as St. Augustine shows at great length in the City of God. Yet God gave them supreme rule, not only that He might reward them for their good works in the moral order, as St. Augustine likewise shows in the City of God, but also that through the union of all the nations under one government the way might be prepared for the preaching of the Gospel, as St. Leo says in his first sermon for the Feast of Saints Peter and Paul.

24 Add, moreover, that even if at the beginning those who founded kingdoms were usurpers for the most part, yet, by the passing of time, either they or their successors became lawful rulers of these kingdoms, since the people gradually gave their consent. In this way the kingdom of France is now lawful, in the opinion of all, though in the beginning the Franks unjustly occupied Gaul. And the same may be said of the kingdom of Spain, which began with the invasion of the Goths; of the kingdom of England, which began with the unjust occupation of the Anglo-Saxons; and of this very Roman Empire, which was founded by Julius Caesar, the oppressor of his country; which, nevertheless, afterward became lawful to such a degree that Our Lord said, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, etc."

Chapter VII

THE SAME IS PROVED FROM ANTIQUITY

25 The fifth argument is taken from the origin of secular power. For even if servile subjection began after the sin of Adam, nevertheless there would have been political government even while man was in the state of innocence. And this is proved, firstly, because even then man would have been by nature a political and social animal, and hence would have had need of a ruler.

26 Secondly, from creation itself; because for that reason God made woman from man, and did not create many men at the same time, but only one, from whom all others were to be born; so that He might show the order and supremacy which He wished to exist among men, as St. Chrysostom observes. Thirdly, since in that state of innocence there would have been inequality of the sexes, of height, of strength, of wisdom, and of virtue, therefore, both supremacy and subjection; for in human society there should be order. But right order demands that the inferior be ruled over by the superior, the woman by the man, the younger by the older, the less wise by the more wise, the less good by the better; moreover, the fact that these diversities would have existed even then may be shown in this way.

27 In that state there would have been generation, as is clear from "Increase and multiply," therefore there was a difference of sexes, which necessarily precedes generation, and a difference of age, which necessarily follows upon generation, and a difference of wisdom and of virtue, which follows upon difference of age; for men would not have been born perfect in that state, but would have had to learn and to make progress gradually. All, indeed, would have been born in the grace of God, and with greater intellectual power than now, as St. Augustine shows, but without doubt they would not have been as perfect as adults; and among those very adults, by reason of free will, some could have been more, some less, earnest in applying themselves to learning.

28 Finally, variety in natural endowments arises from the variety of bodies; and there would have existed at that time bodies differing in size, in shape, in strength, and the like, as is evident, since those bodies were not exempt from the laws of nature, and had need of food, of air to breathe, and of water. Therefore, even at that period, there would have been diversity of mental powers.

29 Fourthly, there is leadership and obedience among the angels; why, then, would there not have been the same among men in the state of innocence? Certainly Beelzebub is called the prince of devils. He certainly did not acquire his leadership by sinning, but retained that which he had formerly held among those angels who followed him, and it is written, "Michael and his angels." Finally, Dionysius says that the first choir of angels was supreme, and commanded the second, and the second commanded the third; and St. Gregory says that the names of Principalities and Dominations among the angels clearly mean that some were superior to others.

30 From these proofs the fifth argument may be stated thus: The liberty in which we were created does not conflict with political subjection, but with despotic, that is, with true and real slavery; but political subjection differs from servile, because one who is subject as a slave exists and works for another as his end; he who is subject politically exists and works for his own advantage. A slave is governed not in view of what is to his own advantage, but of what is to the advantage of his master; a citizen is governed in view of what is to his own advantage, not of what is to the advantage of the magistrates, just as, on the other hand, a political ruler, while he is governing the people, seeks not his own advantage, but that of the people. But a tyrannous lord seeks his own advantage, not that of the people, as Aristotle teaches. And so, truly, if there is any slavery in political government, he who commands should more rightfully be called a slave than he who is subject, as St. Augustine teaches. And this is the literal meaning of that saying of Our Lord, "He that will be first among you, shall be your servant;" indeed, the bishops call themselves the servants of their people, and the Pope calls himself the servant of the servants of God.

31 In explanation of the first quotation, from Gen. I., I say that there it is a question of despotic rule; for thus should man dominate over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and other living beings of the animal world.

32 In explanation of the second quotation I say that woman was as much the partner and subject of man before original sin as after, his partner in generation, his subject in government. Moreover, that quotation, "Thou shalt be under the power of thy husband," does not signify any and every kind of subjection, but that unwilling subjection in sadness and in fear, such as many married women experience. Thus St. Augustine teaches, "For," says he, "we should not believe that before original sin woman was created only to be dominated over by man, and that she might apply herself to serving him, but this state of service may rightly be held to have meant one of condition rather than of choice."

33 In explanation of the third quotation I admit that Cain was the first who built a material city, but it does not follow from this that political rule began there; for even without a material city there can be a State and government, nor can it be denied that Adam's sons and grandsons were subject to him.

34 In explanation of the fourth quotation I say that St. Augustine is speaking of slavery properly so-called, as is clear from the whole chapter, where, among other things, he says, "The condition of slavery is understood to have been justly imposed on the sinner, etc." Nor is this contrary to what St. Augustine says in the same place, that the first just men were made shepherds of flocks rather than kings of men, so that God might make clear this also, namely, what the natural order of creatures would require on the one hand, and what the deserts of sinners would demand on the other. For in this place he considers the abuse of the name of king, which is sometimes taken to mean despotic government. For St. Augustine says, "A king is called such because he guides and advises, not because he rules and dominates," and in this way Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob could have been called kings; yet, since haughty man thinks that a king should derive his title from rule and domination, for this reason Our Lord says, "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them;" and for the same reason the first just men were called shepherds of flocks rather than kings of men.

35 In explanation of the fifth quotation I say that St. Gregory is not speaking of political power as such, but of secular power accompanied by fear, and sadness, and anxiety, etc., which were brought in by sin. And when he says, "All men are equal by nature, but are made unequal by sin, and therefore one should be ruled over by another," he does not mean that men by nature are equal in wisdom or in grace, but equal in essence and in human form, from which equality he rightly infers that one should not be dominated over by another, as man dominates over the beasts, but only that one should be ruled over politically by another. Hence, in the same place he adds: "For it is against nature to act proudly or to wish to be feared by one's equals; for, truly, by sin sinners are made like to beasts; and they fall from that integrity of nature in which they were created, therefore St. Gregory says in the same place that after the first sin one man rightly began to dominate over another with threats and punishments inspiring terror, which would not have been the case in the state of original justice.

Chapter VIII

RULE OR DOMINION CAN EXIST AMONG WICKED MEN

36 The thesis that we have proposed in the second place, namely, that government can exist among the wicked, can easily be proved. But first there comes up for discussion the error of Amarcanus, who teaches that the chief title of the ruler to his authority is the grace of God, or justice and charity; moreover, all other titles are based upon this, and he who lacks the virtue of justice and the grace of God has no true dominion. At the very same time, John Wyclif taught the same error, which Thomas Waldensius ably refutes, and a little later John Huss brought up the same error, as is clear from Session 15 of the Council of Constance.

37 The arguments of these men were three in number. First, from the Scriptures, "They have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not: of their silver and their gold they have made idols to themselves, that they might perish." Here God condemns the rule of wicked princes and says that He did not grant it to them, and He gives as the reason that they made idols for themselves.

38 Their second argument is from the text, "A kingdom is translated from one people to another, because of injustices."

39 Their third argument is from reason, since, as they say, there is no authority to rule, except from God, but God would by no means confer this authority on wicked men, not only because they are His enemies, but also because He would thus seem to approve abuse of power; for all wicked men abuse power.

40 This error is easily refuted. First, from the Scriptures, "Power is given you by the Lord . . . . and being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly, etc." "Thus saith the Lord to my anointed Cyrus, etc." God says, "I have given all those lands into the hand of Nabuchodonosor, king of Babylon, etc." And "Thou art a king of kings: and the God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom and strength, and power, and glory, etc." And, the Apostles Peter and Paul teach that the authority of rulers is from God and they must be obeyed, and this even though at that time there were none but infidel kings.

41 Secondly, from the Council of Constance, where this error is condemned by the Church.

42 Thirdly,, from St. Augustine, who says, "Since this is the case, let us not attribute the giving of a kingdom and the power to rule except to the true God, who gives happiness in the kingdom of heaven only to the good, but the kingdom of earth both to the good and bad, as is pleasing to Him to Whom nothing unjust is pleasing." And below, "He Who gave dominion to Marius, gave it also to Caesar, He Who gave it to Augustus, gave it also to Nero, He Who gave it to Vespasian, father or son, most benign emperors, gave it also to the most cruel Domitian; and that it may not be necessary to recount every instance, He Who gave it to Constantine the Christian gave it also to Julian the Apostate."

43 In the fourth place, we may refute this argument from reason. For the foundation of secular power is not grace, but nature; for man, since he is made in the image of God, and hence endowed with intellect and the use of reason, dominates, therefore, over the lower orders of creation, as may be concluded from Gen. I. But human nature remains in infidels, though grace is wanting, and therefore they may possess true temporal power.

44 In regard to this, since grace and justice are most secret, and no one is certain, in regard to himself or to another, whether he be truly in the state of grace or not, then, if grace were the only title to power, it would follow that no claim to such power would be certain. From this would arise incredible confusion and disturbance among men. And, in fact, none of their arguments lead to anything.

45 In explanation of the first text I say that by these words wicked kings were not condemned by God, but what is condemned is the fact that the Jews wished to have a king, when their king was God. For, as St. Jerome states, Osee explains the reasons why the people of Israel were given into captivity, and he says that one reason is that they wished to have a king, another, that they made idols for themselves.

46 Moreover, the fact that they sinned gravely in wishing to have a king is evident from 1 Kings, where, after Saul had been raised to the throne, Samuel speaks to the people: "Now then stand, and see this great thing which the Lord will do in your sight. Is it not wheat harvest today? I will call upon the Lord and He will send thunder and rain: and you shall know and shall see that you yourselves have done a great evil in the sight of the Lord, in desiring a king over you."

47 In explanation of the second text, I say that political power is transferred from nation to nation on account of injustice, because God, on account of the sins of kings, often gives the victory to their enemies, but the right to rule is not lost by the mere fact of their having sinned.

48 In explanation of the third text, I say that it befits the mercy of God to do good even to his enemies, as we read in the Gospel, "Who maketh His sun to rise upon the good, and bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust." And He does not therefore approve the abuse. For He does not bestow kingdoms upon wicked men that they may abuse power, but either in order that, attracted by His goodness, they may be converted from their sins, as St. Jerome interprets Isaias, "Thus saith the Lord to my anointed Cyrus, . . . . I will go before thee, and will humble the great ones of the earth: I will break in pieces the gates of brass, and will burst the bars of iron. And I will give thee hidden treasures, and the concealed riches of secret places; that thou mayest know that I am the Lord, etc.," or in order that He may reward some of their good deeds, as St. Augustine teaches, or, finally, because now and then the sins of the people deserved it, as the same St. Augustine teaches, interpreting Job, "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people." But the same St. Augustine says that among infidels there can be no justice, nor laws, nor a true nation, or State, etc., but he calls that true justice and true law which leads to eternal life.